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The past decade saw the proliferation of emissions trading as a mechanism of 
internalising the external costs of pollution.1 Since the European Union (EU) 
launched the world’s largest emissions trading system (ETS) in 2005, the number of 
ETSs in force has risen to 18 by 2017.2 Seventeen ETSs in 14 countries are either 
scheduled to commence or are under consideration.3 With the rise in the number 
of ETSs in regions as diverse as Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific and Latin 
America, linking ETSs has been gaining traction since the early 2000s.4 Linking 
ETSs establishes inter-system trading in emissions rights between the linking-
partner ETSs and allocates emissions abatement to wherever it could be achieved 
1 Emissions trading, permit trading, and cap-and-trade are used interchangeably throughout the 
dissertation. This need not imply that each is a perfect substitute for the other. For instance, cap-
and-trade implies an ex ante fixed cap on the quantity of greenhouse gas emissions that regulated 
entities could emit in a given compliance period, while emissions trading is often employed as 
an umbrella concept covering systems with or without a fixed cap. See E Woerdman, Tradable 
Emissions Rights, in JG Backhaus (ed), The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (Edward Elgar 
2005) 366-368; SE Weishaar, ‘CO2 Emission Allocation Mechanisms, Allocative Efficiency and 
the Environment: A Static and Dynamic Perspective’ (2007) 24 European Journal of Law and 
Economics 29, 36-38. If ‘emissions trading system’ is used to denote a system without a fixed cap, it 
will be explicitly stated.
2 International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP), ‘Emissions Trading Worldwide: International 
Carbon Action Partnership Status Report 2016’ (ICAP 2016) 25. See also A Kossoy and others, State 
and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2015 (World Bank 2015) 40-47.
3 ICAP (n 2) 25.
4 See generally G Gruell and L Taschini, ‘Linking Emission Trading Schemes’ [2012] Economics of 
Energy & Environmental Policy 31.
Chapter 1
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at the least possible abatement cost.5 This dissertation assesses, following a law and 
economics perspective, how linking ETSs with different design features could affect 
cost- and environmental effectiveness of the resulting carbon market.
This introductory Chapter is organised as follows. Sections 1.1 and 1.2 aim to 
provide a background to the remainder of the analysis by describing, respectively, 
alternative instruments of climate change policy and the history of linking. Section 
1.3 introduces the research questions that the dissertation attempts to address. 
Methodological and research design issues are addressed in Section 1.4. Section 
1.5 explains the Law and Economics theoretical framework applied in the research. 
Section 1.6 provides a road map of the dissertation. 
1.1. Pricing carbon
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concludes in its latest 
assessment that anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are ‘extremely 
likely’ to have been ‘the dominant cause’ of the observed warming since the mid-20th 
century.6 Between 1750 and 2011, human activity added 2040 (± 310) Gigatons 
of GHG emissions, about half of which in the last 40 years alone.7 If humanity 
chooses to continue down this emissions trajectory, the consequences are predicted 
to be grave. The mean global temperature will likely increase above 4 degrees Celsius 
above pre-industrial levels by 2100, leading to ‘high to very high risk of severe, 
widespread and irreversible impacts globally’ such as substantial species extinction, 
and global and regional food insecurity.8
5 The emissions rights that allow regulated entities to emit a specified quantity of GHG emissions in 
a given compliance period are variously called ‘tradable permits’, ‘pollution permits’ or ‘emissions 
allowances’. In this dissertation, they are used interchangeably. 
6 Core Writing Team, RK Pachauri and LA Meyer (eds), Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. 
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2015) 4. The IPCC uses different qualifiers to describe the assessed 
likelihood of an outcome or a result. These range from ‘virtually certain’ (99–100% probability) 
to ‘exceptionally unlikely’ (0–1% probability). ‘Extremely likely’ represents 95–100% probability. 
In other words, there is a 95-100% probability that climate change is predominantly caused by 
anthropogenic GHG emissions. For more details on expressions of qualified uncertainty, see MD 
Mastrandrea and others, ‘Guidance Note for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on 
Consistent Treatment of Uncertainties’ (IPCC 2010) <https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/supporting-material/
uncertainty-guidance-note.pdf> accessed 29 December 2016.
7 Core Writing Team, Pachauri and Meyer (n 6) 4.




Economic theory characterises GHG emissions as a negative externality – 
unintended and uncompensated consequences of economic actors’ production 
and consumption decisions.9 Whereas GHG emissions impose a cost on society, 
economic actors do not consider the full cost of their pollution when they decide 
how much to produce or consume, creating a divergence between private net 
benefits and social costs. The result is a market equilibrium that fails to maximise 
social welfare and a level of pollution that is more than optimal. Because it is too 
costly for individual actors to negotiate an optimum level of pollution, short-term 
gains dominate rational actors’ decision-making. Actions that are rational from a 
self-interested perspective lead to overexploitation of the common-pool resource, 
resulting in what Hardin called ‘the tragedy of the commons’.10
However, climate change is, as Stern puts it, ‘an externality with a difference’.11 
First, it is global in both its causes and consequences. Addressing climate change 
thus requires a globally concerted action. Second, because GHGs remain in the 
atmosphere for a significant amount of time, the impact of climate change is 
persistent and develops over time. Third, given its long-term consequences, there 
are considerable uncertainties relating to the timing, size, and types of impacts of 
climate change and the costs of climate change mitigation. Finally, absent timely 
action, climate change will have non-marginal consequences to humanity.
The externality problem can be addressed in one of two ways.12 The government 
can specify ‘command-and-control’ instruments, requiring regulated entities to meet 
absolute emissions reduction targets over a specified period, or imposing technology-
9 RH Frank and BS Bernanke, Principles of Economics (5th edn, McGraw-Hill/Irwin 2013) 280-283.
10 G Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243. See also GD Libecap, ‘State 
Regulation of Open-Access, Common-Pool Resources’ in C Menard and MM Shirley (eds), Handbook 
of New Institutional Economics (Springer 2005).
11 N Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge University Press 2007) 23-
25.
12 Surely, this is an oversimplification of institutional arrangements that could be used to address the 
externality problem. The various institutions that aim to protect a common-pool resource could come 
in different forms including government ownership of the resource, privatisation of the resource, and 
ownership of the resource by a community. See T Dietz and others, ‘The Drama of the Commons’ 
in E Ostrom and others (eds) The Drama of the Commons (National Academies Press 2002) 18. For a 
discussion on instrument choice in climate policy, see C Hepburn, ‘Regulation by Prices, Quantities 
or Both: A Review of Instrument Choice’ (2006) 22 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 226; M 
Faure and SE Weishaar, ‘The Role of Environmental Taxation: Economics and the Law’ in JE Milne 
and MS Anderson (eds), Handbook of Research on Environmental Taxation (Edward Elgar 2012).
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based or performance standards.13 Command-and-control instruments are often 
considered as crude instruments that impose pollution reduction commitments 
with little regard to individual firms’ marginal abatement cost (MAC), which is 
private to the regulated entities.14 A second way is to use market-based instruments 
such as pollution taxes and permit trading systems. These could optimally allocate 
abatement between polluters without requiring detailed information about firms’ 
MAC.15
Arthur Pigou (1877-1959) proposed levying a tax that is ideally equal to the 
social cost of an activity with negative externalities.16 The tax shifts up polluting 
firms’ private marginal cost curve and equalises it with the social marginal cost 
curve, leading to a socially optimum equilibrium. In general, Pigovian taxes are more 
efficient than command-and-control instruments because firms facing a higher 
MAC than the tax will continue to pollute (and pay the tax) while firms with a 
lower MAC than the tax will reduce emissions substantially and avoid paying the 
tax. In equilibrium, the tax equalises MACs of regulated firms, leading to an efficient 
pollution reduction.17
13 See, for instance, A Ogus, ‘Regulatory Institutions and Structures’ (2002) 73 Annals of Public and 
Cooperative Economics 627, 632-633. See also IA Moosa and V Ramiah, The Costs and Benefits of 
Environmental Regulation (Edward Elgar 2014) 12-14.
14 See, for instance, B Ackerman and RB Stewart, ‘Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic 
Case for Market Incentives’ (1988) 13 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 171; A Ogus, 
Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Hart Publishing 2004) 204-205. See also SE Weishaar, 
Towards Auctioning: The Transformation of the European Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System. 
Present and Future Challenges to Competition Law (Kluwer Law International 2009) 32-33.
15 See generally T Tietenberg, ‘Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation’ in DR Helm 
(ed) Economic Policy towards the Environment (Blackwell 1991). As Faure cautions, however, one 
needs to be careful in comparing command-and-control instruments and market-based instruments 
because ‘the superiority of the one or the other is very much dependent upon the specific context, 
type of pollutant regulated, institutional design, etc.’ See M Faure, ‘Effectiveness of Environmental 
Law: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?’ (2012) 36 William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy 
Review 293, 309. See also RW Hahn and RN Stavins, ‘Economic Incentives for Environmental 
Protection: Integrating Theory and Practice’ (1992) 82 The American Economic Review 464. 
For instance, Cole and Grossman showed that command-and-control instruments could be more 
efficient than market-based approaches when, for instance, monitoring costs are very high. See DH 
Cole and PZ Grossman, ‘When is Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and 
the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection’ (1999) 
Wisconsin Law Review 887.
16 A Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (Macmillan and Co. 1932).




A typical cap-and-trade system consists of, at the bare minimum, a cap, an 
allocation system, and tradable emissions allowances.18 The cap determines the 
quantity of GHGs that regulated entities can emit over a compliance period. The cap 
is then rationed among regulated entities through an allocation system. Regulated 
entities are required to surrender an allowance for every unit of GHG emissions 
they have put into the atmosphere over a compliance period. Because allowances 
are transferable, they move toward those users that value them the most. Given 
the scarcity created by the cap, each regulated entity has an incentive to reduce its 
emissions until, at the margin, its cost of abatement equals the market allowance 
price. Since firms’ MAC vary, firms with lower MAC have the incentive to reduce 
more emissions than those with higher MAC. The transferability of emissions 
allowances allows firms with lower MAC to sell ‘spare’ allowances to those with 
higher MAC. In equilibrium, the trade equalises the firms’ MAC, reaching the 
aggregate emissions target at the least possible abatement cost.
In an ideal world, where costs and benefits of abatement are certain, price 
instruments (such as a carbon tax) and quantity instruments (such as a cap-and-
trade system) are equally efficient.19 A permit trading system could be designed to 
deliver an allowance price that is equal to the level of an optimum tax. Similarly, a 
tax could be set in such a way to achieve a given quantity of GHG emissions that is 
equal to the optimum level of the cap under a permit trading system. Under more 
realistic settings, however, neither costs of abatement nor benefits of abatement are 
entirely certain.20
Under conditions of uncertain abatement costs, Weitzman demonstrated that 
the fundamental symmetry between price and quantity instruments breaks down, 
and that each instrument imposes a dead-weight loss on society.21 The magnitude of 
the welfare loss, however, differs from one instrument to the other depending on the 
1988) 42-50; Weishaar, Towards Auctioning (n 14) 30-31.
18 R Perman and others, Natural Resource and Environmental Economics (3rd edn, Pearson 2003) 224-
227.
19 M Weitzman, ‘Prices vs. Quantities’ (1974) 41 Review of Economic Studies 477, 480; Baumol and 
Oates (n 17) 58-60.
20 J Meckling and C Hepburn, ‘Economic Instruments for Climate Change’ in R Falkner (ed), The 
Handbook of Global Climate and Environment Policy (Wiley-Blackwell 2013), 470.
21 Weitzman (n 19) 80-82.
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slope of the MAC curve relative to the marginal benefit of abatement (MB) curve.22 
Price instruments are preferred if the MAC curve slopes steeper than the MB curve, 
and that quantity instruments are favoured if the MAC curve slopes flatter than the 
MB curve.23
A relatively steep MAC curve implies that the cost of reducing an additional 
tonne of GHG emission increases very quickly while the marginal benefits of the 
pollution abatement are reasonably constant. Assuming a relatively steep MAC 
curve, if the regulator wrongly sets a quantity target that is too tight, regulated 
entities face an unreasonably high cost of abatement relative to the benefit of the 
abatement. The regulator could reduce the welfare loss by using price instruments 
because regulated entities will abate and avoid the high pollution tax as long as 
their real abatement cost function lies below the pollution tax. On the other hand, 
a relatively steep MB curve implies the marginal damage caused by an additional 
tonne of GHG emission increases very steeply, relative to the cost of reducing the 
tonne of GHG emission. In such cases, setting a wrong quantity target is less costly 
than setting an incorrect price.
Weitzman’s analysis implies that price instruments are preferred (over quantity 
instruments) to fight climate change.24 As a stock externality, the consequences of 
22 See, generally, Weitzman (n 19); Hepburn, ‘Regulation by Prices, Quantities or Both’ (n 12) 231-233.
23 Price and quantity instruments can usefully be combined to form a hybrid instrument. Hybrid 
instruments could, under some conditions, be more efficient than pure quantity or pure price 
instruments. The classic work in this area is by MJ Roberts and M Spence, ‘Effluent Charges and 
Licenses under Uncertainty’ (1976) 5 Journal of Public Economics 193.
24 The conclusion that price instruments are more efficient than quantity instruments under uncertainty 
assumes away uncertainty concerning marginal benefits of abatement. However, MB of abatement 
are anything but certain, not least because climate change has a very long-time horizon. See WA 
Pizer, ‘Combining Price and Quantity Controls to Mitigate Global Climate Change’ (2002) 85 
Journal of Public Economics 409, 416. If the uncertainties concerning both MB and MAC are 
taken into account in analysing the relative efficiency of price and quantity instruments, a different 
conclusion may emerge. For instance, if the MC and MB curves are positively correlated, quantity 
instruments will be preferred over price instruments. Hepburn, ‘Regulation by Prices, Quantities or 
Both’ (n 12) 232. Also, Weitzman’s primary outcome does not take into account the possibility of 
‘tipping points’ that may take the climate system from one state into another irreversible state. The 
IPCC’s latest assessment confirms that as temperature rises ‘some physical and ecological systems 
are at risk of abrupt and/or irreversible changes.’ Core Writing Team, Pachauri and Meyer (n 6) 72. 
The potential for irreversible damage from GHG emissions lends support for fixing the quantity of 
GHG emissions rather than prices. If the amount of GHG emissions is left uncertain through a price 




climate change depend on the accumulated stock of GHG emissions over time (in 
contradistinction to the flow of GHG emissions over a given period such as a year).25 
The flow of pollutants over a short period is unlikely to make a big difference. The 
marginal benefit of reducing the flow of GHG emissions is relatively small and does 
not increase steeply as GHG emissions come down, suggesting a relatively flat MB 
curve. On the other hand, the costs of GHG abatement may rapidly increase as 
one moves from cheap ‘low hanging fruits’ to more expensive forms of abatement, 
indicating a relatively steep MAC curve.26
Whereas efficiency analysis favours price instruments, efficiency is but one 
consideration in choosing between climate policy instruments. Meckling and 
Hepburn, for instance, discuss other factors that might tip the balance towards 
quantity instruments.27 First, quantity instruments are environmentally effective 
in that they achieve an intended environmental target. Second, they are likely to 
be more durable and flexible than price instruments. Third, quantity instruments 
are likely to be consistent with climate policy instruments of trading partners not 
least because of the proliferation of emissions trading in several jurisdictions in 
the past 15 years, facilitating international cooperation on climate policy. Fourth, 
quantity instruments are better suited to translate international climate change 
commitments, which often put quantity limits on GHG emissions, into national 
policy. Finally, as the proliferation of ETSs in several jurisdictions attest, political-
economy considerations seem to favour quantity instruments.28
The efficiency of (sub)national and regional ETSs could be enhanced by linking 
them to one another, thereby establishing trade in emissions allowances between 
previously isolated ETSs. The next Section takes stock of the linking literature and 
introduces the research questions that this dissertation aims to address.
ex post.
25 RG Newell and WA Pizer, ‘Regulating Stock Externalities under Uncertainty’ (2003) 45 Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 416, 417; Perman and others (n 18) 169-170.
26 Hepburn, ‘Regulation by Prices, Quantities or Both’ (n 12) 231-232.
27 Meckling and Hepburn (20) 471-474.
28 Currently, there are 18 ETSs in force. The number of ETSs is set to increase, with 17 ETSs scheduled 




1.2. Linking ETSs: history of an idea
When two ETSs are bilaterally linked, regulated entities in one ETS are allowed to use, 
directly or indirectly, emissions units from the other system to meet their domestic 
compliance obligations.29 Without linking, the price of emissions allowances in 
different jurisdictions is likely to be different. The price difference reflects a loss 
in efficiency that would have been realised had trade in emissions allowances been 
allowed between regulated entities of the different ETSs. With linking, the carbon 
currencies of the linking-partner ETSs become fungible, allowing inter-system trade 
in emissions rights between the relevant ETSs. The inter-system trade in emissions 
rights reallocates allowances to their highest use. It does this by increasing allowance 
prices in one market and decreasing in the other market until prices fully converge. 
The equalisation of prices (marginal costs of abatement) across the linking-partner 
ETSs achieves the aggregate emissions cap at the least possible abatement cost.30
Linking ETSs also increases market liquidity, minimises price volatility, and 
eliminates competitive distortions that might arise from differences in pre-link 
allowance prices.31 In addition to its economic advantages, linking has been touted 
as a de facto or de jure bottom-up international climate policy architecture that would 
serve as a stepping stone to, a substitute for, or a complement to the climate policy 
architecture of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC).32
The potential that linking ETSs could reduce emissions reduction costs without 
compromising environmental effectiveness created enthusiasm among regional and 
29 E Haites, ‘Harmonization between national and international tradable permit schemes’ (OECD 
2003) 5, CATEP Synthesis Paper <http://www.oecd.org/env/cc/2957623.pdf> accessed 8 November 
2016.
30 Lazarowicz, for instance, estimated that a global trade in emissions rights could reduce emissions 
reduction costs by up to 70 per cent by 2020 compared to a scenario where countries meet their 
emissions reduction targets through domestic abatement alone. M Lazarowicz, Global Carbon 
Trading: A Framework for Reducing Emissions, (TSO 2009) 31-32.
31 RN Stavins and J Jaffe, ‘Linking Tradable Permit Systems for Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Opportunities, 
Implications, and Challenges’ (IETA 2007) Report for International Emissions Trading Association 
<http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IETA_Linking_Report.pdf> accessed 7 December 2015; A 
Tuerk and others, ‘Linking Carbon Markets: Concepts, Case Studies and Pathways’ (2009) 9 Climate 
Policy 341, 344. 
32 J Jaffe, M Ranson and R Stavins, ‘Linking Tradable Permit Systems: A Key Element of Emerging 




(sub)national actors and businesses. For instance, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor 
of the State of California from 2003 to 2011, mandated the State Air Resources Board 
in 2006 to, inter alia, ‘develop a comprehensive market-based compliance program 
with the goal of creating a program that permits trading with the European Union, 
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and other jurisdictions.’33 In 2007 leaders of 
more than 15 governments established the International Carbon Action Partnership 
(ICAP) as ‘an international forum for governments and public authorities’ with the 
objective of, inter alia, facilitating linkages between ETSs.34 Arguably, the European 
Union (EU) has been at the forefront of promoting linkages between ETSs.35 In 
the lead upto the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, the European 
Commission outlined its vision of creating a carbon market encompassing countries 
in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) by 
2015 that could be expanded to include ETSs in emerging economies by 2020.36 
Businesses have actively promoted linking ETSs through the International Emissions 
Trading Association - a business association that counts some of the largest firms in 
finance, power and extractive industry among its members.37
Despite its theoretical appeal, linking ETSs has proven difficult in practice.38 
As of 2017, only two linked carbon markets – California-Quebec and the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) – are in operation.39 Although the EU and 
33 Cal Exec Order No S-20-06, para 5.
34 International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP), ‘About ICAP’ (ICAP 2017) <https://
icapcarbonaction.com/en/partnership/about> accessed 17 May 2017.
35 J Wettestad and T Jevnaker, ‘The EU’s Quest for Linked Carbon Markets: Turbulence and Headwind’ 
in Cherry T, Hovi J and McEvoy D (eds), Toward a New Climate Agreement: Conflict, Resolution 
and Governance (Routledge 2014); MA Mehling, ‘Legal Frameworks for Linking National Emissions 
Trading Systems’ in Carlarne CP, Gray KR and Tarasofsky RG (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press 2016) 258; 
36 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a 
comprehensive climate change agreement in Copenhagen’ COM (2009) 39/3 final, 11.
37 International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), ‘Our Mission’ (IETA 2017) < http://www.ieta.
org/Our-Mission> accessed 17 May 2017. For an excellent analysis of the role of business in the 
rise of emissions trading, see J Meckling, Carbon Coalitions: Business, Climate Politics, and the Rise of 
Emissions Trading (The MIT Press 2011).
38 The obstacles for linking have been the subject of academic inquiry over the past ten years or so. For 
a discussion of barriers to linking, see Section 2.5 in Chapter 2.
39 California Air Resource Board and the Gouvernement du Quebec, ‘The Harmonisation and 
Integration of Cap-and-Trade Programs for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions’ <http://www.arb.
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Switzerland agreed to bilaterally link their ETSs and finalised technical negotiations 
in January 2016, the agreement will not enter into force until the treaty is signed 
and ratified by both sides.40 The European Commission’s ambition to establish an 
OECD-wide market by 2015 never materialised. A 2012 agreement between the 
EU and Australia to link their respective carbon markets as of 2015 fell apart due to 
the abolition of the Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism.
Notwithstanding the limited success in linking ETSs in practice, the idea has 
continued to capture the imaginations of policymakers, the private sector, and 
academics. In the lead up to the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference in Paris, the 
UK’s House of Commons outlined in a report that any future agreement ‘should 
promote the use of carbon markets and facilitate the future linking of emissions 
trading systems’.41 Some of the world’s largest gas and oil companies called upon 
the UN and governments to ‘introduce carbon pricing systems (...) [and] create 
an international framework (…) that could eventually connect national systems.’42 
Bodansky and his colleagues, for instance, outline how a future agreement in 
Paris could facilitate the adoption of and the linking between carbon markets by 
providing a common institutional infrastructure enabling trade in emissions rights 
across borders.43
ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/ca_quebec_linking_agreement_english.pdf> accessed 16 December 
2015. See also B Doda and L Taschini, ‘Carbon Dating: When is it Beneficial to Link ETSs?’ (2016) 
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Paper No. 208 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/publication/carbon-dating-when-is-it-beneficial-to-link-
etss/> accessed 7 November 2016.
40 Linking the Swiss and EU emission trading schemes (Swiss Federal Office for the Environment, 25 
January 2016) <https://www.bafu.admin.ch/bafu/en/home/topics/climate/info-specialists/climate-
policy/emissions-trading/linking-the-swiss-and-eu-emissions-trading-schemes.html> accessed 13 
February 2017.
41 House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee, Linking Emissions Trading Systems (HC 
2014-15, HC 739) 3.
42 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), ‘Six Oil Majors Say: We 
Will Act Faster with Stronger Carbon Pricing: Open Letter to UN and Governments’ (UNFCCC, 
01 June 2015) <http://newsroom.unfccc.int/unfccc-newsroom/major-oil-companies-letter-to-un/> 
accessed 17 May 2017.
43 DM Bodansky and others, ‘Facilitating Linkage of Climate Policies through the Paris Outcome’ 





Two fundamental properties of a cap-and-trade system - cost effectiveness and 
environmental effectiveness - has made it a preferred instrument of climate change 
policy in several jurisdictions.44 Linking ETSs, as explained above, leads to greater 
efficiency without undermining environmental effectiveness.45 This observation 
is, however, based on several assumptions, with roots in a neoclassical economics 
conceptualisation of (carbon) markets. Firstly, it assumes that cap-and-trade systems 
are ‘properly designed’ in the sense that they include features that economic theory 
considers ‘optimal’. Secondly, it (implicitly) assumes that cost effectiveness and 
environmental effectiveness constitute the primary, if not the only, objectives of cap-
and-trade systems. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, it ignores the political 
origins of (carbon) markets.
As Brousseau and Glachant argue, markets are ‘manufactured’ complex 
institutions.46 This characterisation is especially pertinent for ETSs since they are 
constructed in all their dimensions. The basic building blocks of an ETS such as a 
cap and an allocation system have to be actively designed and governed. Importantly, 
the process of constructing carbon markets is an inherently political process 
that involves multiple actors with diverse, if not conflicting, economic and non-
economic interests. As a result, ETSs are inherently imperfect not only because they 
are created by the ‘trembling hands’ of boundedly rational humans, but also because 
they embody political compromises between different political actors with diverse 
interests and preferences.47 Also, it is not a given that each ETS aspires to just achieve 
a predefined emissions reduction target cost effectively.48 Conceptualised as such, 
44 Meckling and Hepburn (n 20) 478-480.
45 Gruell and Taschini (n 45).
46 E Brousseau and JM Glachant, ‘Introduction: Manufacturing Markets – What it Means and Why it 
Matters’ in E Brousseau and JM Glachant (eds), The Manufacturing of Markets: Legal, Political and 
Economic Dynamics (Cambridge University Press 2014). See also SK Vogel, ‘Why Freer Markets Need 
More Rules’ in MK Landy, MA Levin and M Shapiro (eds), Creating Competitive Markets: The Politics 
of Regulatory Reform (Brookings Institution Press 2007).
47 Brousseau and Glachant (n 46) 3-4.
48 For instance, the General Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union decided that the 
‘principal declared objective [of the EU ETS] is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions substantially’ and 
that cost-effectiveness and efficiency are ‘sub-objectives’. See Case T-374/04 Germany v Commission 
[2007] ECR 11-4431, para 124; Case C-127/07 Arcelor [2008] ECR 1-09895, para 31; Case 
T-183107 Poland v Commission [2009] ECR 11-03395, para 81. See also L Squintani, M Holwerda 
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whether an ETS leads to a cost-effective achievement of a given emissions reduction 
target depends on how the relevant ETS is designed. By implication, whether linking 
ETSs leads to greater efficiency than autarky without affecting aggregate emissions 
levels depends on the specific designs of the linking-partner ETSs, requiring a case-
by-case analysis of cap-and-trade systems and linkages between them.49
The need for a case-by-case analysis could be illustrated by examining analysis 
into the implications for linking of different allowance allocation mechanisms. 
Standard economic theory suggests that the cost-effective achievement of an emissions 
reduction target by a cap-and-trade system is independent of the initial distribution 
of emissions allowances. This observation, known as the ‘independence property’ 
of cap-and-trade systems,50 is based on Ronald Coase’s insight in ‘social cost’ that 
if transaction costs are zero or sufficiently low and that property rights are properly 
specified and assigned, the price mechanism drives resources to their highest use 
and that this will be independent of the initial distribution of the property rights.51 
The independence property, to quote Hahn and Stavins, ‘is a key reason that cap-
and-trade systems have been employed and have evolved as the preferred instrument 
in a variety of environmental policy settings’.52 It also led to the characterisation of 
differences in systems of allowance allocation between to-be-linked ETSs as unlikely 
to be significant impediments to linking.53
However, the ‘independence property’ of cap-and-trade systems may not always 
hold true. First, the property is based on a categorisation of allowance allocation 
systems into free allocation and auctioning. While free allocation and auctioning 
and K de Graaf, ‘Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions from EU ETS Installations: What Room is 
Left for the Member States’ in M Peeters, M Stallworthy and JC de Larragán (eds), Climate Law in 
EU Member States: Towards National Legislation for Climate Protection (Edward Elgar 2012).
49 This observation is consistent with Ronald Coase’s insight on the role laws and institutions play in 
affecting efficiency and allocation of resources. See, generally, RH Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ 
(1960) 3 Journal of Law & Economics 1. For an extended treatment of Coase’s contribution towards 
the development of emissions trading, see Section 2.2 in Chapter 2. 
50 See, generally, RW Hahn and RN Stavins, ‘The Effect of Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-Trade 
System Performance’ (2011) 54 Journal of Law and Economics 267.
51 Coase, ‘Social Costs’ (n 49) 8.
52 See, generally, Hahn and Stavins (n 50).
53 See, for instance, MJ Mace and J Anderson, ‘Legal and Design Issues Arising in Linking the EU 
ETS with Existing and Emerging Emissions Trading Schemes’ (2009) 6 Journal for European 




represent two broad categories of distributing the rents created by an ETS, they by 
no means capture the full complexity of allocation rules in different jurisdictions. 
For instance, free allocation of allowances itself has several variants. It could be 
based on historical emissions levels (grandfathering), sector-wide benchmarks and a 
covered entity’s current production levels, or sector-wide benchmarks and historical 
production levels.54 Second, as Coase himself pointed out, the price mechanism 
does not always lead to the most optimal outcome especially when transaction costs 
are positive.55 With positive transaction costs, both efficiency and environmental 
integrity of an ETS (and of linked ETSs) depend on the institutions that determine 
how allowances are allocated in the linking-partner jurisdictions.
In summary, one needs to analyse the specific rules of, say, allowance allocation 
and examine how they affect economic efficiency and environmental integrity before 
concluding a priori that different allocation mechanisms do not affect cost-effectiveness 
and environmental effectiveness of an ETS (and of a linked ETS). This dissertation 
aims at assessing whether and how linking ETSs with different design features affect 
cost-effectiveness and environmental effectiveness of a linked carbon market on a 
case-by-case-basis, not least because of significant design differences between real-
life ETSs.56 Hence, the central question of the research is: How does linking ETSs 
affect cost-effectiveness and environmental effectiveness of linked carbon markets? To 
address the central question, three research questions need to be answered:
1. What are the major design differences between linking-partner ETSs?
2. What are the cost-effectiveness and environmental effectiveness implications 
of linking ETSs with different design features?
3. What do these implications imply for policy towards linking ETSs?
Our research builds on the linking literature that focuses on mapping out 
54 PMR (Partnership for Market Readiness), ‘Carbon Leakage: Theory, Evidence, and Policy’ (World 
Bank 2015) PMR Technical Note 11 <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22785> accessed on 28 August 
2016, 38-39.
55 RH Coase, ‘The Relevance of Transaction Costs in the Economic Analysis of Law’ in F Parisi and CK 
Rowley (eds), The Origins of Law and Economics: Essays by the Founding Fathers (Edward Elgar 2005) 
207-208. See also C Veljanovski, Economic Principles of Law (Cambridge University Press 2007) 52-
53; Hahn and Stavins (n 50) 271-279. 
56 To see the diversity of real-life ETSs, see SE Weishaar, Emissions Trading Design: A Critical Overview 
(Edward Elgar 2014) 66-98.
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barriers to linking ETSs.57 This strand of the linking has examined how and why 
different design features might erect barriers to linking ETSs.58 Owing partly to the 
limited number of ETSs in operation, the early work on barriers to linking focused 
on theoretical design variants and examined how linking ETSs with different 
design variants affect, among other things, environmental integrity and economic 
efficiency of linked carbon markets.59 Some design differences are considered 
‘critical’ for facilitating linking ETSs because of their likely impact on efficiency 
and environmental integrity.60 As a result, differences in such ‘critical’ design 
features are regarded as significant obstacles for linking. These include, for instance, 
offset provisions and cost-containment measures (price floor, price ceiling and the 
like).61 On the other hand, such design differences as the allocation of allowances 
and coverage of sectors are considered not to pose significant obstacles for linking 
either because they do not affect the efficiency and environmental integrity of the 
linked market or their effect on environmental integrity and economic efficiency is 
independent of linking.62
Although similar to the literature on barriers to linking, our analysis relies 
on real-life ETSs rather than theoretical design variants of ETSs. Admittedly, the 
use of prototypical design variants simplifies the complexity of real-life ETSs and 
provides valuable insights into how functionally comparable design features interact 
57 See, for instance, MJ Mace and others, ‘Analysis of Legal and Organisational Issues Arising in Linking 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme to other Existing and Emerging Emissions Trading Schemes’ 
(European Commission 2008). For a concise review of the literature, see MA Mehling, ‘Legal 
Frameworks for Linking National Emissions Trading Systems’ in CP Carlarne, KR Gray and RG 
Tarasofsky (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press 
2016) 261-265.
58 See, for instance, Mace and others, ‘Legal and Organisational Issues Arising in Linking’ (n 57); A 
Roßnage, ‘Evaluating Links between Emissions Trading Schemes: An Analytical Framework’ (2008) 
4 Carbon & Climate Law Review 394; C Flachsland, R Marschinski and O Edenhofer, ‘To Link or 
not to Link: Benefits and Disadvantages of Linking Cap-and-Trade Systems’ (2009) 9 Climate Policy 
358; Mace and Anderson, ‘Legal and Design Issues’ (n 53); Tuerk and others (n 31). 
59 See, for instance, C Fisher, ‘Combining Rate-based and Cap-and-trade Emissions Policies’ (2003) 
Climate Policy 89; R Marschinski, ‘Efficiency of Emissions Trading between Systems with Absolute 
and Intensity Targets’ (2008) Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research <http://edoc.gfz-
potsdam.de/pik/4951> accessed 8 November 2016; Roßnage (n 58) 395; Tuerk and others (n 31). 
60 Roßnage (n 58); Mace and Anderson, ‘Legal and Design Issues’ (n 53) 217-220; Tuerk and others (n 
31) 347-349.
61 Mace and Anderson, ‘Legal and Design Issues’ (n 53) 217-220; Tuerk and others (n 31) 347-349.




and what effects they produce. However, the reliance on prototypical ETSs cannot 
capture, as explained above using the example of allowance allocation systems, the 
full complexity of real-life ETSs.
1.4. Research design
In examining whether and how linking ETSs may affect cost-effectiveness and 
environmental effectiveness, the research employs a qualitative case study research 
design focusing on four issue areas: free allocation systems, offset provisions, market 
stabilisation measures, and policy durability. Systems of allocating allowances free of 
charge are selected because they represent issues that are considered, as described above, 
in the existing literature as unlikely to raise cost-effectiveness and environmental-
effectiveness concerns. In analysing if and how different systems of allocating 
allowances free of charge affect efficiency and environmental effectiveness, we take 
the allocation systems of the EU ETS and the Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism 
(CPM) as case studies.63 Both the EU ETS and the Australian CPM have used the 
allocation of allowances free of charge to sectors exposed to international competition 
as a mechanism of addressing competitiveness and carbon leakage concerns. Despite 
this apparent similarity, each system’s free allocation scheme varies from the other 
along several lines. These broadly similar, yet different, allocation systems provide 
an ideal setting to analyse if and how different free allocation schemes affect the 
economic efficiency and environmental integrity of a linked carbon market.
In comparison to allowance allocation systems, differences in offset provisions 
belong to design features that are considered as significant challenges for linking 
due to their likely impact on environmental integrity and economic efficiency.64 The 
central thesis of this argument is that linking ETSs with different offset provisions 
leads to a ‘back-door’ problem, where more restrictive offset provisions of an ETS 
63 The Australian CPM was abolished in 2014, roughly two years after its launch in 2012. Despite 
this, we have used the Australian CPM as one of our case studies. Since competitiveness and carbon 
leakage concerns are central in carbon pricing in general, the insights from this analysis contributes to 
other ETSs – current and future alike.
64 An offset programme awards credits for emission reductions and removals realised in ‘uncapped’ 
sectors and regions. If accepted by an ETS as alternative instruments of compliance, the offset credits 
are used to ‘offset’ (compensate) for emissions of firms covered under the relevant ETS. See, generally, 
RW Hahn and KR Richards, ‘Environmental Offset Programs: Survey and Synthesis’ (2010) Indiana 
University School of Public & Environmental Affairs Research Paper No. 2010-12-01, 2-4 <https://
ssrn.com/abstract=1721544> accessed 25 May 2017.
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would be circumvented through a linking-partner that enforces less restrictive rules 
on the use of offset credits.65 As we show in Chapter 5, however, linking two cap-
and-trade systems with different offset provisions does not necessarily lead to a worse 
efficiency or environmental integrity outcome than the case in autarky. We show this 
by reviewing the offset provisions of major ETSs and analysing the likely effects of 
the differences in their offset provisions on efficiency and environmental integrity.
Market stabilisation measures and policy durability represent newly emerging 
issues that have thus far received limited attention in the literature on linking ETSs. 
The persistently low allowance prices in the EU ETS has reignited debates about the 
dynamic efficiency of cap-and-trade schemes. Within the context of the EU ETS, 
the debate has largely focused on the causes of the price slump,66 policy options to 
address the problem in the short- and long-run,67 and the efficiency, environmental 
effectiveness, and political feasibility of the various options.68 Despite the potentially 
significant risk that linking poses to market stability by facilitating contagion of 
localised price shocks and consequently eroding political support for domestic 
ETSs,69 studies analysing the linking implications of market stabilisation measures 
are largely absent. 
65 See, for instance, Tuerk and others (31) 346-347; J Jakob-Gallmann, Regulatory Issues in the Carbon 
Market: The Linkage of the Emissions Trading System of Switzerland with the Emissions Trading Scheme 
of the European Union (Schulthess 2011) 140-142; House of Commons Energy and Climate Change 
Committee, Linking Emissions Trading Systems (HC 2014-15, HC 739) 14.
66 For instance, Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A 
policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030’ COM (2014) 15 final; N 
Koch and others, ‘Causes of the EU ETS Price Drop: Recession, CDM, Renewable Policies or a Bit 
of Everything? – New Evidence’ (2014) 73 Energy Policy 676.
67 G Grosjean and others, ‘After Monetary Policy, Climate Policy: Is Delegation the Key to EU ETS 
Reform?’ (2016) 16 Climate Policy 1; C de Perthuis and R Trotignon, ‘Governance of CO2 Markets: 
Lessons from the EU ETS’ (2014) 75 Energy Policy 100.
68 B Knopf and others, ‘The European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS): Ex Post Analysis, the 
Market Stability Reserve and Options for a Comprehensive Reform’ (2014) FEEM Working 
Paper No 79.2014 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2499457> accessed 8 December 2015; SE Weishaar, 
‘Incentivising Technologic Change in Emissions Trading Systems: The Case of Excess Supply’ in L. 
Kreiser and others (eds), Environmental Taxation and Green Fiscal Impact: Theory and Impact (Edward 
Elgar 2014).
69 WJ McKibbin, A Morris and PJ Wilcoxen, ‘Expecting the Unexpected: Macroeconomic Volatility 
and Climate Policy’ (2008) Brookings Global Economy and Development Working Paper No. 28 




Our analysis focuses on the market stabilisation measures of the EU ETS and 
the South Korean ETS (hereafter: Korean ETS). The market stabilisation measures 
of these ETSs are selected because they represent different spectra of the debate on 
market stabilisation measures. The EU ETS’s Market Stability Reserve (MSR) – 
a quantity-based system of scarcity management – manages supply of allowances 
in response to predefined quantity-based triggers.70 The Korean ETS, by contrast, 
included multiple instruments including price-based instruments such as price 
floor and price ceiling and quantity-based instruments such as an allowance reserve 
scheme. These different approaches to addressing a similar challenge provide ideal 
inputs to examine the welfare implications for linked carbon markets of combining 
price-based and quantity-based instruments of market stabilisation.
Finally, the interface between climate policy durability and linking came to 
the fore with New Jersey’s withdrawal from the RGGI and the faltering of the EU-
Australia agreement to link their respective ETSs as of 2015 when Australia decided 
to abolish its CPM in 2014.71 The EU ETS, 11 years old and counting, has thus 
far proved durable despite several challenges since its inception. In contrast, the 
Australian CPM was abolished in just two years after its launch in 2012. We explain 
why the EU ETS has proved durable in the face of several challenges while the 
Australian CPM unravelled quickly. As discussed in Chapter 6, understanding these 
factors has important policy implications for linking ETSs.
1.5. Analytical framework
The research applies a comparative law and economics framework in addressing the 
research questions. Comparative law and economic analysis of law, each constituting 
a distinct discipline, allow ‘a detached outside look at the actual dynamics of the 
law’,72 and can be integrated to complement each other in several ways.73 This Section 
synthesises the analytical framework by combining insights from both comparative 
70 Decision (EU) 2015/1814 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2015 
concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse 
gas emission trading scheme and amending Directive 2003/87/EC [2015] OJ L264/1.
71 See generally WA Pizer and AJ Yates, ‘Terminating Links between Emission Trading Programs’ (2015) 
71 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 142.
72 U Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (The University of Michigan Press 1997) 10.
73 F Faust, ‘Comparative Law and Economic Analysis of Law’ in M Reimann and R Zimmermann 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press 2006) 845-863.
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law and law and economics. After briefly describing comparative law (Section 1.5.1) 
and law and economics (Section 1.5.2) as analytical tools, Section 1.5.3 explains 
how the two could be linked to provide an integrated theoretical framework for 
analysing the efficiency and environmental integrity implications of linking ETSs.
1.5.1. Comparative law
Comparative law is generally concerned with analysing particular institutions, 
problems, laws, and legal systems of the world.74 The comparison aims at discovering, 
explaining and evaluating similarities and differences as well as identifying 
influences between the various laws, institutions, problems or legal systems.75 In this 
endeavour, functionalism serves as the principal method of comparative law.76 This 
method assumes that all societies face mostly similar challenges and that they need 
to devise institutions that meet these challenges.77 These institutions are functionally 
equivalent (similar) in the sense that they ‘fulfil similar functions in different legal 
systems’.78 The presumption of similarity (praesumptio similitudinis) is central to the 
functionalist comparative law thesis. Michaels explains what the presumption of 
similarity does and does not say as follows:
What is presumed to be similar are neither the legal institutions, nor 
the problems to be solved by them and the need for societies to respond 
to them, but the functional relation between problems and solutions: 
if a society has a certain problem a, it must have a legal institution y, 
and different solutions to a are functionally equivalent. This does not 
mean that different solutions to similar problems, the core element of 
74 K Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Tony Weir tr, 3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press 1998); R Michaels, ‘Comparative Law’ in H Basedow and R Zimmermann (eds), 
Oxford Handbook of European Private Law (Oxford University Press 2011).
75 Michaels, ‘Comparative Law’ (n 74).
76 Zweigert and Kötz postulated the methodological monopoly of the functional approach to comparative 
law, maintaining ‘the basic methodological principle of all comparative law is that of functionality’. 
Zweigert and Kötz (n 74) 34. This statement, however, has since proved controversial and so much 
ink has been spilt attacking the methodological monopoly of the functionalism approach. For a 
review and discussion of the controversy, see R Michaels, ‘The Functionalist Method of Comparative 
Law’ in M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford 
University Press 2006).
77 Zweigert and Kötz (n 74).




the functional method, are really ‘similar’ ….79
Functional equivalence is thus similarity in difference. In the context of 
emissions trading, the presumption of similarity can be explained by using the 
systems of distributing allowances in different jurisdictions. Allocation rules decide 
on a myriad of issues including the modes of allocation (for instance, auctioning, 
free allocation or any combination thereof ); if free allocation is opted for, the basis 
for free allocation (for instance, benchmarking, grandfathering or some other rule); 
and the treatment of firms entering or exiting the scheme after it commenced. Some 
jurisdictions may opt for auctioning while others preferring a free allocation system 
based on grandfathering or other criteria such as benchmarking.
The specific rules of allocation differ from one jurisdiction to another. Despite 
the differences, the allocation rules are functionally equivalent in that they fulfil the 
similar function of distributing the scarcity rents created by an ETS and addressing 
concerns such as competitiveness and leakage. In conclusion, functionalism allows 
comparison of institutions in different legal systems while those institutions maintain 
their differences for it ‘neither presumes, nor does it lead to, similarity.’80
1.5.2. Law and Economics
Law and Economics, as an analytical method, refers to the use of the tools and 
methods of economics in examining legal rules and institutions.81 Ronald Coase’s 
contribution on social costs82 and Guido Calabresi’s article on the allocation of risks 
in tort law83 are credited to have started the modern law and economics tradition, 
which applies economic theory to wide-ranging areas of law from family law to 
criminal law to constitutional law that once were considered immune to economic 
analysis.84 Accepting the standard economic assumption that individuals are rational 
79 Michaels, ‘The Functionalist Method’ (n 76) 371.
80 Michaels, ‘The Functionalist Method’ (n 76) 372.
81 JL Coleman, ‘Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophical Aspects of the Economic Approach 
to Law’ (1980) 68 California Law Review 221, 221; L Kornhauser, ‘The Economic Analysis of Law’, 
The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Summer edn, 2015) <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
sum2015/entries/legal-econanalysis/> accessed 22 December 2015.
82 Coase, ‘Social Cost’ (n 49).
83 G Calabresi, ‘Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts’ (1961) 70 Yale Law Journal 
499.
84 For a detailed discussion of the early history of law and economics, see CK Rowley, ‘An Intellectual 
History of Law and Economics: 1739-2003’ in F Parisi and CK Rowley (eds), The Origins of Law and 
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wealth-maximisers, law and economics analyses the role of law as an incentive 
mechanism that changes the relative prices attached to alternative actions.85 There is 
nothing controversial about applying economic theory in studying markets – ETSs 
– that are created with the explicit purpose of economising on transaction costs, 
thereby allocating scarce resources – pollution rights – to those who value them the 
most.
Law and economics has positive and normative variants.86 Positive law 
and economics uses economic theory to explain or predict how rational wealth-
maximising actors respond when subject to a given rule. For instance, Posner’s thesis 
that ‘the common law is best (not perfectly) explained as a system for maximising 
the wealth of society’ is a positive theory aimed at explaining the common law.87 
In contrast, normative law and economics maintains that the legal system ought 
to be organised in such a way that it promotes economic efficiency. Rather than 
using efficiency to explain how a law has evolved over time or to predict how it will 
develop in the future, the normative analysis views efficiency as a normative criterion 
for prescribing how it ought to be organised.88 For instance, Calabresi’s assertion 
that the goal of tort law should be to ‘minimise the sum of the costs of accidents 
and the costs of preventing accidents’89 is grounded in the normative belief that 
legal rules should be designed to promote efficiency. This dissertation follows the 
positivist tradition of using economic theory to explain the welfare effects of legal 
rules and institutions.
Both normative and positive economic analyses of law use economic efficiency, 
albeit to different ends. Economists distinguish between Pareto-efficiency and 
Economics: Essays by the Founding Fathers (Edward Elgar 2005). See also Veljanovski (n 55) 3-9; RA 
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (8th edn, Wolters Kluwer 2011) 29-31.
85 F Parisi, ‘Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and Economics’ (2004) 18 European 
Journal of Law and Economics 259, 262; A Ogus, Costs and Cautionary Tales: Economic Insights for 
the Law (Hart Publishing 2006) 25-31.
86 A third, and relatively new, branch of law and economics concerns functional law and economics 
that ‘cut[s] across the positive and normative distinction … [and] is attentive to the identification of 
political failures in the formation of law, stressing the importance of market-like mechanisms in the 
creation and selection of legal rules’. See Parisi (n 85) 265. 
87 Posner (n 84) 32; A Ogus, ‘What Legal Scholars Can Learn from Law and Economics’ (2004) 79 
Chicago-Kent Law Review 383, 384-385.
88 TJ Miceli, Economics of the Law (Oxford University Press 1997) 3.




Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.90 Pareto-efficiency refers to a state of allocation that it is 
impossible to improve the welfare of an individual without reducing the welfare 
of others. By focusing on ‘the individual and individual choice’, Pareto-optimality 
precludes making interpersonal comparisons of welfare, making it almost unusable 
in the real world.91 On the other hand, a reallocation is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if 
those that are made better off by the reallocation could (hypothetically) compensate 
those that are made worse off and still be better off.92 Because the Pareto-optimality 
criterion leaves no room for an interpersonal comparison of utility, hence very 
restrictive, the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion is often used in policy analysis.93 
Efficiency, in the context it is used in this book, refers to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.
1.5.3. Comparative law and economics: Application to linking
How can functional comparative law and economic analysis of law be integrated? 
Faust suggests two standard avenues for the two disciplines to be linked.94 First, 
economic analysis of law can be used as ancillary to comparative law. In this sense, 
a comparatist could use efficiency as an explanatory device in assessing the benefits 
and costs of different national rules in comparison to each other (a descriptive 
approach);95 or as a ranking criterion of various national rules (a normative exercise).96 
Alternatively, and second, comparative law can be used as ancillary to economic 
analysis of law. Because economic analysis of law studies the efficiency of legal rules 
and institutions, comparative law could provide economic analysis with the objects 
of the study – the legal rules and institutions, bringing ‘economic analysis down from 
the clear, blue skies of economic theory to the varied and complex conditions on 
earth’.97 This research employs the functional comparative law method as ancillary 
90 See, generally, Ogus, Costs and Cautionary Tales (n 68) 27-29; Veljanovski (n 67) 32-33.
91 Veljanovski (n 67) 32.
92 Ogus, Costs and Cautionary Tales (n 85) 27; K Mathis, Efficiency Instead of Justice? Searching for the 
Philosophical Foundations of the Economic Analysis of Law (Deborah Shannon tr, Springer 2009) 38-
39.
93 In Posner’s words, ‘… [w]hen an economist says that free trade or competition or the control of 
pollution or some other policy or state of the world is efficient, nine times out of ten he means 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient’. Posner (n 84) 18.
94 See Faust (n 73) 845-863. 
95 Faust (n 73) 845-847.
96 Faust (n 73) 847-849.
97 Faust (n 73) 852.
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to the economic analysis of linking.
The theoretical framework, combining the analytical methods of comparative 
law and economic analysis of law, is necessitated, first, by the research’s focus on 
real-life ETSs spanning several jurisdictions, and, second, by its aim to analyse 
efficiency implications of linking the ETSs. The efficiency analysis, which is the 
domain of economic analysis of law, hinges on identifying comparable legal rules 
and institutions of the relevant ETSs. The latter is a comparative law exercise, 
requiring identifying legal rules and institutions that cater to roughly similar practical 
challenges in different jurisdictions.98 The legal rules and institutions so identified 
from different jurisdictions serve as inputs in our economic analysis.
An implication of the functional approach to law means that legal rules are 
selected and analysed on the basis of their likely impact on cost-effectiveness and 
environmental effectiveness of linked carbon markets. Our analysis remains at a 
system level, focusing on core design elements of linking-partner ETSs. In doing 
so, we focus on the implications of linking ETSs with different design features for 
economic efficiency and environmental integrity of the linked carbon market. The 
economic efficiency criterion refers to whether a linked carbon market achieves a 
specified emissions reductions target at the lowest possible abatement cost to society.99 
In theory, once an environmental agency specifies a particular level of pollution 
clean-up and assigns tradable pollution permits, regulated entities will bargain their 
way to efficiency. Linking ETSs increases the efficiency of isolated carbon markets 
by expanding market size, increasing market liquidity and diversifying abatement 
options.
The environmental effectiveness/integrity test is less straightforward than the 
economic efficiency criterion. In its most basic sense, it is used to assess whether a 
98 In organising a market for pollution rights, jurisdictions face roughly similar problems. They have to 
decide on a myriad of issues ranging from coverage of the market (in terms of both sectors and GHG 
emissions), the point of regulation (upstream, downstream, or hybrid), the scheme’s cap (absolute 
or relative), mode of allowance allocation (such as free allocation or auctioning), cost-containment 
measures (such as banking, borrowing, offsets and price ceiling), and compliance and penalty. The 
inherently political nature of designing carbon markets and the several compromises that have to be 
struck between actors with differing and conflicting interests and preferences mean that different 
jurisdictions are likely to respond to these practical challenges differently. A cursory look at existing 
ETSs shows the complex emissions trading landscape whereby ETSs vary along several of their design 
features. See, generally, Weishaar, Emissions Trading Design (n 56) 66-98.




climate policy instrument can achieve a predefined level of emissions reduction.100 A 
cap-and-trade system could be considered in this sense as environmentally effective 
because it guarantees that a pre-defined emissions reduction target will be achieved. 
This conclusion, of course, assumes that the cap-and-trade system has a credible 
compliance and enforcement mechanism and a robust monitoring, reporting and 
verification (MRV) regime. A credible compliance and enforcement mechanism 
incentivises regulated entities to hold a sufficient number of pollution permits 
covering their emissions over a given compliance period, while a robust MRV regime 
ensures that GHG emissions over a compliance period are properly accounted. 
Environmental integrity of an ETS might also include the environmental 
integrity of emissions units it accepts for compliance purposes. Especially when offset 
credits are accepted as alternative instruments of compliance, their environmental 
integrity – that they represent real, permanent and additional emissions reductions 
– is crucial to the environmental integrity of an ETS.101 Environmental effectiveness 
has also come to be understood broadly to include a climate policy instrument’s 
effect on carbon leakage.102 Carbon leakage refers to cases when a climate policy, in 
our case emissions trading, induces firms to emigrate to regions with less stringent 
(or without any) climate policy and continue to emit GHGs. Rather than reducing 
GHG emissions, the introduction of an ETS may just displace it to ‘pollution 
havens’.103
The focus on efficiency and environmental integrity need not imply that these 
are the only goals of ETSs or that other objectives are less relevant. Jurisdictions 
may pursue policy objectives that do not squarely fit into the efficiency and 
environmental integrity labels not least because the process of designing carbon 
markets is inherently political and that politics may trump good economics.104 
Ex ante political constraints and ex post implementation hurdles may obstruct the 
100 See Weishaar, Emissions Trading Design (n 56) 40-41.
101 See A Prag, G Briner and C Hood, ‘Making Markets: Unpacking Design and Governance of Carbon 
Market Mechanisms’ (2012) Climate Change Expert Group Paper No. 2012(3), OECD/IEA <http://
dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k43nhks65xs-en> accessed 4 September 2016, 21.
102 See JE Aldy, S Barrett and RN Stavins, ‘Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy 
Architectures’ (2003) 3 Climate Policy 373, 375.
103 A Shoyer, J Sul and C van der Ven, ‘Carbon Leakage and the Migration of Private CO2 Emitters 
to other Jurisdictions’ in CP Carlarne, KR Gray and RG Tarasofsky (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press 2016) 286-287.
104 See Brousseau and Glachant (n 46) 1-9. 
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pursuit of efficiency and environmental integrity. Pursuing other objectives (than 
economic efficiency and environmental integrity), while legitimate, may come, 
however, at the cost of reducing efficiency.105
1.6. Plan of the book
The remainder of the book is structured into six chapters. Chapter 2 presents a review 
of the linking literature and discusses, inter alia, types of linking, the economics of 
linking, barriers to linking and governance aspects of linking.
Chapter 3 deals with issues of carbon leakage and free allocation of allowances 
in relation to linking. It compares leakage prevention measures of the EU ETS and 
the Australian CPM and analyses their linking implications. A central claim of the 
chapter concerns that although both the EU ETS and the Australian CPM follow 
a similar system of addressing leakage and competitiveness concerns, the devil lies 
in the detail. The methods of allocation of allowances to emissions-intensive trade-
exposed industries vary significantly on, for instance, the benchmarks and activity 
levels used to calculate the number of allowances. These differences affect the 
efficiency and environmental effectiveness of linking. They may also create political 
obstacles for linking.
Chapter 4 deals with the linking implications of different market stabilisation 
measures. It takes market stabilisation measures of the EU ETS and the Korean 
ETS as case studies and analyses their linking implications from the perspective 
of economic efficiency, environmental integrity, and domestic policy priorities of 
the respective jurisdictions. While the EU ETS has established a single instrument 
– the Market Stability Reserve – to make the carbon market resilient to demand-
side shocks, the Korean ETS has put together a list of quantity- and price-based 
instruments to address a similar concern. If the two carbon markets are linked, the 
mix of policy instruments may not only undermine the environmental effectiveness 
and economic efficiency of the linked carbon market, some of the instruments 
would unlikely be fit for purpose.
Chapter 5 examines whether differences between the offset provisions of to-be-
linked ETSs impede linking. In the linking literature, differences in offset provisions 
are considered as significant impediments to linking. The claim is that different 
offset rules are problematic because they undermine the environmental integrity 




of the linked carbon market. Chapter 5 reviews the offset rules of major ETSs, 
identifies their differences, and shows that differences in offset provisions do not 
necessarily undermine environmental integrity of a linked carbon market.
Chapter 6 studies the interrelationship between climate policy durability and 
linking. Policy durability is crucial for linking not least because the prospect that 
one of the linking-partner ETSs may not be politically sustainable erodes market 
participants’ trust over the linkage and undermines the economic and political 
advantages of the linking.106 The Chapter takes the EU ETS and the repealed 
Australian CPM as case studies and examines using a three-pronged criteria – 
commitment devices, policy feedback and political polarisation – why the EU ETS 
seems to be politically sustainable while the Australian CPM unravelled.
Chapter 7 draws the major findings of the research and explains the future of 
linking.





lInkIng emIssIons trAdIng systems: A revIew 
of the lIterAture
2.1. Introduction
The insights from international trade theory that there are economic gains from 
trade underpins the economics of linking emissions trading systems (ETSs).107 
Linking ETSs establishes a trade in emissions allowances between previously isolated 
carbon markets. The trading allocates abatement to wherever – within the reaches 
of the linked ETSs – it can be realised at the lowest possible abatement cost. The 
more diverse the marginal abatement cost (MAC) functions of regulated entities, the 
higher the gains (the cost savings) from the trade in emissions rights. In equilibrium, 
the trade in emissions rights equalises firms’ MACs and achieves a predefined 
environmental target in a cost-effective manner.
Linking between ETSs has attracted considerable attention over the past decade 
as a natural next step to the increase in the use of emissions trading in pollution 
control in several jurisdictions across the globe. As early as 2009, the EU set out to 
establish, through linking, an OECD-wide carbon market by 2015 that will expand 
to include advanced developing countries by 2020.108 Jaffe, Ranson and Stavins 
argued that linking ETSs provides ‘the most promising’ alternatives in comparison 
107 JF Green, T Sterner and G Wagner, ‘A Balance of Bottom-up and Top-down Linking Climate Policies’ 
(2014) 4 Nature Climate Change 1064, 1064.
108 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a 
comprehensive climate change agreement in Copenhagen’ COM (2009) 39/3 final, 11.
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to other bottom-up international climate policy architectures whether in promoting 
participation and cost-effectiveness in the short run or in replacing, over the long 
term, the international climate policy architecture under the umbrella of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).109
Despite the theoretical appeal of linking ETSs, it has proven difficult to realise 
in practice. Of the sixteen ETSs currently in force, there are only two bilaterally/
multilaterally linked markets. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) - a 
cap-and-trade scheme covering fossil fuel-fired power plants - emerged in 2009 as 
a multilaterally linked ETS involving nine north-eastern and mid-Atlantic states in 
the US.110 The Californian ETS111 and Quebec ETSs112 have been bilaterally linked 
since 2014.113 The EU and Switzerland have yet to implement a linking agreement 
109 J Jaffe, M Ranson and RN Stavins, ‘Linking Tradable Permit Systems: A Key Element of Emerging 
International Climate Change Policy’ (2009) 36 Ecology Law Quarterly 789; M Ranson and RN 
Stavins, ‘Post-Durban Climate Policy Architecture Based on Linkage of Cap-and-Trade Systems’ 
(2013) 13 The Chicago Journal of International Law 403.
110 The RGGI was conceived in 2005 as concerted effort of nine north-eastern and mid-Atlantic states 
in the US to launch a cap-and-trade scheme. It commenced in 2009 after partner states’ legislative 
houses passed laws and regulations implementing the scheme. See Memorandum of Understanding 
(Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 20 December 2005); Second Amendment to Memorandum of 
Understanding (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 20 April 2007) <https://www.rggi.org/design/
history/mou> accessed 7 November 2016.
111 The California cap-and-trade programme is part of California’s wide-ranging Global Warming 
Solutions Act of 2006 (commonly known as AB 32). AB 32 mandated the California Air Resource 
Board (ARB) to, inter alia, develop a market-based mechanism to achieve the State’s emissions target 
of stabilising emissions at 1990 levels by 2020. The ARB adopted the California Cap on Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions and Market-Based Compliance Mechanisms Regulation that establishes the 
Californian cap-and-trade programme. See Cal Code Regs, tit 17, para 95801 et seq. The Programme 
commenced in 2012 and now covers about 450 entities in electricity, industrial, and fuel distribution 
sectors. See California Air Resource Board, ‘Overview of ARB Emissions Trading Program’ (California 
Environmental Protection Agency 2015) <http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/cap_
trade_overview.pdf > accessed 16 December 2015.
112 The Quebec cap-and-trade system has been up and running since 1 January 2013. During its first 
compliance period (2013-2014), it covered businesses in the industrial and electricity sectors with 
25,000 metric tons or more of CO2 emissions per annum. Since its second compliance period (2015-
2017), the system’s sectoral coverage has expanded to include fossil fuel distributors. See Regulation 
respecting a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emission allowances, Decree No 1297-2011 
<http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=3&file=/Q_2/
Q2R46_1_A.HTM>.
113 California Air Resource Board and the Gouvernement du Quebec, ‘The Harmonisation and 
Integration of Cap-and-Trade Programs for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions’ <http://www.arb.
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agreed in 2016 after five years of negotiation. A 2012 agreement between the EU and 
Australia to link their respective carbon markets as of July 2015 failed to materialise 
due to the abolition in 2014 of the Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM). 
New Zealand and Australia – close allies and trade partners – had planned to link 
their carbon markets as early as 2015.114 However, the Australian CPM rose and fell 
before any linking with the New Zealand ETS could see the light of day.
This Chapter reviews the literature on the linking ETSs. The remainder of the 
Chapter is organised as follows. Since the economic theory underlying linking ETSs 
is tightly linked to the theory of markets for pollution rights, Section 2.2 discusses 
the theory behind emissions trading. Section 2.3 defines linking and describes 
its different forms. Section 2.4 discusses expected benefits and concerns about 
linking ETSs. Section 2.5 examines impediments to linking. Section 2.6 discusses 
governance aspects of linking ETSs. Section 2.7 concludes the Chapter.
2.2. Emissions trading: theory and practice
The intellectual history of emissions trading can be traced back to Coase’s seminal 
contributions on transaction costs and the institutions that humans devise to 
economise on transaction costs.115 In his 1937 article – The Nature of the Firm, Coase 
asked why firms exist in the first place. Coase’s ‘nature of the firm’ was, in essence, an 
attack on the (then) orthodox view that market transactions are costless. If market 
transactions are indeed costless, Coase wanted to know, why some transactions are 
organised within firms rather than markets? In neoclassical economic theory, the firm 
has been seen as a technological construction that transforms inputs into outputs.116 
Coase’s answer, intuitive in hindsight, was that the firm exists because ‘there is a cost 
of using the price mechanism’.117 It is this ‘cost of using the price mechanism’ that 
was later termed as transaction cost, which refers to costs of arranging a contract ex 
ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/ca_quebec_linking_agreement_english.pdf> accessed 16 December 
2015.
114 Thompson Reuters, ‘Australia, New Zealand could link carbon trade schemes in 2015’ Thompson 
Reuters (5 December 2011) <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-newzealand-carbon-
idUSTRE7B40AK20111205> accessed 27 May 2017.
115 TH Tietenberg, Emissions Trading: Principles and Practice (Resources for the Future 2006); A Nentjes 
and E Woerdman, ‘Tradable Permits versus Tradable Credits: A Survey and Analysis’ (2012) 6 
International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics 1.
116 RH Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law (The University of Chicago Press 1988) 5.
117 RH Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4 Economica 386, 390.
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ante and monitoring and enforcing that contract ex post.118
In his 1959 article – The Federal Communications Commission - Coase 
outlined how transaction costs preclude the market mechanism from addressing the 
pollution problem as follows:
[I]f many people are harmed and there are several sources of pollution, 
it is more difficult to reach a satisfactory solution through the 
market. When the transfer of rights has to come about as a result 
of market transactions carried out between large numbers of people 
or organisations acting jointly, the process of negotiation may be so 
difficult and time-consuming as to make such transfers a practical 
impossibility. Even the enforcement of rights through the courts may 
not be easy. It may be costly to discover who it is that is causing the 
trouble. And, when it is not in the interest of any single person or 
organisation to bring suit, the problems involved in arranging joint 
actions represent a further obstacle. As a practical matter, the market 
may become too costly to operate.119
Coase expanded his analysis on the relevance of transaction costs in the economic 
system in his 1960 article on ‘social costs’.120 In ‘social costs’, Coase demonstrated 
that if transaction costs are zero and property rights are properly defined, the law 
has no impact on the efficient allocation of resources. Gains from trade will guide 
bargaining parties to the most efficient outcome.121 The outcome will not only be 
efficient; it will also be independent of the initial assignment of property rights, 
118 Williamson formalised the analysis of transaction costs, arguing that ‘the economic institutions of 
capitalism have the main purpose and effect of economising on transaction costs’. OE Williamson, The 
Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (The Free Press 1985) 17.
119 RH Coase, ‘The Federal Communications Commission’ (1959) 2 Journal of Law & Economics 1, 29 
(emphasis added). As Libecap explains, ‘the “commons” [problem] persists because of transaction costs. 
It is too costly to place boundaries around the resource; it is too costly to secure agreement to limit 
individual actions; and it is too costly to obtain enough information to determine the proper course 
of action to protect the resource.’ See GD Libecap, ‘State Regulation of Open-Access, Common-Pool 
Resources’ in C Menard and MM Shirley (eds), Handbook of New Institutional Economics (Springer 
2005) 546.
120 RH Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law & Economics 1.
121 This insight was later formalised by George Stigler as the ‘Coase Theorem’, which states that ‘under 
perfect competition private and social costs will be equal’. See GJ Stigler, The Theory of Price (3rd edn, 
Macmillan 1966) 113.
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allowing policymakers to disentangle issues of economic efficiency and fairness.122 
The enduring legacy of Coase, however, remains his explication of ‘the fundamental 
role which transaction costs do, and should, play in the fashioning of institutions 
which make up the economic system’.123
In a world of zero transaction costs, ‘institutions which make up the economic 
system have neither substance nor purpose’,124 markets cannot fail, and there is 
no margin for government intervention. Humans devise laws and institutions to 
economise on transaction costs, making possible potentially welfare-enhancing 
transactions that would otherwise be impeded due to transaction costs.125 Because 
transaction costs are almost always positive, laws and institutions become critical 
in affecting efficiency and the allocation of resources.126 Coase reasoned as follows:
If transaction costs were zero (…) people [would contract] … around the 
law whenever the value of production would be increased by a change 
in the legal position. But in a regime of positive transaction costs, such 
contracting would not occur whenever transaction costs were greater 
than the gain that such a redistribution of rights would bring. As a 
consequence the rights which individuals possess will commonly be 
those established by the law, which in these circumstances can be said 
to control the economy.127
Coase’s insight that a properly defined property rights system could lead to an 
internalisation of the social costs of carbon later led the emergence of markets for 
pollution rights.128 Thomas Crocker pointed out the applicability of the property 
122 Coase, ‘Social Cost’ (n 120) 8. See also M Babiker, J Reilly and L Viguier, ‘Is International Emissions 
Trading Always Beneficial?’ 25 The Energy Journal 33. 
123 RH Coase, ‘The Relevance of Transaction Costs in the Economic Analysis of Law’ in F Parisi and CK 
Rowley (eds), The Origins of Law and Economics: Essays by the Founding Fathers (Edward Elgar 2005) 
207.
124 Coase, ‘The Relevance of Transaction Costs’ (n 123) 208.
125 C Veljanovski, Economic Principles of Law (Cambridge University Press 2007) 52-53.
126 Coase, ‘Social Cost’ (n 120). See also RO Zerbe Jr, Economic Efficiency in Law and Economics (Edward 
Elgar 2001) 168-174.
127 RH Coase, ‘Law and Economics at Chicago’ (1993) 36 Journal of Law & Economics 239, 251.
128 Tietenberg, Emissions Trading (n 115) 3-5. For a review of the early history of emissions trading, see 
DH Cole, ‘Origins of Emissions Trading in Theory and Early Practice’ in SE Weishaar (ed), Research 
Handbook on Emissions Trading Systems (Edward Elgar 2016). However, Madema argues that ‘the 
transferable permits system has little in common with the bilateral bargaining discussion emphasised 
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rights system of pollution control for air,129 and John Dales for water.130 In Coasean 
jargon, thus, a cap-and-trade system is an institution (a set of institutions) designed 
to economise on transaction costs. It institutes the ‘missing market’ that is at the 
heart of Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’.131 As a market, it restricts access to the 
atmosphere, rations the access rights which are transferable, and directs resources to 
their highest use.
Dales outlined the basic structure of the market consisting of a cap, a system of 
allocating the pollution rights, and transferable pollution rights as follows:
The government’s decision is, let’s say, that for the next five years no 
more than x equivalent tons of waste per year are to be discharged into 
the waters of region A. Let it therefore issue x pollution rights and 
put them up for sale, simultaneously passing a law that everyone who 
discharges one equivalent ton of waste into the natural water system 
during a year must hold one pollution right throughout the year. (…) 
Firms that found that their actual production was likely to be less than 
their initial estimate of production would have rights to sell, and those 
in the contrary situation would be in the market as buyers. (…) The 
virtues of the market mechanism are that no person, or agency, has to 
set the price—it is set by the competition among buyers and sellers of 
rights.132
Crocker-Dales’ idea of creating a market for pollution rights was first put to the 
test in the United States (US) when Congress established in 1989 a cap-and-trade 
programme to reduce sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions.
133 The SO2 programme 
proved, by and large, successful and inspired successive carbon markets.134 The 
in “The Problem of Social Cost”’. See SG Madema, ‘The Curious Treatment of the Coase Theorem in 
the Environmental Economics Literature: 1960-1979’ (2014) 8 Review of Environmental Economics 
and Policy 39, 43.
129 TD Crocker, ‘The Structuring of Atmospheric Pollution Control Systems’ in H Wolozin (ed), The 
Economics of Air Pollution (Norton 1966).
130 JH Dales, Pollution, Property, and Prices (University of Toronto Press 1968).
131 J Leitzel, Concepts in Law and Economics: A Guide for the Curious (Oxford University Press 2015) 14-
15. See also DR Helm and DW Pearce, ‘Economic Policy towards the Environment: An Overview’ 
in DR Helm (ed) Economic Policy towards the Environment (Blackwell 1991) 8-10.
132 Dales (n 130) 801.
133 Nentjes and Woerdman (n 115) 2.
134 Nentjes and Woerdman (n 115) 7-8. 
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European Union launched in 2005 the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) – 
the largest carbon market in the world. Although the EU ETS remains the biggest 
carbon market, other major ETSs include the Swiss ETS (since 2008), the New 
Zealand ETS (since 2008), the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in north-
east United States (since 2009), the Californian ETS (since 2013), the Quebec ETS 
(since 2012), the Korean ETS (since 2015), and several sub-national pilot ETSs in 
China (since 2015).135
With the increase in the number of ETSs in regions as diverse as Europe, North 
America, and the Asia-Pacific, linking them to one another has been discussed in 
both academic and policy circles since the early 2000s. The subsequent Sections 
focus on the literature on linking ETSs. It starts by defining linking and identifying 
its different types.
2.3. Linking: definition and taxonomy
Two or more ETSs are considered as linked if at least one of them recognises and 
accepts, directly or indirectly, the emissions units issued by the other scheme(s) as 
valid instruments of compliance in its domestic jurisdiction.136 At the core of this 
definition lies an understanding that in autarky each linking-partner jurisdiction 
defines and uses its own distinct emissions units. After linking, the emissions units 
of the linking-partner ETSs become fungible, allowing covered entities in an ETS to 
use the carbon units of the linking-partner ETSs for compliance purposes without 
requiring ‘individual review and approval prior to each transaction.’137
An issue related to the definition of linking concerns how to characterise 
multi-jurisdictional ETSs such as the EU ETS and RGGI. Pohlmann, for instance, 
characterises the EU ETS during Phase I (2005-2007) and Phase II (2008-2012) 
as ‘a system of 30 largely independent, but inter-linked national emissions trading 
135 SE Weishaar, Emissions Trading Design: A Critical Overview (Edward Elgar 2014) 66-98.
136 Haites E, ‘Harmonization between National and International Tradable Permit Schemes’ (OECD 2003) 
5, CATEP Synthesis Paper <http://www.oecd.org/env/cc/2957623.pdf> accessed 8 November 2016; 
RN Stavins and J Jaffe, ‘Linking Tradable Permit Systems for Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Opportunities, 
Implications, and Challenges’ (IETA 2007) Report for International Emissions Trading Association 
<http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IETA_Linking_Report.pdf> accessed 7 December 2015.
137 B Görlach, MA Mehling and E Roberts, ‘Designing Institutions, Structures and Mechanisms to Facilitate the 
Linking of Emissions Trading Schemes’ (German Emissions Trading Authority 2015) 15 (reference omitted).
Chapter 2
34
schemes.’138 Görlach and his colleagues argue, on the other hand, that the EU 
ETS could more appropriately be characterised as ‘a single ETS covering several 
jurisdictions’.139 Pohlmann’s characterisation of the EU ETS as an ‘inter-linked’ 
system is primarily based on the decentralised nature of the ETS during its formative 
phases and the discretion enjoyed by national authorities in making key decisions.140 
By contrast, Görlach and his colleagues characterise the EU ETS as multi-
jurisdictional because Member States ‘have agreed to facilitate cross-border trading 
in one and the same [European Union Allowance]’ and that the use of a uniform 
carbon currency ‘strongly indicates the existence of a single ETS covering several 
jurisdictions.’141 The upshot of this is that the characterisation varies depending on 
the criteria one applies to distinguish a (single and coherent) multinational ETS and 
a system of multilaterally linked ETSs.142
Linking comes in different shapes and forms, each having various economic 
and environmental consequences. A general distinction is made between direct and 
indirect linking.143 A direct linking is established if an ETS accepts the emission units 
of another ETS as valid instruments of compliance.144 A direct linking could either be 
unilateral, bilateral or multilateral depending on the number of participating ETSs 
and direction of the flow of allowances between the linking-partner jurisdictions. In 
138 M Pohlmann, ‘The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme’ in D Freestone and C Streck (eds), 
Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen, and beyond (Oxford University Press 2009) 
343. See also JB Skjærseth and J Wettestad, EU Emissions Trading: Initiation, Decision-Making and 
Implementation (Ashgate 2008) 155.
139 Görlach, Mehling and Roberts (n 137) 16.
140 Although all national regulatory authorities adhered to certain common rules, procedures and 
guidelines, Member States had autonomy over cap setting, allocations of emissions allowances, 
operation of registries, enforcement and determining the quantitative limits to the use of offset 
credits. Pohlmann (n 138) 343-344.
141 Görlach, Mehling and Roberts (n 137) 16.
142 This dissertation, following Görlach and his colleagues´ approach, makes a conceptual distinction 
between a multijurisdictional ETS and a system of linked ETSs based on the emissions units the relevant 
jurisdictions use. The need for linking ETSs arises due to a lack of fungibility between different emissions 
units. If different jurisdictions define and use a uniform carbon currency, the jurisdictions need not enter 
into an agreement for mutually recognising each other’s carbon currencies. In a linked ETS, on the other 
hand, linking-partner jurisdictions must establish mechanisms for mutually recognising each other’s 
emissions units as alternative instruments of compliance in their respective jurisdictions.
143 Jaffe, Ranson and Stavins, ‘Linking Tradable Permit Systems’ (n 109) 795-796; A Tuerk and others, 
‘Linking Carbon Markets: Concepts, Case Studies and Pathways’ (2009) 9 Climate Policy 341, 343.
144 Tuerk and others (n 144) 343.
Linking ETSs: A Review of the Literature
35
2
a direct unilateral linking, an ETS recognises the emission units of another ETS or a 
crediting mechanism such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), but not 
vice versa. The flow of allowance is unidirectional, hence the name unilateral linking. 
Because several ETSs accept some types of credits from the Kyoto’s CDM, there is a 
unilateral link between these ETSs and the CDM.145
A direct bilateral linking involves two ETSs, and each ETS recognises the emission 
units of the other linking partner, resulting in a two-way flow of allowances.146 
The two-way linking between the Californian and Quebec ETSs is an example of 
direct bilateral linking.147 A direct multilateral linking is similar to direct bilateral 
linking except that the former involves more than two ETSs. In contrast to a direct 
link, an indirect linking can be established even if neither of the linking-partner 
ETSs recognises each other’s allowances. If several ETSs are unilaterally linked to 
a common third scheme, an indirect link emerges between them.148 Although this 
does not create a direct linking between the individual ETSs, the ETSs compete for 
the same pool of allowances from the common third scheme and influence each 
other’s allowance prices. For instance, because both the EU and New Zealand ETSs 
accept some types of credits from the CDM, they are indirectly linked to each other 
through the CDM. Similarly, if scheme A is bilaterally linked to scheme B which is 
also bilaterally linked to scheme C, an indirect linking is created between schemes 
A and C.
The form of the linking that ETSs establish determine the economic 
consequences of linking.149 When two ETSs are bilaterally linked, allowance prices 
will rise in one market and fall in the other till prices fully converge, unless they 
are impeded by transaction costs and other trade restrictions. The convergence in 
allowance prices allows regulated entities first to exploit ‘low-hanging fruits’ spread 
across the linking-partner ETSs before utilising more expensive abatement options, 
lowering the overall costs of abatement.150 Indirectly linked ETSs also influence each 
145 Ranson and Stavins, ‘Post-Durban Climate Policy’ (n 109) 407.
146 M Ranson and RN Stavins, ‘Linkage of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Systems: Learning from 
Experience’ (2016) 16 Climate Policy 284.
147 Green, Sterner and Wagner (90) 1064.
148 Stavins and Jaffe, ‘Linking Tradable Permit Systems for Greenhouse Gas Emissions’ (n 136) 13-14.
149 Ranson and Stavins, ‘Post-Durban Climate Policy’ (n 109) 407.
150 Stavins and Jaffe, ‘Linking Tradable Permit Systems for Greenhouse Gas Emissions’ (n 136); C 
Flachsland, R Marschinski and O Edenhofer, ‘To Link or not to Link: Benefits and Disadvantages of 
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other’s prices through a common third scheme, resulting in some convergence in 
their allowance prices.151
2.4. The economics of linking
Linking ETSs brings several economic and political benefits. It is not also without 
disadvantages. This Section reviews the near-term and long-term benefits of linking 
and concerns about linking.
2.4.1. Short-term benefits
The economic intuition behind emissions trading explains the short-run benefits of 
linking ETSs. Standard economic theory holds that a cap-and-trade scheme achieves 
a given emissions target at the lowest possible abatement cost.152 The ‘cap’, coupled 
with a robust monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) system and a credible 
compliance and enforcement system, limits the quantity of regulated greenhouse 
gases that covered entities emit over a period. The ‘trade’ allows the covered entities 
to shift abatement activities to entities with the lowest MAC. In equilibrium, the 
trade in emissions rights equalises regulated entities’ MACs, a sine qua non for a cost-
efficient realisation of an environmental target.
Without linking, allowance prices in one ETS are likely to be different from 
others, reflecting the difference in the costs of abatement that firms face in each 
jurisdiction and the value each jurisdiction attaches to the benefits of pollution 
reduction. The different allowance prices reflect a suboptimal situation in comparison 
to a case where each ETS freely trades in emissions allowances with others.153 Linking 
ETSs connects previously isolated carbon markets and establishes an international 
Linking Cap-and-Trade Systems’ (2009) 9 Climate Policy 358; Tuerk and others (n 144); G Gruell 
and L Taschini, ‘Linking Emission Trading Schemes’ [2012] Economics of Energy & Environmental 
Policy 31; Ranson and Stavins, ‘Post-Durban Climate Policy’ (n 109); Ranson and Stavins, ‘Linkage 
of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Systems’ (n 146).
151 MA Mehling and E Haites, ‘Mechanisms for Linking Emissions Trading Schemes’ (2009) 9 Climate 
Policy 169, 171; R Dellink, S Jamet, J Chateau and R Duval, ‘Towards Global Carbon Pricing: Direct 
and Indirect Linking of Carbon Markets’ (2014) 6 OECD Journal: Economic Studies 209, 211; MA 
Mehling, ‘Legal Frameworks for Linking National Emissions Trading Systems’ in CP Carlarne, KR 
Gray and RG Tarasofsky (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law (Oxford 
University Press 2016) 260-261.
152 Tietenberg, Emissions Trading (n 115); Weishaar, Emissions Trading Design (n 135).
153 Babiker, Reilly and Viguier (n 122) 37.
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trade in emissions allowances. The free trade in emissions allowances will increase 
allowance prices in some markets and decrease others until, in equilibrium, prices 
fully converge.154 The cross-border trade in emissions allowances lowers total costs 
of abatement compared to autarky, benefiting all linking-partner jurisdictions.155 
The higher the divergence in the price of allowances between the linking-partner 
ETSs in autarky, the greater the gains (cost savings) from the inter-system trade in 
emissions rights. In sum, linking ETSs increases the gains from trade by creating 
new opportunities for trade that would otherwise remain untapped.
Although the primary benefit of linking is equalising carbon prices across the 
linking-partner ETSs, it also has other advantages. First, by enlarging carbon markets 
and increasing the number of buyers and sellers of allowances, linking increases 
liquidity and reduces price volatility that might otherwise destabilise individual 
ETSs.156 The liquidity benefit of linking is crucial to small ETSs that inevitably 
face problems of liquidity due to their size. Linking helps regulated entities to 
spread abatement across space and creates a more liquid market (than a pre-linking 
scenario) that is more resilient to price shocks.157
154 Stavins and Jaffe, ‘Linking Tradable Permit Systems for Greenhouse Gas Emissions’ (n 136); 
Flachsland, Marschinski and Edenhofer, ‘To Link or not to Link’ (n 150); Tuerk and others (n 144); 
Gruell and Taschini (n 150); Ranson and Stavins, ‘Post-Durban Climate Policy’ (n 109); Ranson and 
Stavins, ‘Linkage of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Systems’ (n 146).
155 Although linking ETSs brings net benefits, it creates winners and losers in each linking-partner 
jurisdiction. See text to notes 174–175 below. In addition, the conclusion that linking ETSs benefits 
all linking-partner jurisdictions assumes a first-best world in which each linking-partner ETS operates 
in a perfectly competitive economic environment. As a result, emissions trading leads to optimal 
outcomes in both autarky and trade. If we dispense with this assumption, linking ETSs may not 
necessarily benefit all linking-partner ETSs. Babiker, Reilly and Viguier, for instance, show that for 
a linking-partner jurisdiction that becomes net-seller of allowances, the increase in allowance prices 
following linking may reinforce pre-existing distortions from inefficiently high fuel taxes, potentially 
leading to a loss in efficiency that may outweigh the benefits from trade. See generally Babiker, Reilly 
and Viguier (n 122).
156 Stavins and Jaffe, ‘Linking Tradable Permit Systems for Greenhouse Gas Emissions’ (n 136) 18; 
Flachsland, Marschinski and Edenhofer, ‘To Link or not to Link’ (n 150) 361; W Sterk and R 
Schule, ‘Advancing the Climate Regime through Linking Domestic Emissions Trading Systems’ 
(2009) 14 Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 409, 411; Tuerk and others (n 
144) 344.
157 S Fankhauser and C Hepburn, ‘Designing Carbon Markets. Part II: Carbon Markets in Space’ (2010) 
38 Energy Policy 4381. The issue of market stability, regulatory options to address demand-side 
shocks, and their implications for linking are discussed in Chapter 4 below.
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Second, linking addresses issues of competitive distortion and carbon leakage 
that might arise due to different levels of pre-linking carbon prices.158 Any sub-global 
attempt to address climate change (such as through national or regional ETSs) raises 
issues of competitiveness and carbon leakage because carbon-intensive production 
may flee (through industrial relocation, imports, and new investments) to regions 
without, or with less costly, climate policies.159 A country’s climate policy may thus 
encourage firms to shift their emissions to ‘pollution havens’ rather than reduce 
them locally. Central to issues of competitiveness and carbon leakage are different 
carbon prices in different jurisdictions. Linking addresses these by equalising carbon 
prices in the linking-partner jurisdictions, contributing to also addressing equity 
concerns arising from different carbon prices in different jurisdictions.160
The claim that linking between ETSs addresses issues of competitiveness and 
carbon leakage is valid with respect to competitiveness and leakage concerns that 
might arise from differential climate policy landscapes between the linking-partner 
ETSs. Concerning competitiveness and leakage concerns vis-à-vis third- jurisdictions 
– those that are not part of the linking arrangement – linking may reduce or exacerbate 
the problems depending on its impact on pre-linking allowance prices. Leakage from 
a linking-partner jurisdiction to third jurisdictions may increase/decrease if linking 
leads to an increase/decrease in the jurisdiction’s pre-linking allowance prices.161
2.4.2. Long-term benefits
The potential long-term benefits of linking ETSs are arguably more important 
than its short-term efficiency gains. The long-term benefits of linking ETSs are 
both economic and political. Economically, linking ETSs may help improve the 
dynamic efficiency of linking-partner ETSs. Politically, it could create a bottom-up 
158 Stavins and Jaffe, ‘Linking Tradable Permit Systems for Greenhouse Gas Emissions’ (n 136) 18; FG 
Tiche, SE Weishaar and O Couwenberg, ‘Carbon Leakage, Free Allocation and Linking Emissions 
Trading Schemes’ (2014) 8 Carbon and Climate Law Review 97, 101.
159 JW Coleman, ‘Unilateral Climate Regulation’ (2014) 38 Harvard Environmental Law Review 87. 
It is to be noted, however, that the theoretical debate on whether asymmetric climate policies cause 
carbon leakage is not settled. The empirical evidence is also mixed. See text to notes 215–229 below 
in Chapter 3.
160 S Rudolph, A Lerch and T Kawakatsu, ‘Developing the North American Carbon Market: Prospects 
for Sustainable Linking’ (2016) Discussion Paper E-16-009, Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto 
University <http://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/dp/papers/e-16-009.pdf> accessed 7 June 2017, 6.
161 Tiche, Weishaar and Couwenberg, ‘Carbon Leakage’ (n 158) 101.
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and decentralised international climate policy architecture that may complement, 
lead to, or substitute the global climate policy architecture under the umbrella of 
the UNFCCC. Linking ETSs may also contribute towards addressing social justice 
issues associated with climate change. Each of these benefits is discussed below.
A linking between ETSs binds the linking-partner jurisdictions to each other. 
In this sense, linking serves as a commitment device and constrains the ‘free’ 
reign of regulatory authority by individual linking-partner jurisdictions.162 The 
use of linking as an external institutional constraint has two advantages. First, it 
strengthens the political sustainability of the linking-partner ETSs by making policy 
reversal cumbersome and costly. Second, it may increase the dynamic efficiency of 
an ETS by locking in a long-term emissions targets.163 Linking-partner jurisdictions’ 
commitment to each other means that they are less likely to renege on their long-
term emissions reduction targets than in a pre-linking scenario, providing a credible 
signal to private actors and helping to improve the dynamic efficiency of the 
respective jurisdictions’ climate policies. Again, this analysis assumes that linking-
partner jurisdictions will respect the terms of the linking agreement, which may not 
necessarily be true especially when the costs of defection and/or the probability of 
detection are low. Chapter 6 further explore these issues.
Politically, linking ETSs was predicted to play potentially three roles in building 
an international climate alliance.164 First, a web of linking between regional, national 
and sub-national ETSs, coupled with unilateral emissions reduction commitments, 
might give rise to a bottom-up international climate alliance that might serve 
as a backup, albeit imperfect, in case the international climate policy process of 
the UNFCCC fails or drags on too long.165 Second, linking between ETSs could 
encourage countries – by reducing aggregate abatement and compliance costs – 
to adopt more ambitious climate policy targets, hence serving as a stepping stone 
162 S Brunner, C Flachsland and R Marschinski, ‘Credible Commitment in Carbon Policy’ 12 Climate 
Policy 255, 256-257.
163 Flachsland, Marschinski and Edenhofer, ‘To Link or not to Link’ (n 150) 361.
164 C Flachsland, R Marschinski and O Edenhofer, ‘Global Trading versus Linking: Architectures for 
International Emissions Trading’ (2009) 37 Energy Policy 1637, 1645; Jaffe, Ranson and Stavins, 
‘Linking Tradable Permit Systems’ (n 109) 804-806; Ranson and Stavins, ‘Linkage of Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Trading Systems’ (n 146).
165 Flachsland, Marschinski and Edenhofer, ‘Global Trading versus Linking’ (n 164) 1645; Jaffe, Ranson 
and Stavins, ‘Linking Tradable Permit Systems’ (n 109) 804-805.
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towards an ambitious global climate policy.166 Finally, the cost-saving and other 
benefits of linking may prompt policy makers to consider including the existing 
linking in any future broader climate policy architecture.167
Rudolph and his colleagues argue that linking ETSs contributes towards 
addressing some of the social justice issues associated with climate change 
mitigation.168 By reducing aggregate cost of abatement relative to autarky, linking 
ETSs lessens the cost burden of climate change mitigation on current generations, 
contributing towards addressing intergenerational equity issues.169 The cost saving 
from trade in emissions allowances also allows rich countries to spare more cash to 
support climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts of developing countries, 
addressing intra-generational equity issues.170
2.4.3. Concerns about linking
Linking ETSs may not always have desirable consequences. In this Section, we discuss 
four disadvantages associated with linking. The first involves the uneven distribution 
of abatement with its co-benefits.171 Because linking creates opportunities to shift 
abatement to wherever it could be achieved at the least possible cost, the geographical 
distribution of abatement activities might be uneven. With some jurisdictions 
undertaking more abatement than others, co-benefits associated with emissions 
reduction such as increased air quality, increased energy security, and incentives for 
investment and innovation in low-carbon carbon technologies will not be evenly 
distributed over the linking-partner jurisdictions.
Second, the cross-border trade in emissions allowances could create a contagion 
of localised price shocks from one ETS into other linking-partner ETSs.172 Third, 
and related to the issue of regulatory autonomy, linking may undermine domestic 
166 Jaffe, Ranson and Stavins, ‘Linking Tradable Permit Systems’ (n 109) 805-806.
167 Jaffe, Ranson and Stavins, ‘Linking Tradable Permit Systems’ (n 109) 803.
168 Rudolph, Lerch and Kawakatsu (n 160) 6-7.
169 Rudolph, Lerch and Kawakatsu (n 160) 6-7.
170 Rudolph, Lerch and Kawakatsu (n 160) 6-7.
171 Flachsland, Marschinski and Edenhofer, ‘To Link or not to Link’ (n 150) 361-362.
172 WJ McKibbin, A Morris and PJ Wilcoxen, ‘Expecting the Unexpected: Macroeconomic Volatility 
and Climate Policy’ (2008) Brookings Global Economy and Development Working Paper No. 
28 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1324938> accessed 7 December 2015; Flachsland, Marschinski and 
Edenhofer, ‘To Link or not to Link’ (n 150) 361; Tuerk and others (n 144) 344.
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policy priorities of the linking-partner jurisdictions. Not only does it couple a 
jurisdiction’s decarbonisation efforts to an international carbon price that it cannot 
shape unilaterally, but it also limits its flexibility in pursuing local policy objectives 
either by requiring prior approval before certain regulatory measures are implemented 
or by removing certain policy options from the regulatory menu.173 Either way, a 
jurisdiction is likely to enjoy less regulatory flexibility than in autarky.
Fourth, linking ETSs results in intra-system and inter-system redistribution of 
wealth, which may, in turn, undermine the environmental integrity of the linked 
ETSs. That linking ETSs has net benefits does not necessarily imply that the 
distribution of the benefits will be symmetric. Because allowance price convergence 
following linking results from an increase in pre-linking allowance prices in some 
jurisdictions and a decrease in others, linking redistributes wealth from net-buyers 
(net-sellers) to net-sellers (net-buyers) of allowances in jurisdictions where allowance 
prices increase (decrease) because of the linking. Similarly, linking also transfers 
wealth from jurisdictions that are net buyers of allowances to jurisdictions that are 
net sellers of allowances.174 However, as Rehdanz and Tol point out, trade restrictions 
such as import quotas may reduce the incentive to relax a given ETS’s emissions 
reduction targets.175
The concern is that the asymmetric distribution of benefits incentivises 
jurisdictions that expect to become net buyers of allowances after linking to improve 
their terms of trade by inflating/diluting their cap, creating a ‘race to the bottom’.176 
If linking-partner jurisdictions start loosening their ETS caps in anticipation of an 
impending link, they will emit more aggregate GHG emissions post-linking than 
173 K Neuhoff, Climate Policy after Copenhagen: The Role of Carbon Pricing (Cambridge University Press 
2011), 152.
174 Flachsland, Marschinski and Edenhofer, ‘To Link or not to Link’ (n 150) 361-362; Green, Sterner 
and Wagner (n 107) 1066.
175 K Rehdanz and RSJ Tol, ‘Unilateral Regulation of Bilateral Trade in Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Permits’ (2005) 54 Ecological Economics 397. See also Flachsland, Marschinski and Edenhofer, ‘To 
Link or not to Link’ (n 150) 362.
176 C Helm, ‘International Emissions Trading with Endogenous Allowance Choices’ (2003) 87 Journal 
of Public Economics 2737. For a different type of ‘race to the bottom’ phenomenon that may arise 
because of linking-partner jurisdictions monitoring, reporting and verification procedures, see S 
Borghesi and M Montini, ‘Linking Emission Trading Schemes around the World: Critical Analysis 
and Perspectives’ (2016), FESSUD Working Paper Series No 86 <http://fessud.eu/wp-content/
uploads/2015/03/Linking-Emission-Trading-Schemes-around-the-world-critical-analysis-and-
perspectives-working-paper-86.pdf> accessed 1 September 2016, 11.
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would otherwise happen without linking, undermining the environmental integrity 
of the linked carbon market. The race to the bottom may also damage the credibility 
of linking as a free trade ideal.
In reality, linking-partner’s incentive to strategically relax their respective 
cap is likely to be counterbalanced by other factors.177 Relaxing an ETS’s cap for 
short-term economic gains becomes less attractive if a given jurisdiction is bound 
by an international agreement that imposes economy-wide emissions reduction 
commitments. With a binding emissions reduction target, relaxing an ETS’s cap 
shifts the burden of reducing those emissions to the non-ETS sectors, forcing 
the jurisdiction to weigh the benefits of relaxing the ETS cap against the costs of 
achieving the shifted emissions in the non-ETS sectors. Reputational incentives 
might also reduce linking-partner jurisdictions’ incentive to manipulate their 
emissions reduction targets strategically.
2.5. Barriers to linking ETSs
The discussion on linking in the preceding Section mostly ignores the politics of 
market design, and by implication, that of linking. Much of the analysis (implicitly) 
assumes a linking between ‘properly’ designed cap-and-trade schemes with no 
significant design differences. In reality, existing ETSs vary along several of their 
design features, reflecting the diverse interests and preferences of their respective 
jurisdictions. In developing their respective ETSs, jurisdictions may go beyond (or 
even trade off) achieving the two objectives mostly associated with emissions trading 
– environmental effectiveness and cost effectiveness – and aim to realise additional 
goals in other subsystems such as energy and industry policies. When linked, the 
different design features and policy objectives interact, affecting the success of the 
linking in achieving a given emissions reduction target cost effectively. Also, that 
linking-partner jurisdictions may pursue different policy objectives ties linking 
negotiations to not just climate policy but also to other broad policy subsystems, 
rendering linking negotiations daunting.
In the remainder of this Section, we discuss if and how these institutional aspects 
of ETSs impede linking. The discussion is organised into three broad categories. 
Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 discuss, respectively, the implications of design differences 
for the environmental integrity and efficiency and equity/fairness of a linked carbon 
177 See Tuerk and others (n 144).
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market. Section 2.5.3 examines if and how differences in policy priorities between 
the linking-partner jurisdictions might erect barriers for linking.
2.5.1. Environmental integrity and cost effectiveness concerns
A successful linking achieves the aggregate emissions reduction target of the linking-
partner ETSs at the least possible abatement cost, i.e. it is both environmentally 
effective and efficient. If different design differences between the linking-partner 
ETSs undermine either of these, it is likely that they would pose challenges for 
linking.178 Design differences relating to credibility and stringency of enforcement 
systems, offset eligibility requirements, the nature of the emissions targets, and cost-
containment measures are considered to undermine environmental effectiveness 
and/or cost effectiveness, posing the most serious challenges for linking.179
If either of the linking-partner ETSs lacks a stringent enforcement mechanism, 
there is no guarantee that the alleged emissions reductions are indeed realised. This 
is both inefficient and environmentally ineffective. It undermines environmental 
integrity because the alleged emissions reduction might not have been realised. It is 
inefficient because it misrepresents the true level of scarcity of emissions allowances, 
distorting the carbon price signal and resulting in suboptimal investment decisions 
by market participants.180
Differences in offset eligibility requirements are related to a wider issue of 
definition and recognition of emissions units.181 Several jurisdictions impose 
restrictions on the use of offset credits, and the type and stringency of the limitations 
vary across jurisdictions (see Chapter 5 on offsets). If offset credits accepted in one 
ETS are excluded in the linking-partner ETS, covered entities in the former could 
comply with the offset credits and free up corresponding ‘regular’ emissions units 
which they could sell to covered entities of the latter, circumventing the offset 
178 See for instance A Roßnage, ‘Evaluating Links between Emissions Trading Schemes: An Analytical 
Framework’ (2008) 4 Carbon & Climate Law Review 394, 395; MJ Mace and J Anderson, ‘Legal 
and Design Issues Arising in Linking the EU ETS with Existing and Emerging Emissions Trading 
Schemes’ (2009) 6 Journal for European Environmental and Planning Law 197; Tuerk and others (n 
144).
179 Mace and Anderson, ‘Legal and Design Issues’ (n 178) 217-220; Sterk and Schule (n 156) 417; Tuerk 
and others (n 144) 346-349.
180 Mace and Anderson, ‘Legal and Design Issues’ (n 178) 220; Sterk and Schule (n 156) 419; Tuerk and 
others (n 144) 348.
181 See for instance Sterk and Schule (n 156) 416-417.
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eligibility requirements of the latter. Several authors argue that this constitutes 
a serious impediment for linking.182 As discussed in Chapter 5, we doubt this 
conclusion. We argue that different offset eligibility requirements do not necessarily 
lead to a worse environmental integrity situation than in a pre-linking scenario.
Differences concerning the type of the linking-partner ETS’ emissions reduction 
targets may raise environmental effectiveness and cost-effectiveness concerns.183 
With respect to emissions reduction targets of ETSs, a distinction is generally made 
between absolute and relative targets. An absolute emissions target imposes a fixed 
cap on the quantity of greenhouse gases that regulated entities could emit over a 
compliance year. A cap-and-trade system is a good example. An ETS with a relative 
target couples the level of emissions over a period to a unit of output, input, energy 
consumption, or gross domestic product. Unlike an absolute target, a relative target 
accommodates the possibility of an increase in emissions if the corresponding unit 
of measurement also increases.
A linking between a cap-and-trade scheme and another scheme with a relative 
target may undermine both environmental integrity and cost effectiveness. Post-
linking emissions level may exceed emissions level in a pre-linking scenario if, for 
instance, an increase in demand for allowances in the cap-and-trade scheme leads 
covered entities in the system with a relative target to increase their output to a 
level that might not happen without the linking. Also, a relative emissions target 
necessarily requires an ex post adjustment of the number of allowances to account 
for the actual level of, for instance, output in a given period. The ex post correction 
of supply of allowances might create a liquidity shock, with repercussions for the 
interconnected carbon market.184
Finally, cost-containment measures (such as borrowing, price floor, and price 
cap) create another set of challenges for linking.185 The concern with cost containment 
182 See for instance W Blyth and M Bosi, ‘Linking Non-EU Domestic Emissions Trading Schemes with 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme’ (OECD/IEA 2004) 20 <http://www.oecd.org/env/cc/32181382.
pdf> accessed 7 December 2015; Sterk and Schule (n 156); Tuerk and others (n 144) 348.
183 Mace and Anderson, ‘Legal and Design Issues’ (n 178) 219-220; Sterk and Schule (n 156) 417-418; 
Tuerk and others (n 144) 348.
184 J Ellis and D Tirpak, ‘Linking GHG Emission Trading Systems and Markets’ (OECD/IEA 2006) 
<http://www.oecd.org/env/cc/37672298.pdf> accessed 7 December 2015; Sterk and Schule (n 156) 
417; Tuerk and others (n 144) 348.
185 Mace and Anderson, ‘Legal and Design Issues’ (n 178) 218-219; Sterk and Schule (n 156) 419-420.
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measures involves the propagation of one ETS’s cost-containment measures into 
a linking-partner’s ETS. In a linking between an ETS that bans borrowing and 
another that allows borrowing, the borrowing provisions of the latter propagate 
into the former, allowing regulated entities of the former to borrow from future 
compliance periods.186 Similarly, a linking between an ETS with a price floor and a 
price ceiling to an ETS that uses neither results in the latter de facto operating under 
the price floor and price ceiling of the former.
2.5.2. Fairness/equity issues
A linking that is environmentally effective and that brings collective welfare gains 
may not necessarily be fair to all stakeholders in the linking-partner jurisdictions, 
triggering political opposition to linking. Fairness/equity concerns may arise because 
of or independent of linking. The former category includes the intra-system and 
inter-system redistribution of wealth resulting from linking between ETSs. The 
latter category concerns equity/fairness issues arising from design differences relating 
to, for instance, the sectoral coverage and allowance allocation rules of the linking-
partner ETSs.
The level of linking-partners’ emissions reduction targets affects the wealth 
redistribution implications of linking. Because the intersystem trade in allowances 
shifts abatement to wherever it could be achieved at the least possible cost, a 
jurisdiction with a less stringent emissions target and/or a lower MAC – both 
compared to another linking-partner jurisdiction – will receive net wealth transfers 
from the latter. The wealth transfer from one jurisdiction to another might be 
politically difficult to justify to domestic constituencies not least because the co-
benefits of emissions abatement such as increased air quality are also enjoyed by those 
jurisdictions receiving the net wealth transfers. Especially if the linking is between 
ETSs in a developed and developing countries, the size of the wealth transfer is 
likely to be high because abatement costs in developing countries are likely to be 
significantly low.
The intra-system redistribution of wealth is a by-product of the uniform carbon 
price that prevails after linking. Because the post-linking allowance price results from 
an increase in pre-linking allowance prices in one jurisdiction and a decrease in the 
other, linking creates winners and losers in each of the linking-partner jurisdictions. 
186 Tuerk and others (n 144) 348-349.
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In jurisdictions where allowance prices increase, net-sellers of allowances gain and 
net-buyers of allowances and consumers of emissions-intensive products or services 
lose.187 The converse holds true in jurisdictions where linking results in a decrease 
in allowance prices. Interest groups that will be worse off (better off) than in a pre-
linking scenario are likely to lobby against (for) linking. If the interest groups that 
will lose out because of linking wield more political clout than those gaining from 
linking, this may lead to political barriers for linking.
Issues of equity/fairness may also arise independently of linking. These include 
that some sectors are covered in one ETS but excluded from a linking-partner ETS; 
that entities covered under one ETS buy their allowances while entities in a linking-
partner ETS receive them free of charge; or new entrants and closing entities receive 
a more favourable treatment in one ETS than in a linking-partner ETS. Although 
such differential treatments are results of the design choices of the linking-partner 
jurisdictions – as such independent of linking – covered entities in the ETS with a 
less favourable ETS may demand similar treatment on the grounds of fairness.188 As 
Tuerk and his colleagues argue fairness concerns arising from significant differences 
in linking-partner ETS’ emissions reduction targets are likely to constitute one of 
the most critical challenges for linking.189
2.5.3. Issues of shared-sovereignty
When two or more jurisdictions agree to link their respective ETS to one another, 
they will have to outline institutional and governance arrangements that support the 
linked carbon market. At the bare minimum, the linking arrangement must provide 
that the linking-partner jurisdictions recognise each other’s emissions allowances as 
alternative instruments of compliance in their respective jurisdictions.190 Linking-
partner jurisdictions will also have to put in place governance structures to manage 
matters of mutual concern (see the discussion in Section 2.6). These governance 
structures mean that each linking-partner jurisdiction will have to seek the 
acquiescence of the other partners before taking regulatory measures that also affect 
the other linking-partners, creating a form of shared/pooled sovereignty whereby 
187 See, for instance, Rudolph, Lerch and Kawakatsu (n 160) 6.
188 Sterk and Schule (n 156) 417-419; Tuerk and others (n 144) 346-347.
189 Tuerk and others (n 144) 347-348.
190 Görlach, Mehling and Roberts (n 137) 16.
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each jurisdiction cedes a part of its sovereignty over its respective ETS.191
As discussed in Section 2.4.2, the shared-sovereignty is instrumental in enhancing 
the political sustainability of an ETS and increasing its dynamic efficiency. The flip 
side of this, however, is that it creates regulatory inflexibility and ties a jurisdiction’s 
climate policy ambitions to the acquiescence of other linking-partner jurisdictions. 
These policy objectives may relate to incentivising technological development, 
promoting economic growth, generating government revenue from the sale of 
allowances, or supplementarity–that a share of the overall abatement should be 
realised at home.192 Because different jurisdictions are likely to have different policy 
objectives, the relevant question for our discussion is whether differences in policy 
priorities impede linking.
If the policy objectives of the linking-partner jurisdictions are inconsistent, 
pursuing one may require sacrificing (part of ) the other. This can be illustrated 
by taking two linking-partner jurisdictions with different policy priorities. Assume 
that the first jurisdiction prioritises economic growth and the second, technological 
development. The first jurisdiction is likely to contain carbon prices within an 
‘acceptable’ range, while the latter is likely to favour high carbon prices to incentivise 
innovation and investment in low-carbon technologies. Post-linking, realising 
both policy priorities is inherently difficult. The jurisdiction that prefers high and 
predictable carbon prices is thus likely to find a linking with an ETS that dilutes its 
carbon price signal a too-high price to pay for linking.
It is unlikely that the issue of shared-sovereignty raises concerns if the linking-
partner jurisdictions pursue broadly similar policy priorities. However, it is not 
uncommon for jurisdictions’ policy priorities to evolve and change over time. This 
could lead to divergence in the policy priorities of the linking-partner jurisdictions 
over time, creating similar problems as in the static sense and threatening the 
sustainability of the linking. These issues can be addressed through governance 
structures that linking-partner jurisdictions could establish as part of their linking 
agreement. This is discussed in the next Section.
191 R Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final Report (Cambridge University Press 2008) 
228. See also S Borghesi, M Montini and A Barreca, The European Union Emission Trading System and 
Its Followers: Comparative Analysis and Linking Perspectives (Springer 2016) 96. 
192 Roßnage (n 178); Flachsland, Marschinski and Edenhofer, ‘To Link or not to Link’ (n 150); Tuerk 




Even after linking-partner jurisdictions address outstanding issues relating to 
environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, equity and regulatory autonomy, 
there remains the daunting task of implementing the link and putting in place 
institutions and governance arrangements to support the day-to-day functioning 
of the carbon market and to sustain it over time. This Section discusses governance 
structures and institutions that may be required to sustain an environmentally 
credible and economically efficient linked carbon market.
2.6.1. Forms of linking
As explained in Section 2.3, bilaterally linking two ETSs requires each linking-
partner jurisdiction recognising the emissions units of the other as valid instruments 
of compliance.193 Absent recognition of ‘foreign’ emissions units as alternative 
instruments of compliance, no linking is possible. There are different avenues that 
two or more jurisdictions could link their carbon markets and recognise each other’s 
emissions units.194
In a unilateral link, an ETS could establish the link with another carbon 
market by simply including the emissions units of the ‘foreign’ carbon market 
to the catalogue of carbon currencies recognised for compliance purposes.195 
Depending on the constitutional law requirements of the relevant jurisdiction 
and the manner in which the ETS was established, recognising foreign units for 
compliance purposes might require a formal legislative amendment.196 Absent 
such constitutional requirement, the recognition could be realised by adjusting the 
technical rules such as registry regulations.197 While unilateral linking need not 
require the consent of the ‘foreign’ jurisdiction, this may become necessary if the 
foreign jurisdiction does not allow non-residents to maintain accounts to hold and 
transfer emissions allowances.
193 See text to notes 136–142 above.
194 MJ Mace and J Anderson, ‘Transnational Aspects of a Linked Carbon Market’ (2008) 2 Carbon and 
Climate Law Review 190, 193-194; Mehling, ‘Legal Frameworks for Linking’ (n 151) 267. 
195 Görlach, Mehling and Roberts (n 137) 17; Mehling, ‘Legal Frameworks for Linking’ (n 151) 267-
268.
196 Görlach, Mehling and Roberts (n 137) 17.
197 Görlach, Mehling and Roberts (n 137) 17.
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A (bilateral/multilateral) linking between ETSs can be established in either of the 
following ways: (i) the linking-partner jurisdictions specifying in an agreement that 
they recognise each other’s emissions units as alternative instruments of compliance 
in their respective jurisdictions; or (ii) through the mutual reciprocal commitments 
of the linking-partner jurisdictions embedded in their respective domestic laws.198 
The first option envisages a linking agreement that is formal and binding (such as 
a treaty) or informal and non-binding (such as a memorandum of understanding). 
The second option offers the possibility of establishing linking without the need to 
enter into an agreement – formal or otherwise.199 The linking hinges on the political 
commitments of each linking-partner jurisdiction.
The form of the linking arrangement influences linking-partner jurisdictions’ 
calculus for compliance and the flexibility that they enjoy within the arrangement. 
Formal and binding arrangements increase the costs of exit, make ex post reneging 
costly, and increase states’ incentive to make ex ante agreement-specific investments.200 
This makes them more credible than informal and non-binding linking agreements. 
On the other hand, informal and non-binding agreements offer greater flexibility, 
can be entered between parties incapable signing of international treaties, and rarely 
require a legislative endorsement to take effect.
While it is necessary that linking-partner jurisdictions recognise each other’s 
carbon units as instruments of compliance to establish bilateral/ multilateral linking, 
it is not sufficient to sustain a credible link. The need for and the types of governance 
structures are discussed next.
198 MA Mehling, ‘Bridging the Transatlantic Divide: Legal Aspects of a Link between Regional Carbon 
Markets in Europe and the United States’ (2007) 7 Climate Law Reporter 46, 47; Mace and 
Anderson, ‘Transnational Aspects of a Linked Carbon Market’ (n 194) 194; Mace and Anderson, 
‘Legal and Design Issues’ (n 178) 225-231; Mehling and Haites (n 151) 176; Görlach, Mehling and 
Roberts (n 137) 18-19. See also A Prag, G Briner and C Hood, ‘Making Markets: Unpacking Design 
and Governance of Carbon Market Mechanisms’ (OECD/IEA 2012) Climate Change Expert Group 
Paper No. 2012(3) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k43nhks65xs-en> accessed 4 September 2016, 29-
40; C Haug, M Frerk and M Santikarn, ‘Towards a Global Price on Carbon: Pathways for Linking 
Carbon Pricing Instruments’ (Adelphi 2015) 21, Background Report to Inform the G7 Process 
<https://www.adelphi.de/en/publication/towards-global-price-carbon-pathways-linking-carbon-
pricing-instruments> accessed 23 October 2016.
199 Mace and Anderson, ‘Legal and Design Issues’ (n 178) 227-228.
200 Mace and Anderson, ‘Legal and Design Issues’ (n 178) 226; TL Meyer, Power, Exit Costs, and 
Renegotiation in International Law’ (2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal 379, 395-396. 
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2.6.2. Governance institutions and structures
ETSs are dynamic systems. They must adapt to changing circumstances such as a shift 
in political actors’ interests and preferences, new information about climate change 
and abatement options, unforeseen circumstances such as demand-side shocks, and 
international climate change diplomacy. Adaptation often requires changing ‘old’ 
design features or adding new institutional features. In autarky, the effect of these 
changes is likely to be limited to actors within the relevant jurisdiction. With linking, 
however, linking-partner jurisdictions are affected by each other’s policy choices.
Absent institutions and governance structures that go beyond those already 
in place at the domestic level, unilateral policy interventions by linking-partner 
jurisdictions may lead to market fragmentation, compromise environmental 
integrity, and reduce cost-effectiveness.201 Also, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, 
uncoordinated policy responses to similar challenges may fuel market instability.202 
Linking also brings with it governance challenges that may not arise in autarky. 
There is, for instance, a concern that linking might provide an incentive to each 
linking-partner jurisdiction to set a less stringent emissions reduction target than its 
partners to maximise its short-term economic gains, undermining the environmental 
integrity of the linked carbon market and upsetting the bargain that linking-partner 
jurisdictions set at the time of the linking agreement.203
Irrespective of its form, a linking arrangement has to put in place institutions 
and governance structures that, in addition to supporting the day-to-day functioning 
of the linked carbon market, coordinate periodic changes to the linking-partner 
ETSs, manage unforeseen circumstances such as macroeconomic changes, and 
establish procedures accession of new members and exit of existing members.204 The 
governance structures could range from informal regulatory cooperation between 
the linking-partner jurisdictions to establishing an autonomous supranational 
organisation with extensive powers including determining the jurisdictions’ 
emissions reduction pathways, managing allowance supply dynamically, allocating 
201 Mehling and Haites (n 151) 179.
202 See Section 4.4.1 below in Chapter 4..
203 See text to notes 176–177 above. See also Mehling and Haites (n 151) 179.
204 See for instance MA Mehling, ‘Global Carbon Market Institutions: An Assessment of Governance 
Challenges and Functions in the Carbon Market’ (DECC 2009) 14-21, Background Paper prepared 
for the Department of Energy and Climate Change <http://climatestrategies.org/publication/global-
carbon-market-institutions>; Mehling and Haites (n 151); Tuerk and others (n 144) 351-354.
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allowances, and overseeing the overall functioning of the linked carbon markets.205
The informal regulatory cooperation approach, while flexible, is unlikely to 
be adequate to address governance challenges arising from linking. Establishing an 
independent supranational agency also seems politically unrealistic as this requires 
linking-partner jurisdictions to cede sovereignty on almost every aspect of their 
carbon policy. It is likely that governance structures of linking would initially take the 
form of a basic formal agreement specifying, for instance, the mutual recognition of 
emissions units, a common electronic registry, and a combined periodic auctioning 
schedule. As jurisdictions build confidence in each other’s performance over time, 
they may add supranational institutional structures to address common challenges.
2.7. Summary
In summary, the linking literature could be categorised into three generations. The 
first generation theoretically underpinned linking ETSs by outlining the expected 
benefits and costs of linking. A common thread of the early literature is one of 
enthusiasm about linking ETSs as mechanism of driving down costs of abatement, 
reducing price volatility and creating a bottom-up international climate policy 
architecture that could complement or lead to an international climate policy 
architecture under the UNFCCC.
The second generation of the literature sketched prospects and challenges for 
linking ETSs. The analysis in this strand of the literature focused on whether different 
design features of ETSs pose barriers to linking. Whether different design features 
pose barriers to linking was assessed based on the likely effects of prototypical design 
variants of ETSs for economic efficiency, environmental integrity, competitiveness 
and fairness. This strand of the literature underscored that the expected benefits and 
costs of linking ETSs depend crucially on the manner in which the linking-partner 
ETSs are designed.
The third generation of the linking literature has started bringing in real-life 
ETSs into the discussion on barriers to linking ETSs. Although this strand of the 
literature echoes the themes of the second generation, it differs along important 
lines. First, it accounts for subtle design differences that the early literature could not 
205 See for instance Mehling and Haites (n 151); S Goers and B Pfluglmayer, ‘Post-Kyoto Global 
Emissions Trading: Perspectives for Linking National Emissions Trading Schemes with the EU ETS 
in a Bottom-up Approach’ (2012) 3 Low Carbon Economy 69, 78.
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account for. Second, the politics of linking ETSs has featured prominently in the 
analysis. Third, it moved the discussion from analysing prospects and challenges of 
linking to include issues of governing linked ETSs.
In tune with the third generation of the linking literature, the upcoming 
Chapters discuss the welfare effects of linking ETSs by taking real-life ETSs as 
case studies. Our analysis, however, differs in one important aspect: it is positivist 
in nature. It examines if and how the manner in which linking-partner ETSs are 
constructed affect the economic efficiency and environmental integrity of a linked 
carbon market. It leaves out the question of whether concerns relating to economic 
efficiency or environmental integrity identified in our analysis are likely or unlikely 




CArbon leAkAge, free AlloCAtIon And lInkIng206
3.1. Introduction
Where the coverage of an emissions trading system (ETS) is sub-global, covered 
installations face a higher cost of production, ceteris paribus, than similar plants in 
countries without, or with less stringent, emissions constraints. The concern is that, 
in a world of unequal carbon prices, carbon-intensive production may flee to regions 
without costly climate policies.207 Also, if a carbon price induces a shift away from 
fossil fuels, the price of fossil fuels may decrease, prompting an increase in their 
consumption in countries where stringent climate regulations are lacking.208 A sub-
global ETS could thus threaten competitiveness and lead to ‘carbon leakage’, where 
emissions are simply transferred rather than reduced.
The empirical evidence supporting leakage caused by the asymmetric climate 
policy landscape is, at best, mixed.209 Leakage and competitiveness concerns, 
perceived or real, have, however, attracted policymakers’ attention. Of the seventeen 
206 A shorter version of this chapter was published as FG Tiche, SE Weishaar and O Couwenberg, 
‘Carbon Leakage, Free Allocation and Linking Emissions Trading Schemes’ (2014) 8 Carbon and 
Climate Law Review 97.
207 Z Zhang, ‘Competitiveness and Leakage Concerns and Border Carbon Adjustments’ (2012) 6 
International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, 228-229.
208 Zhang (n 207) 228-229.
209 A Dechezleprêtre and M Sato, ‘The Impacts of Environmental Regulations on Competitiveness’ 
(2014) 13, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and Global Green 
Growth Institute Policy Brief <http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/publication/the-impacts-of-
environmental-regulations-on-competitiveness> accessed 8 December 2015.
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ETSs currently in force, all but the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
distribute varying levels of allowances free of charge to regulated entities that are 
deemed to face risks of competitiveness and leakage.210 The system of allocating 
allowances free of charge differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Differences in allocation systems are considered in the linking literature as 
unlikely to hinder linking.211 This is because, first, differences in the rules of allowance 
allocation are independent of linking, and, second, the efficiency and environmental 
effectiveness characteristics of an ETS are separate from the system of distributing 
allowances. The latter claim is in line with Coase’s insight that if property rights 
are properly defined, and that negotiation is costless, bilateral negotiation achieves 
optimal allocation of resources irrespective of the initial allocation of allowances.212 
However, as one moves from a frictionless world to the world where transaction 
costs are positive, institutions that determine the initial distribution of property 
rights will have welfare effects.213 In the world of positive transaction costs, efficient 
allocation of resources depends on how the laws and institutions that underpin the 
market transactions are designed.
This Chapter seeks to explain how, and in what ways, differences in 
competitiveness and leakage safeguards affect linking ETSs by taking the EU ETS 
and the Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM) as case studies. Whereas 
both the EU ETS and the Australian CPM use(d) free allocation of allowances as a 
primary mechanism of addressing competitiveness and leakage concerns, their rules 
of allocation vary along several lines. Some of the differences include the basis for the 
free allocation, the rate of assistance to emissions-intensive trade-exposed (EITE) 
sectors, and the scope of the free allocation.
210 See International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP), ‘Emissions Trading Worldwide: International 
Carbon Action Partnership Status Report 2016’ (ICAP 2016) 29-67.
211 See, for instance, MJ Mace and J Anderson, ‘Legal and Design Issues Arising in Linking the EU 
ETS with Existing and Emerging Emissions Trading Schemes’ (2009) 6 Journal for European 
Environmental and Planning Law 197; A Tuerk and others, ‘Linking Carbon Markets: Concepts, 
Case Studies and Pathways’ (2009) 9 Climate Policy 341, 347.
212 RH Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law & Economics 1, 8.
213 C Veljanovski, Economic Principles of Law (Cambridge University Press 2007) 52-53. See also 
RH Coase, ‘The Relevance of Transaction Costs in the Economic Analysis of Law’ in F Parisi and 
CK Rowley (eds), The Origins of Law and Economics: Essays by the Founding Fathers (Edward Elgar 
2005).
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The Chapter is structured into five Sections. Section 3.2 discusses the economics 
of asymmetric climate policy and explains the context in which competitiveness 
and leakage issues arise. Section 3.3 describes leakage-preventing measures of the 
EU ETS and the Australian CPM. Section 3.4 analyses if and how the respective 
schemes’ leakage-preventing measures affect linking. Section 3.5 outlines the major 
conclusions.
3.2. Competitiveness and carbon leakage concerns
The global climate policy landscape is decidedly asymmetric.214 The uneven climate 
policy landscape entails that firms engaging in carbon-intensive production face 
different emissions constraints in different jurisdictions. The effect of uneven 
environmental policies on firms’ competitiveness have long been debated, with two 
hypotheses – the pollution haven hypothesis and the Porter hypothesis – dominating 
the discussion.215 The pollution havens hypothesis posits that an increase in trade 
liberalisation increases global emissions levels by inducing firms producing emissions-
intensive goods to relocate from the country with tight emissions constraint to the 
country with lax (or no) emissions constraints.216 In autarky, producing emissions-
214 The Paris Agreement instituted legal obligations on both developed and developing countries in 
contributing towards limiting global warming to below 2 degrees Celsius by the turn of the century. 
The near universal coverage of the Agreement, 195 countries and the EU, does not, however, 
level the ‘playing field’. To begin with, the Agreement still incorporates elements of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’. Whereas developed countries are expected to ‘take the lead’ by setting 
absolute economy-wide emissions reduction targets, developing countries are ‘encouraged to move 
over time’ towards absolute economy-wide emissions reduction/limitation targets. Also, the bottom-
up structure of the Agreement, with each country outlining measures it intends to take towards 
achieving the global target, entails that some countries’ emissions reduction commitments are bound 
to be more ambitious than others. While a milestone in the global fight against climate change, the 
Paris Agreement will not eliminate asymmetries from the international climate policy landscape. See 
generally Paris Agreement, opened for signature 22 April 2016 (entered into force 4 November 2016).
215 Dechezleprêtre and Sato (n 209) 6-7. See also M Faure, ‘Does Environmental Law Matter’ in M 
Faure and J Smits (eds), Does Law Matter? On Law and Economic Growth (Intersentia 2011) 395-401.
216 The hypothesis is based on the following assumptions: two jurisdictions that are symmetrical except 
for the level of environmental policy; a free trade in goods; no strategic use of environmental policy; 
and a first best world of no externalities. See MS Taylor, ‘Unbundling the Pollution Haven Hypothesis’ 
(2005) University of Calgary Department of Economics Working Paper 2005-15, 3-6, <https://econ.
ucalgary.ca/sites/econ.ucalgary.ca/files/u58/wp05-15.pdf> accessed 26 November 2016. See also WJ 
Baumol and WE Oates, The Theory of Environmental Policy (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 
1988) 258-266; MS Taylor and BR Copeland, ‘Trade, Growth, and the Environment’ (2004) 4 
Journal of Economic Literature 7.
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intensive goods is relatively expensive in the jurisdiction with tight emissions 
constraints, and relatively cheap in the country with lax (or without) emissions 
restrictions.217 With trade liberalisation firms producing emissions-intensive goods 
relocate to the country with lax emissions constraints, leading to a rise in global 
emissions levels because the most emissions-intensive firms locate in the country 
with the laxest emissions restrictions.218
The contrasting view on the competitiveness effects of uneven environmental 
regulation was put forward by Michael Porter.219 Porter hypothesised that well-
designed environmental policies foster innovation and deployment of cleaner 
technologies that ‘may partially or more than fully offset the costs of complying 
with them.’220 The hypothesis questions the view that firms, as profit-maximising 
entities, will innovate without even an environmental regulation if doing so can 
be profitable. Porter and van der Linde argue that in a world where technological 
opportunities are changing, information is imperfect, and incentives may be split 
due to, for instance, agency problems, environmental regulation plays several roles 
in spurring innovation.221
First, it signals to firms about potential resource inefficiencies and technological 
improvements. Second, regulation focused on information gathering raises corporate 
awareness and can lead to environmental improvement. Third, regulation reduces 
uncertainties about the prospects of environment-friendly investments. Fourth, 
regulation creates pressure that motivates innovation by fostering creative thinking 
and mitigating agency problems. Fifth, regulation provides a buffer until cost-
effective new technologies become available by ensuring that firms play by the same 
rules.
Whether asymmetric environmental policies harm or improve competitiveness 
is, in the end, an empirical question. Neither the pollution haven hypothesis nor 
the Porter hypothesis has significant coherent empirical support.222 Jaffe and others, 
217 Taylor (n 241) 4.
218 Taylor (n 241) 4
219 ME Porter, ‘Towards a Dynamic Theory of Strategy’ (1991) 12 Strategic Management Journal 95; 
ME Porter and C van der Linde, ‘Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness 
Relationship’ (1995) 9 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 97, 98.
220 Porter and van der Linde (n 219) 98.
221 Porter and van der Linde (n 219) 99-100.
222 Faure (n 215) 397-401; Dechezleprêtre and Sato (n 209) 16-17.
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who reviewed the early empirical literature on the pollution haven hypothesis, 
concluded that ‘there is relatively little evidence to support the hypothesis that 
environmental regulations have had a large adverse effect on competitiveness.’223 
Twenty years later, Dechezlepretre and Sato reach a similar conclusion that ‘the 
overall conclusion has changed only slightly … [and that] there is no case to cut 
back environmental regulations for competitiveness reasons.’224 Although there is 
significant evidence suggesting that environmental regulation triggers innovation 
in greener technologies,225 the cost-saving from the innovation is not significant 
enough to fully offset its costs.226
In general, the competitiveness impacts of different emissions constraints could 
be mitigated or aggravated by a host of factors including the carbon-intensity of 
the specific products, affected industries’ ability to pass through the carbon costs 
to consumers and the availability of cost-effective abatement options.227 Intuitively, 
highly emissions-intensive industries face higher carbon costs than less emissions-
intensive industries. Competitiveness and leakage concerns are acute within sectors 
and sub-sectors that shoulder high carbon costs but are unable to pass through these 
223 AB Jaffe and others, ‘Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of US Manufacturing: 
What Does the Evidence Tell Us?’ (1995) 33 Journal of Economic Literature 132, 157. The results 
from the empirical analysis stand in contrast to ex ante leakage estimates that range from five per cent 
to 130 per cent. See S Droege and others, ‘Tackling Leakage in a World of Unequal Carbon Prices’ 
(Climate Strategies 2009) <http://climatestrategies.org/publication/tackling-leakage-in-a-world-of-
unequal-carbon-prices> accessed 8 December 2015. See also S Droege, ‘Using Border Measures to 
Address Carbon Flows’ (2011) 11 Climate Policy 1191.
224 Dechezleprêtre and Sato (n 209) 18.
225 For a review of the relevant literature, see D Popp, RG Newell and AB Jaffe, ‘Energy, the Environment, 
and Technological Change’ in BH Halland and N Rosenberg (eds), Handbook of the Economics 
of Innovation- Vol-II (Academic Press 2010); S Ambec and others, ‘The Porter Hypothesis at 20: 
Can Environmental Regulation Enhance Innovation and Competitiveness?’ (2013) 7 Review of 
Environmental Economics and Policy 2-22.
226 See, for instance, P Lanoie and others, ‘Environmental Policy, Innovation and Performance: New 
Insights on the Porter Hypothesis’ (2011) 20 Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 
803.
227 M Sato and L Mohr, ‘A Small Number of Sectors are Potentially Affected’ in K Neuhoff and F 
Matthes (eds), The role of auctions for emissions trading (Climate Strategies 2008) 25-27; JE Aldy and 
WA Pizer, ‘The Competitiveness Impacts of Climate Change Mitigation Policies’ (2011) 4, NBER 
Working Paper No. 17705 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w17705> accessed on 23 February 2017; 
T Hausotter, S Steuwer and D Tänzler, ‘Competitiveness and Linking of Emission Trading Systems’ 
(German Federal Environment Agency 2011) 8-9, Report No. (UBA-FB) 001447/E <http://www.
uba.de/uba-info-medien-e/4051.html> accessed 8 December 2015.
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costs without losing market share or profits.228 The design of the particular climate 
policy instrument also affects competitiveness and carbon leakage by influencing 
the availability of cost-effective abatement options. In the framework of emissions 
trading, for instance, the smaller the carbon market and the tighter the intertemporal 
flexibility between trading periods, the higher will be the impact of the carbon price 
on competitiveness.229
The limited empirical support for the incidence of carbon leakage 
notwithstanding, competitiveness and leakage concerns continue to be divisive in 
climate policymaking. As a result, domestic climate policies often include one or 
several leakage and competitiveness safeguards. The next Section describes leakage-
preventing measures implemented within the framework of the EU ETS and the 
Australian CPM.
3.3. Leakage safeguards: EU ETS and Australian CPM
Both the EU ETS and the Australian CPM use free allocation of allowances to EITE 
entities as the primary policy measure to address competitiveness and leakage concerns. 
In this Section, we summarise the respective schemes’ systems of free allocation.
228 Firms’ ability to pass on these costs depends, inter alia, on the elasticity of demand, the market 
structure in which they are operating, and their trade exposure. If demand for their products is 
relatively inelastic, companies will have more room to pass through the carbon costs to their 
consumers. On the other hand, where demand is elastic, a slight increase in prices is likely to lead 
to consumers’ switching to cheaper substitutes. Companies facing an elastic demand thus have to 
decide either to pass along the carbon costs and risk losing market share or to shoulder the carbon 
prices and face a reduced profit margin. See F Matthes, ‘What Makes a Sector with Significant Cost 
Increase Subject to Leakage?’ in K Neuhoff and F Matthes (eds), The role of auctions for emissions 
trading (Climate Strategies 2008); Sato and Mohr (n 227) 25-26; Hausotter, Steuwer and Tänzler (n 
227) 29-30. The electricity sector has long been considered as less prone to carbon leakage not only 
because its large physical assets make relocating to other jurisdictions in response to a carbon price 
costly but also because electricity generators are able to pass on the costs of carbon to their consumers. 
However, Weishaar and Madani show why the EU electricity sector is not immune to what they call 
‘electricity carbon leakage’ - carbon leakage from the electricity sector. Their analysis suggests that 
electricity carbon leakage from the EU could happen to adjacent countries – Moldova and Ukraine – 
for a carbon price as low as €13/tCO2. See SE Weishaar and S Madani, ‘Energy Community Treaty 
and the EU Emissions Trading System: Evidence of an Unrecognized Policy Conflict’ (2014) 12 Oil, 
Gas & Energy Law Intelligence 1.
229 S Fankhauser and C Hepburn, ‘Designing Carbon Markets. Part I: Carbon Markets in Time’ (2010) 
38 Energy Policy 4363, 4363–4370; S Fankhauser and C Hepburn, ‘Designing Carbon Markets. Part 
II: Carbon Markets in Space’ (2010) 38 Energy Policy 4381, 4381–4387.
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3.3.1. Allowance allocation in the EU ETS
In the third trading phase of the EU ETS (2013-2020) and beyond, auctioning is 
the default mode of allocation. The electricity sector, except power plants in the 
Eastern European Member States, faces full auctioning as of 2013.230 Non-electricity 
sectors receive varying levels of freely allocated allowances based on Community-
wide harmonised allocation rules.231
The harmonised free allocation rules set out four variables as the basis for the free 
allocation: ex ante benchmarks, a historical activity level, a carbon leakage exposure 
factor, and a cross-sectoral correction factor or linear factor. The benchmarks are, 
to the extent possible, product-specific.232 They reflect the average of the 10 per 
cent most efficient installations in terms of emissions-intensity in the EU in the 
2007/2008 period in particular sectors and sub-sectors.233 The benchmarks are 
multiplied by an installation’s historical activity level to determine the preliminary 
annual number of allowances. The historical activity level reflects the average of 
an installation’s median activity levels over 2005-2008 or 2009-2010, whichever is 
higher.234
Once the preliminary annual number of allowances is calculated, it is then 
adjusted according to the carbon leakage exposure of the relevant installations. The 
carbon leakage exposure factor for the EITE sectors and sub-sectors is set at 1.00 for 
all years of the third trading period. EITE sectors and sub-sectors will thus receive 
all their allowances free of charge provided that they meet the ex ante benchmarks. 
Non-EITE sectors’ leakage exposure factor starts with 0.8 in 2013 and decreases to 
0.3 in 2020.235
230 See Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
scheme of the community [2009] OJ L140/63, arts 10a(1) and 10c (hereafter: Revised Emissions 
Trading Directive).
231 Revised Emissions Trading Directive, art 10a.
232 Revised Emissions Trading Directive, art 10a(1).
233 Revised Emissions Trading Directive, arts 10a(2) & 10a(12).
234 Commission Decision of 27 April 2011 determining transitional Union-wide rules for harmonised 
free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, [2011] OJ 2003 L130/1, art 9(1) (hereafter: Harmonised 
Free Allocation Rules).
235 Revised Emissions Trading Directive, art 10a(11); Harmonised Free Allocation Rules, annex VI.
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The preliminary annual number of allowances may also be adjusted by a cross-
sectoral correction factor to ensure that the freely allocated allowances do not 
exceed the maximum amount of free allocation specified by art 10a(5) of the ETS 
Directive.236 Also, the number of allowances allocated – for free or via auctions 
– declines at a reduction factor of 1.74 per cent per annum corresponding to the 
overall emissions reduction target.237
New entrants into EITE sectors get the same level of free allocation as existing 
firms. A new-entrant reserve is set up corresponding to 5 per cent of the annual 
community-wide free allocation.238 Plant closure results in no allocations as of the 
year following the cessation of operations. Unlike the previous phases, the transfer 
of allowances from a closing facility to a new replacement facility is not allowed as 
of 2013.239
3.3.2. Allowance allocation in the Australian CPM
The Australian CPM covered approximately 400 of Australia’s biggest emitters. 
It commenced in July 2012 as a fixed-price scheme and, after three years, it will 
236 In September 2013, the Commission announced, as required by art 15(3) of the Harmonised Free 
Allocation Rules, the cross-sectoral correction factors applicable for phase III (2013-2020) of the EU 
ETS. The Commission uniformly applies the cross-sectoral correction factors and reduces the number 
of freely allocated allowances if Member States’ provisional free allocation of allowances exceeds the 
maximum amount specified by art 10a(5) of the ETS Directive. A number of firms in Austria, Italy, 
and the Netherlands challenged the validity of their respective national authorities’ provisional free 
allocations for Phase III and, indirectly, the Commission’s cross-sectoral correction factors, which 
determines the maximum number of allowances that could be allocated during this period. The Court 
of Justice of the European Union, to which the cases were referred by national courts for preliminary 
ruling, found the cross-sectoral correction factors set by the Commission in 2013 as invalid. As a 
result, the Commission issued a new Decision on 24 January 2017 outlining modified cross-sectoral 
correction factors. See Revised Emissions Trading Directive, art 10a(5); Harmonised Free Allocation 
Rules, art 15(3); Commission Decision (EU) 2017/126 of 24 January 2017 amending Decision 
2013/448/EU as regards the establishment of a uniform cross-sectoral correction factor in accordance 
with Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, [2017] OJ 
L 19/94, art 1 and annex; Joined Cases C-191/14 , C-192/14, C-295/14, C-389/14 and C-391/14 
to C-393/14 Borealis Polyolefine GmbH and Others v Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, 
Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft and Others [2016] OJ C 243/6.
237 Revised Emissions Trading Directive, art 9.
238 Revised Emissions Trading Directive, art 10a (7).
239 DA Ellerman, F Convery and C de Perthuis, Pricing Carbon: The European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (Cambridge University Press 2010) 78.
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transition to flexible prices.240 Australia sells the majority of allowances initially at 
a fixed price and afterwards via auctions. EITE industries receive freely allocated 
allowances through a Jobs and Competitiveness Program (JCP).241
The free allocation is based on three factors: an assistance rate for a given year, the 
output level for that year, and the baselines for the relevant activity.242 The assistance 
rate varies according to the emissions intensity of a particular activity. The higher 
an industries’ emissions intensity, the more the number of free allowances it receives 
in absolute terms. In 2012/13 allocation year, the assistance rate was 94.5 per cent 
for highly emissions intensive activities and 66 per cent for moderately emissions 
intensive activities.243 The rate declines at 1.3 per cent per annum.244
The second factor is industries’ actual production levels in a given allocation 
year. This element contrasts with the EU ETS’ free allocation system that takes into 
account installations’ historical output. In the Australian CPM, the allocation of 
allowances was made early in each compliance period based on an entity’s previous 
financial year production levels. The allocation is then adjusted in the subsequent 
compliance year for any over- or under-allocation to account for actual production.245 
The level of free allocation thus increases with an increase in EITE entities’ output, 
and vice versa. Also, unlike the EU ETS, the level of free allocation is not capped.246
The third factor concerns the emissions baselines for the relevant activity. Separate 
baselines are set for every activity’s (a) direct emissions intensity, (b) electricity use and 
(c) natural gas feedstock use in undertaking a relevant activity. The baselines are based on 
industry weighted average emissions, electricity usage, and natural gas feedstock usage 
assessed during the baseline period of 2006/07 and 2007/08.247 The baselines thus ensure 
that EITE industries are compensated for both their direct and indirect emissions.
240 L Caripis and others, ‘Australia’s carbon pricing mechanism’ (2011) 2 Climate Law 583, 585.
241 Clean Energy Amendment Regulation 2012 (No 1) 2012 (Cth) (hereafter: Clean Energy Amendment 
Regulation). See also Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy Future: The Australian 
Government’s Climate Change Plan (Australian Government 2011) 53-56.
242 Clean Energy Amendment Regulation, cls 906-907; Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean 
Energy Future (n 241) 104-115.
243 Clean Energy Amendment Regulation, cl 907.
244 See Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth), ch 5.18 (hereafter: Explanatory 
Memorandum).
245 Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy Future (n 241) 114.
246 Explanatory Memorandum, ch 5.23; See also Revised Emissions Trading Directive, art 10a(5).
247 Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy Future (n 241) 77.
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New entrants into EITE activities receive the same level of assistance as 
incumbents except that allocation to new entrants is capped. If a plant that received 
allowances free of charge closed down, it would be required to return the carbon 
units for the production that did not occur in the respective financial year.248
3.4. Leakage, free allocation and linking
At the heart of the issues of competitiveness and leakage is the lack of a uniform carbon 
price across the globe. Could linking, by equalising carbon prices across the linking-
partner jurisdictions, eliminate the need for implementing measures addressing 
leakage and competitiveness concerns? If the unilateral leakage-preventing measures 
are maintained, how do they affect linking? Both questions are addressed below.
3.4.1. Leakage and linking
Bilateral or multilateral linking could resolve competitiveness and leakage issues 
between the linking-partner jurisdictions by equalising carbon prices across the 
linking-partner jurisdictions and ensuring that firms across the interconnected 
market face a uniform carbon price.249 This could avoid the problems arising from 
the interaction of different leakage-preventing measures in the linking-partner 
jurisdictions.
Leakage to third jurisdictions could, however, increase or decrease depending 
on, all else equal, whether allowance prices increase or decrease due to linking.250 If 
linking leads to an increase in allowance prices relative to autarky, leakage to third 
jurisdictions could increase. On the other hand, if linking leads to a decrease in 
allowance prices relative to a pre-linking level, the competitiveness effects of the 
carbon price will decrease, and leakage to third jurisdictions will be less than under 
a pre-linking scenario. 
248 Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy Future (n 241) 135.
249 RN Stavins and J Jaffe, ‘Linking Tradable Permit Systems for Greenhouse Gas Emissions: 
Opportunities, Implications, and Challenges’ (IETA 2007) 38, Report for International Emissions 
Trading Association <http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IETA_Linking_Report.pdf> accessed 
7 December 2015.
250 Tuerk and others (n 211) 344. See also A Tuerk, ‘The Challenge of the European Carbon Market: 
Emission Trading, Carbon Leakage and Instruments to Stabilise the CO2 Price: Implications 
of Linking on Leakage’ (2011) 9, WIFO Working Paper No. 410 <www.wifo.ac.at/en/pubma_
entries?detail-view=yes&publikation_id=43105> accessed 8 December 2015.
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In the context of the EU ETS and the Australian CPM, bilateral linking would 
lead to a significant decrease in the Australian CPM’s allowance price and only a 
relatively small increase in the EU ETS allowance price.251 This would mean that 
leakage to third jurisdictions could decrease in Australia and remain more or less 
the same in the EU. Given that the link with the EU ETS will significantly decrease 
Australian CPM’s allowances prices and that China – Australia’s biggest trading 
partner – is putting a price on carbon, Australia may be encouraged to reduce its 
industry assistance through the free allocation of allowances, thereby resolving some 
of the allocation-related issues discussed above.
3.4.2. Free allocation and linking
Free allocation rules of the EU ETS and the Australian CPM differ in some aspects. 
These relate to the basis for free allocation (benchmarking that is coupled with 
historical activity levels in the EU vs. industry average baselines that are coupled 
with actual activity levels in Australia),252 the rate of assistance (up to 100 per cent 
in the EU vs. up to 94.5 per cent in Australia),253 the reduction factor (1.74 per cent 
per annum in the EU vs. 1.3 per cent in Australia),254 the level of free allocation 
(capped in the EU vs. uncapped in Australia),255 and the scope of assistance (for 
direct costs only in the EU vs. both for direct and indirect costs in Australia).256 Do 
these differences affect linkage between the EU ETS and the Australian CPM? 
Differences in allowance allocation systems are not considered as major 
obstacles for linking.257 Even freely allocated allowances have opportunity costs as 
251 Although Australia and the EU agreed in July 2012 to link their respective ETSs starting in 2015, 
the Australian CPM was repealed before the linking agreement took effect. Commission, ‘Australia 
and European Commission agree on pathway towards fully linking Emissions Trading Systems’ 
European Commission (Brussels, 28 August 2012) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-
916_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 8 November 2016. The announcement of the linking agreement led 
to a significant decrease in the Australian expected carbon price for 2015 (from A$29 to just A$12.1). 
Point Carbon, ‘Australia Takes A$6 Billion Write-down after EU CO2 Price Fall’ Thompson Reuters 
(Oslo, 24 May 2013) <http://www.pointcarbon.com/polopoly_fs/1.2386086!cmanz20130524.pdf> 
accessed 11 February 2014.
252 Revised Emissions Trading Directive, arts 10a(1) and 10c; Explanatory Memorandum, ch 5.7.
253 Revised Emissions Trading Directive, art 10a(11); Explanatory Memorandum, ch 5.17.
254 Revised Emissions Trading Directive, art 9; Explanatory Memorandum, ch 5.18.
255 Revised Emissions Trading Directive, art 10a(5); Explanatory Memorandum, ch 5.23.
256 See text to note 264 below; Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy Future (n 241) 77.
257 Tuerk and others (n 211) 347; D Burtraw and others, ‘Linking by Degrees: Incremental Alignment 
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each freely procured allowance that is surrendered could have been sold.258 Modes 
of allocation should thus in principle not affect production decisions and thereby 
competitiveness. But the devil is in the details. The next Sections analyse if and how 
the efficiency, equity, competitiveness, and environmental effectiveness of an EU-
Australian carbon market could be affected by the different systems of free allocation.
(a) Allocation baselines and benchmarks: efficiency considerations
The bases for the free allocation of allowances are ex ante benchmarks in the EU ETS 
and average baselines in the Australian CPM. Whereas the EU ETS’ benchmarks 
reflect the average efficiency of the EU’s 10 per cent most efficient installations 
producing a relevant product, the Australian CPM’s baselines reflect the average of 
an entire industry engaging in a relevant activity.
In the EU ETS, EITE entities that meet the benchmarks, i.e. those that are 
among the top 10 per cent most efficient installations, receive all the allowances they 
need free of charge.259 These entities may not improve efficiency if they expect that 
the benchmarks will be tightened to reflect efficiency improvements realised over 
time.260 Any efficiency improvement realised in the current trading period would 
then affect their future allocation as they will likely be taken as the basis for setting 
new benchmarks. They will thus not abate (improve efficiency) unless the price of 
allowances exceeds the sum of their current marginal abatement cost (MAC) and the 
value of future allowances forgone by undertaking abatement (improving efficiency) 
today.
EITE installations that do not meet the benchmarks, notwithstanding the 
possibility of updating of the benchmarks, are better off improving efficiency if this 
is cheaper than buying allowances. They will do so until they reach the efficiency 
of Cap and Trade Markets’ (2013) 13, Resources for the Future DP 13-04 <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2249955> accessed 1 September 2016; S Borghesi and M Montini, ‘Linking Emission 
Trading Schemes around the World: Critical Analysis and Perspectives’ (2016) 16, FESSUD Working 
Paper Series No 86 <http://fessud.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Linking-Emission-Trading-
Schemes-around-the-world-critical-analysis-and-perspectives-working-paper-86.pdf> accessed 1 
September 2016.
258 E Woerdman, O Couwenberg and A Nentjes, ‘Energy Prices and Emissions Trading: Windfall Profits 
from Grandfathering?’ (2009) 28 European Journal of Law and Economics 185, 187.
259 Revised Emissions Trading Directive, arts 10a(2) and 10a(12).
260 K Neuhoff, K Martinez and M Sato, ‘Allocation, Incentives and Distortions: The Impact of EU ETS 
Emissions Allowance Allocations to the Electricity Sector’ (2006) 6 Climate Policy 73, 75-77.
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level of the current most efficient installations. As any future updating of the 
current benchmarks will likely take into account efficiency improvement within 
the ‘top performers’, abatement (efficiency improvement) within the ‘less efficient 
installations’ does not affect the latter’s future allocations. Once they reach the 
efficiency level of the current most efficient installations, abating does not pay off 
anymore unless the price of allowances exceeds their MAC and the expected value of 
emission units forgone by further efficiency improvements.
In the Australian CPM, updating the baselines will affect the entire EITE 
industry rather than just a subset of the installations as is the case in the EU ETS. If 
the baselines are tightened, the number of freely allocated allowances per regulated 
entity will decrease because the baselines are set by taking the average of an entire 
EITE industry.261 An EITE entity will thus be less inclined to improve, for instance, 
its emissions intensity unless the price of emissions units exceeds its MAC and the 
value of future emissions units forgone by undertaking abatement currently. The 
possibility of updating thus ‘forces’ EITE entities to place a value on an allowance 
that is higher than their MAC.
Not only does the updating affect innovation (dynamic efficiency) by distorting 
investment decisions, it also affects the cost-saving potential of the respective 
schemes.262 If a firm expects that its current abatement behaviour affects its future 
allocations, if it is a seller, it will not be willing to sell allowances unless allowance 
prices exceed the sum of its MAC and the expected value of allowances that it will 
forgo by reducing output or undertaking abatement currently. If it is a buyer, it 
will be willing to pay a premium price that is well above its MAC. This ‘higher 
than MAC’ valuation of an allowance increases the costs of achieving an emissions 
reduction target.
Given the possibility of updating, a bilateral link between the Australian CPM 
and the EU ETS may not necessarily shift abatement to a system where it could be 
achieved at the least cost.263 If Australian EITE entities have a lower MAC than EU 
261 Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy Future (n 241) 77.
262 See Stavins and Jaffe, ‘Linking Tradable Permit Systems for Greenhouse Gas Emissions’ (n 249) 38-
39.
263 The implications of the Australian CPM’s free allocation system for the interconnected carbon market 
are likely to be more pronounced than that of the EU ETS’. The former’s allocation system affects all 
EITE entities while the latter’s impact is limited only to the most efficient installations. The discussion 
is thus limited to linking implications of the Australian CPM’s free allocation rules.
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ETS entities, they will still buy allowances from the EU ETS until prices exceed 
the sum of their MAC and the expected value of future allowances that are forgone 
by undertaking abatement currently. This will shift abatement from a system with 
lower MAC (Australia) to a system with a higher MAC (EU ETS). If Australian 
EITE entities have a higher MAC than EU ETS EITE entities, the former are better 
off buying allowances from the EU ETS. In this circumstance, shifting abatement 
to the EU ETS is efficient. Even then, they will be willing to pay a premium price as 
their valuation of allowances does not necessarily reflect their MAC.
If the Australian CPM were unilaterally linked to the EU ETS, Australian 
entities would shift abatement to the EU ETS (more abatement in the EU) although 
the former might enjoy a lower MAC. As the prices of allowances in the Australian 
CPM do not solely reflect regulated firms’ MAC, the firms will (depending on 
circumstances) be willing to import allowances from the EU ETS (a shift in abatement 
from Australia to the EU) even if abating domestically might be more efficient. In 
both the unilateral and bilateral linking scenario, even if the intersystem trading in 
allowances is mutually beneficial to the parties involved in the transactions, it does 
not necessarily lead to a full realisation of societal cost-savings. Linking may not thus 
work the way it should.
(b) Allocation baselines and benchmarks: equity issues
The EU ETS benchmarks cover direct emissions only. No free allocation is thus 
made for indirect emissions.264 The Australian CPM’s free allocation system, by 
contrast, covers both direct and indirect emissions by setting separate baselines for 
emissions-intensity, electricity use and natural gas feedstock use in undertaking an 
EITE activity. The Australian CPM’s free allocation system is thus in practice more 
generous than that of the EU ETS regarding the number of allowances handed out 
to EITE firms.
This difference in the scope of free allocation does not affect the efficiency 
of a linked EU-Australian carbon market. Irrespective of the quantity of freely 
allocated allowances, regulated entities make a decision, ceteris paribus, to abate or 
to buy allowances based on their MAC and the price of allowances. However, if the 
264 Member States are allowed to compensate EITE industries for their electricity costs in accordance 
with the EU state aid rules. EITE industries are not, however, guaranteed that they will indeed receive 
the compensation. See Revised Emissions Trading Directive, art 10a(6).
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Australian entities can pass on all or part of their carbon cost to consumers, they 
will enjoy a higher windfall profit than their European competitors. In that case, 
the perception that Australian entities benefit from a more generous free allocation 
system may trigger lobbying from the EU ETS’ EITE sectors for a similar system.
Moreover, because the size of the windfall profit depends partly on the price 
of allowances and because linking affects the carbon price in the linking-partner 
jurisdictions,265 the equity issue is directly affected by linking. Given the currently 
very low carbon prices in the EU ETS and since Australia will be a price-taker in any 
linking scenario, allowance prices will likely drop in Australia after linking. The size 
of the windfall profit that Australian EITE industries could get would thus decline 
after linking. If Australian entities are able to pass on the carbon costs, they may 
lobby against the linking as any link with the EU ETS will likely slash their expected 
profit. This may change once the prices increase in the EU ETS as a result of, for 
instance, economic growth, allowance price regulation such as an auction reserve 
price or a price floor.
(c) Historical versus actual output: Competitiveness effects
The EU ETS uses historical output whereas the APCPM uses actual output to allocate 
free allowances to EITE entities. This may have competitiveness implications in case 
of linking. The Australian CPM’s output-based free allocation scheme, by linking 
the number of free allowances that a firm receives to its production level, discourages 
reducing emissions or output even if doing so would be more efficient. This mode 
of free allocation accommodates future growth and thereby dispels competitiveness 
concerns.266 It is a de facto production subsidy as firms with higher level of output 
are awarded more allowances.267 The free allocation in the EU ETS, by contrast, is a 
lump sum subsidy which should not affect operational decisions.268 Unlike Australian 
EITE entities, EITE entities in the EU ETS cannot influence their allocation by 
increasing or decreasing output.
265 Tuerk and others (n 211) 343-344.
266 Neuhoff, Martinez and Sato (n 260) 75-77.
267 D Burtraw and others, ‘The Effect of Allowance Allocation on the Cost of Carbon Emission Trading’ 
(2001) 29, Resource for the Future Discussion Paper 01-30 <http://www.rff.org/RFF/documents/
RFF-DP-01-30.pdf> accessed 8 December 2015; Stavins and Jaffe, ‘Linking Tradable Permit Systems 
for Greenhouse Gas Emissions’ (n 249) 37.
268 Ellerman, Convery and de Perthuis (n 239) 86-87.
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The actual value of the Australian de facto subsidy depends on the price of 
allowances. Linking, by affecting pre-linking carbon prices, thus affects the effective 
size of the subsidy. Given the currently very low carbon prices in the EU ETS, 
Australian CPM’s link with the EU ETS, whether unilateral or bilateral, will likely 
decrease pre-linking carbon prices in the Australian market thereby also reducing 
the magnitude of the perverse incentives arising from the Australian CPM’s free 
allocation scheme. Because the linking will reduce Australian EITE entities’ expected 
benefits from their future allocation, they may lobby against linking.
(d) Output-based allocation: Environmental effectiveness
Environmental effectiveness of an ETS depends on an emissions target and a robust 
monitoring and compliance system. As far as the emissions target is set at a socially 
desirable level and it is properly enforced, the mechanisms through which emissions 
rights are distributed should not affect its integrity. Also, a link between two cap-
and-trade systems with different modes of allowance allocation (e.g. auctioning vs. 
free allocation) does not affect emissions level as the linked system’s total emissions 
will be equal to the aggregate number of allowances issued under each system. After 
linking, abatement shifts from one trading system into another and this does not 
affect the pre-linking combined emissions levels.
However, a link between two ETSs could affect aggregate emissions if either 
of them lacks an absolute cap. The Australian CPM lacks an absolute cap as its 
free allocation system is coupled with EITE entities’ actual production levels in a 
given compliance year.269 The free allocation of allowances is thus not capped, and it 
increases when relevant industries increase their output.270 Depending on whether a 
bilateral link between the Australian CPM and the EU ETS increased or decreased 
allowance prices in the former, aggregate emissions from the Australian CPM and 
the EU ETS would be lower or higher than a pre-linking scenario.
If linking reduces allowance prices in the Australian CPM, Australian EITE 
firms would enjoy a reduction in one of their input costs, shifting, ceteris paribus, 
the supply curve in their product market to the right, i.e. increasing the equilibrium 
output (with associated emissions) relative to the autarky equilibrium. Compared 
to the pre-linking scenario, aggregate emissions will thus rise as the Australian 
269 Clean Energy Amendment Regulation, cls 906 and 907.
270 Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy Future (n 241) 104-115.
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government will have to issue more allowances to account for the increased 
production. On the other hand, an increase in allowance prices in the Australian 
CPM as a result of linking would increase input costs of Australian EITE firms, 
shifting the supply curve in their product market to the left and decreasing the 
equilibrium output. Hence a post-linking allowance price increase would lead to 
a lower level of output and thereby lower emissions than in a pre-linking scenario.
(e) New entrant and closure provisions
The EU ETS’ and Australian CPM’s rules of allowance allocation to new entrants 
are different. In the EU ETS, new entrants into EITE sectors face the same product-
specific benchmarks that are set with reference to the most efficient installations in 
the EU. In the Australian CPM, on the other hand, new entrants benefit from a 
more generous output-based allocation scheme. The Australian allocation system is 
thus more attractive than that of the EU. In principle, this may bias, ceteris paribus, 
investment decisions towards Australia.
If an installation that received free allowances closes down in the EU ETS, free 
allocation ceases as of the next compliance year from the year the installation closed 
down. In Australia, by contrast, plant closure entails surrendering freely allocated 
allowances for the production that is not realised in the same compliance year 
already. Closure rules of these kinds are widely recognised as inefficient as they create 
the perverse incentive to keep inefficient installations running as far as the return 
from selling surplus allowances is greater than the loss from keeping the inefficient 
installations.271 The perverse incentive is stronger in the Australian CPM as closure 
affects allocations made for the year the plant closes, in addition to future allocations.
The new entrant and closure rules may not, however, be major obstacles for 
linking. First, the perverse incentives created by the new entrant and plant closure 
provisions are not the result of linking. They will continue to exist even in the absence of 
linking. Also, given the currently very low carbon prices in the EU ETS, the role of the 
provisions in distorting investment and closure decisions is likely to be marginal even 
in the absence of linking. It is, however, expected that EU ETS firms will lobby for an 
allocation scheme similar to the Australian CPM as that gives them more allowances.
271 Ellerman, Convery and de Perthuis (n 239) 114-116; A Nentjes and E Woerdman, ‘Tradable Permits 
versus Tradable Credits: A Survey and Analysis’ (2012) 6 International Review of Environmental and 




A sub-global ETS risks harming competitiveness and causing carbon leakage. 
These concerns cast doubt on the efficiency and environmental effectiveness of a 
unilateral climate policy. ETSs implemented thus far include measures to address 
competitiveness and leakage concerns. Analysis of the EU ETS’s and the Australian 
CPM’s leakage-preventing measures shows that certain differences give rise to 
efficiency, competitiveness, equity, and environmental effectiveness concerns.
If the current allocation baselines and benchmarks are updated for the upcoming 
trading periods, it may distort current abatement and investment decisions. It could 
raise the costs of meeting the emissions targets in both jurisdictions. In the case of 
linking, abatement may not necessarily be optimally shifted to a jurisdiction where 
it could be achieved at the least cost possible.
Second, because the Australian CPM’s allocation baselines are more generous 
than that of the EU ETS, Australian EITE entities will likely reap higher windfall 
profits, all else being equal, than their EU competitors not necessarily because they 
are more competitive but because they receive more valuable allowances free of 
charge which they could sell. Although this is independent of linking, it may trigger 
lobbying by EU ETS EITE entities for a similar allocation system.
Third, the Australian CPM’s free allocation system is a de facto production 
subsidy. By influencing allowance prices, linking will affect the size of the subsidy 
that Australian EITE industries get from the allocation system. A link with the 
EU ETS would slash the size of their subsidy as allowance prices are expected to 
drop in Australia. This may trigger opposition against the linking by the EITE 
entities. Finally, linking between the EU ETS and the Australian CPM could lead 
to more emissions than a pre-linking scenario if it leads to lower allowance prices 
in the Australian CPM and Australian EITE entities are facing a relatively elastic 
demand.
Whether and how these concerns will influence the outcome of linking 
negotiations depend on a host of factors embedded in the domestic politics of the 
linking-partner jurisdictions. Because international cooperation (such as linking) 
and domestic politics are inextricably intertwined, linking-partner jurisdictions 
will likely formulate their policy positions on linking by taking into account the 
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likely reactions of their internal constituencies and political institutions.272 For 
future research, case-specific analyses of the interests and ideas of domestic political 
and societal actors and institutions are needed to determine how the efficiency, 
competitiveness, equity, and environmental integrity concerns play out in the 
domestic arena and how this will affect linking, and vice versa. 
272 H Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations 
(Princeton University Press 1997); R Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-
Level Games’ (1998) 42 International Organisation 427; K Harrison and L Sundstrom, ‘Introduction: 
Global Commons, Domestic Decisions’ in K Harrison and L Sundstrom (eds), Global Commons, 





CArbon mArket stAbIlIsAtIon meAsures And 
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4.1. Introduction
Allowance price volatility has been a recurring challenge in emissions trading systems 
(ETSs).274 In April 2006, the price of European Union Allowances (EUAs) – the 
primary carbon currency of the EU ETS – crashed from nearly €30/tCO2 to less 
than €13.31/tCO2 after it became apparent that verified emissions were less than 
the number of allowances allocated to regulated entities.275 Although the allowance 
price recovered and reached near €30/tCO2 at the beginning of the second trading 
phase (2008-2012), it has started declining in late 2008 due partly to the European 
economic crisis.276 Allowance prices have since not broken the €10/tCO2 mark, 
273 The research into this Chapter is supported by the Korea Foundation under the research theme 
‘Korean Climate Change policy – economic, legal and political perspectives of linking.’
274 Price volatility generally refers to a change in prices over time. Price changes are expected in markets, 
and carbon markets are no exception. In so far as the change in prices reflects market fundamentals, 
hence predictable, it may not be problematic. It becomes problematic when it is large and cannot be 
anticipated, creating uncertainties for market participants and leading to suboptimal decisions. By 
price volatility, we mean the latter. 
275 DA Ellerman and BK Buchner, ‘Over-Allocation or Abatement? A Preliminary Analysis of the EU 
ETS based on the 2005-06 Emissions Data’ (2008) 41 Environmental Resource Economics 267.
276 M Ferdinand, ‘The EU ETS – Struggling for Shortage: What Policies Required to Get a Functioning 




contributing to the EU ETS’s surplus of over 2 billion allowances.277
The price volatility in the EU ETS is not by any means unique. In the summer 
of 2000, the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market programme in California saw a 
sudden spike in the price of NOx emissions allowances from an average of $400/t 
to an average of over $40,000 due to an energy crisis.278 When the EU and Australia 
announced in August 2012 an agreement to link their respective carbon markets 
as of 2015,279 the expected price of Australian Carbon Units (ACUs) – the carbon 
currency of the (now defunct) Australian CPM – for 2015 dropped from A$29/
tCO2 to A$12.1/tCO2.
280
With volatile prices, economic actors defer long-term low-carbon investments. 
This may lock-in carbon-intensive investments, undermining the dynamic efficiency 
of carbon markets and increasing the costs of transitioning an economy into a low-
carbon future.281 Several jurisdictions have attempted to enhance the dynamic 
efficiency of their respective ETSs by introducing market stabilisation measures. 
As these measures vary from one jurisdiction to another, the relevant question is 
whether and how different market stabilisation measures affect linking ETSs. This 
chapter addresses this question in the context of a bilateral linking scenario between 
the EU ETS and the Korean ETS. The market stabilisation measures of the EU 
ETS and the Korean ETS provide an interesting case study not least because they 
represent different spectra of the debate on whether market stabilisation measures 
277 Commission, ‘Impact assessment accompanying the document concerning the establishment and 
operation of a Market Stability Reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC’ COM (2014) 20 final.
278 LH Goulder and AD Schein, ‘Carbon Taxes versus Cap and Trade: A Critical Review’ (2013) 4 
Climate Change Economics 1350010, 1350010-12.
279 Commission, ‘Australia and European Commission agree on pathway towards fully linking Emissions 
Trading Systems’ European Commission (Brussels, 28 August 2012) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-12-916_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 8 November 2016.
280 Point Carbon, ‘Australia Takes A$6 Billion Write-down after EU CO2 Price Fall’ Thompson Reuters 
(Oslo, 24 May 2013) accessed 11 February 2014.
281 C Hepburn, ‘Regulation by Prices, Quantities or Both: A Review of Instrument Choice’ (2006) 22 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 226, 233. See also A Dixit, ‘Investment and Hysteresis’ (1992) 
6 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 107; F Jotzo, T Jordan and N Fabian, ‘Policy Uncertainty 
about Australia’s Carbon Price: Expert Survey Results and Implications for Investment’ (2012) 45 The 
Australian Economic Review 395, 404; SE Weishaar, ‘Incentivising Technologic Change in Emissions 
Trading Systems: The Case of Excess Supply’ in L Kreiser and others (eds), Environmental Taxation 
and Green Fiscal Impact: Theory and Impact (Edward Elgar 2014).
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should regulate prices or quantity. Whereas the EU ETS adopted a quantity scheme 
of scarcity management called the Market Stability Reserve (MSR), the Korean ETS 
implemented a plethora of measures, dominated by price-based instruments.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the need for and 
the mechanisms of stabilising carbon markets. Section 4.3 explains the market 
stabilisation measures of the EU ETS and the Korean ETS. Section 4.4 analyses 
the efficiency, environmental integrity, and regulatory implications of the market 
stabilisation measures for an EU-Korean carbon market. Section 4.5 concludes the 
Chapter.
4.2. The why and how of stabilising carbon markets
Economic theory predicts that a cap-and-trade scheme allows achievement of a 
given emissions target at the lowest possible cost. The ‘cap’, coupled with a credible 
compliance and enforcement system, ensures that emissions are kept below a specified 
level. The ‘trade’ shifts abatement to entities with the lowest marginal abatement 
cost (MAC). This equalises regulated entities’ MACs, leading to the realisation of 
an environmental target at the least possible abatement cost.282 However, the success 
of a cap-and-trade system depends on, in addition to achieving a given emissions 
target at the lowest possible abatement cost, the extent to which it provides dynamic 
incentives for the invention, innovation and diffusion of low-carbon technologies.283
Cap-and-trade systems trail behind pollution taxes in providing dynamic 
incentives.284 This is primarily because a (pure) cap-and-trade system leaves carbon 
prices uncertain while a pollution tax provides price certainty. In cap-and-trade 
systems, as in any market, the forces of supply and demand determine the price of 
282 T Tietenberg, ‘The Tradable Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons’ in E Ostrom and others 
(eds) The Drama of the Commons (National Academies Press 2002) 204; R Perman and others, Natural 
Resource and Environmental Economics (3rd edn, Pearson 2003) 224-227.
283 WA Magat, ‘The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Innovation’ (1979) 43 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 4. See also AB Jaffe and RN Stavins, ‘Dynamic Incentives of Environmental 
Regulations: The Effects of Alternative Policy Instruments on Technology Diffusion’ (1995) 29 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 43.
284 AB Jaffe, RG Newell and RN Stavins, ‘Environmental Policy and Technological Change’ (2002) 22 
Environmental and Resource Economics 41; T Requate, ‘Dynamic Incentives by Environmental 
Policy Instruments – A Survey’ (2005) 54 Ecological Economics 175; C Allan, AB Jaffe and I Sin, 
Diffusion of Green Technology: A Survey’ (2014) Motu Working Paper 14-04 <http://motu-www.
motu.org.nz/wpapers/14_04.pdf> accessed 12 November 2014.
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allowances – the commodity traded in carbon markets. In contrast to most markets, 
however, the supply of emissions allowances is exogenously fixed and relatively 
inelastic. The cap, which is fixed ex ante, puts an absolute limit on the supply of 
emissions allowances in a given compliance period. The demand for emissions 
allowances, by contrast, is dynamic and changes in response to demand drivers such 
as changes in weather conditions, economic growth or slowdown, the successful 
diffusion of new abatement technologies, or regulatory changes.
With an inelastic supply that neither expands nor contracts in response to, 
respectively, an increase or a decrease in the demand for allowances, allowance prices 
respond strongly to demand-side shocks, resulting in higher or lower prices than the 
predicted carbon price that incentivises an optimal rate of abatement, innovation 
and investment to reduce costs in the long-run path.285 Without predictable and 
politically credible carbon prices, private entities defer long-term low-carbon 
investments until after a predictable price pattern emerges or ‘demand a “risk 
premium” to overcome the (…) credibility deficit.’286
Different policy instruments can be used to address price uncertainty and price 
volatility in cap-and-trade schemes. Banking, borrowing, and offset provisions and 
allowance reserve schemes could instil a form of flexibility to an inflexible cap.287 
While banking provisions allow regulated entities to carry over unused allowances 
to future compliance/commitment periods, borrowing provisions enable covered 
entities to draw allowances from future compliance/commitment periods for current 
compliance.288 Banking and borrowing provisions thus expand a carbon market 
285 B Knopf and others, ‘The European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS): Ex Post Analysis, the 
Market Stability Reserve and Options for a Comprehensive Reform’ (2014) 8, FEEM Working Paper 
No 79.2014 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2499457> accessed 8 December 2015.
286 Weishaar, ‘Incentivising Technologic Change’ (n 281) 132. S Fankhauser and C Hepburn, ‘Designing 
Carbon Markets. Part I: Carbon Markets in Time’ (2010) 38 Energy Policy 4363; Hepburn, 
‘Regulation by Prices, Quantities or Both’ (n 281) 233-234.
287 B Murray, RG Newell and WA Pizer, ‘Balancing Cost and Emissions Certainty: An Allowance Reserve 
for Cap-and-Trade’ (2009) 3 Review of Environmental Economics and Policy84; JB Bushnell, ‘The 
Economics of Carbon Offsets’ (2010) 2, NBER Working Paper No 16305 <http://www.nber.org/
papers/w16305> accessed 9 December 2015; Fankhauser and Hepburn, ‘Carbon Markets in Time’ (n 
286); S Fankhauser and C Hepburn, ‘Designing Carbon Markets. Part II: Carbon Markets in Space’ 
(2010) 38 Energy Policy 4381.
288 Fankhauser and Hepburn, ‘Carbon Markets in Time’ (n 286); H Fell, E Moore and RD Morgenstern, 
‘Cost Containment under Cap and Trade: A Review of the Literature’ (2011) 5 International Review 
of Environmental and Resource Economics 285. See also SE Weishaar, Emissions Trading Design: A 
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across time and create temporal flexibility.289 An allowance reserve introduces some 
form of flexibility to an ETS’s cap by increasing or decreasing allowance supply 
dynamically in response to changes in demand and/or prices.
Another approach is to design an ETS as a hybrid scheme by incorporating 
price price-control systems such as a price floor and/or a price ceiling.290 A price 
floor guarantees that the carbon price will not fall below a specified amount.291 A 
price ceiling is the mirror image of a price floor, and it sets a maximum carbon price. 
A government could establish a price ceiling by, for instance, committing to sell an 
unlimited number of allowances if carbon prices reach the level of the ceiling.292 A 
price corridor combines a price floor and a price ceiling and allows the carbon price 
to float between the corridors freely. The narrower/wider the price collar, the more/
less certain prices become, the less/more flexible the carbon market gets, and the 
closer/further the ETS gets to a price instrument in a continuum between pure price 
and pure quantity instruments.
A third approach to stabilising carbon markets is a dynamic management of 
supply by an independent authority.293 An independent regulatory agency decides 
– in much the same way as an independent central bank would manage monetary 
policy – the supply of allowances dynamically taking into account the supply-
Critical Overview (Edward Elgar 2014) 61-63.
289 Fankhauser and Hepburn, ‘Carbon Markets in Time’ (n 286) 4364-4365.
290 WJ McKibbin and PJ Wilcoxen, ‘A Better Way to Slow Global Climate Change’ (1997) Brookings 
Policy Brief No 17 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/1997/06/energy-mckibbin> 
accessed 8 December 2015; WJ McKibbin and PJ Wilcoxen, ‘Climate Change Policy after Kyoto: A 
Blueprint for a Realistic Approach’ (2002) The Brookings Institution <http://www.brookings.edu/
research/articles/2002/03/spring-energy-mckibbin> accessed 8 December 2015; WJ McKibbin and 
PJ Wilcoxen, ‘The Role of Economics in Climate Change Policy’ (2002) 16 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 107; Hepburn, ‘Regulation by Prices, Quantities or Both’ (n 281) 230. C Kettner, 
D Kletzan-Slamanig and A Koppl, ‘The EU Emission Trading Scheme: Is There a Need for Price 
Stabilisation’ in L Kreiser and others (eds), Environmental Taxation and Green Fiscal Impact: Theory 
and Impact (Edward Elgar 2014) 119-122.
291 PJ Wood and F Jotzo, ‘Price Floors for Emissions Trading’ (2011) 39 Energy Policy 1746.
292 An alternative could be to establish an allowance reserve with a specified number of allowances that 
will be released if market prices reach the level of the ceiling. See Murray, Newell and Pizer (n 287); 
H Fell and others, ‘Soft and Hard Price Collars in a Cap-and-Trade System: A Comparative Analysis’ 
(2012) 64 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 183.
293 See G Grosjean and others, ‘After Monetary Policy, Climate Policy: Is Delegation the Key to EU ETS 
Reform?’ (2016) 16 Climate Policy 1; C de Perthuis and R Trotignon, ‘Governance of CO2 Markets: 
Lessons from the EU ETS’ (2014) 75 Energy Policy 100.
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demand dynamics in the carbon market294 This option addresses price uncertainty 
and volatility stemming from political uncertainty and time-inconsistency and an 
inelastic supply.
A few of these mechanisms, or variations thereof, have already gotten their way 
into most of current and past ETSs. An unlimited banking, a limited borrowing, 
and a limited use of offsets are common features of current and past cap-and-trade 
schemes.295 The Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism, abolished in July 2014, 
was initially designed with price collars.296 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
enforces price floors through auction reserve prices.297 The Californian cap-and-trade 
scheme has an allowance reserve scheme that would be deployed to contain high 
carbon prices.298 The EU ETS’ MSR is also a form of quantity-based instrument 
of scarcity management. The Korean ETS incorporates several measures including 
price floors, price ceilings and an allowance reserve scheme.299 The next Section 
elaborates on the market stabilisation measures of the EU ETS and the Korean ETS.
4.3. Market stabilisation measures: EU ETS and Korean ETS
4.3.1. The EU ETS’s Market Stability Reserve
The EU ETS faced volatile prices at several junctures.300 It commenced in 2005 
with a modest carbon price of below €10/tCO2 which continued until mid-2005. 
Allowance prices peaked to above €30/tCO2 in April 2006 to later fall sharply after 
the publication of the first verified emissions which showed the market was over-
allocated.301 Prohibition of banking of Phase I (2005-2007) allowances drove prices 
294 Grosjean and others (n 293); de Perthuis and Trotignon (n 293)
295 Weishaar, Emissions Trading Design (n 288) 66-96.
296 FG Tiche, SE Weishaar and O Couwenberg, ‘Sustaining Climate Policy Reforms: A Tale of Two 
Reforms’ (2014) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2509505> accessed on 29 August 2016.
297 Weishaar, Emissions Trading Design (n 288) 76.
298 Weishaar, Emissions Trading Design (n 288) 79.
299 H Park and WK Hong, ‘Korea’s Emission Trading Scheme and Policy Design Issues to Achieve 
Market-Efficiency and Abatement Targets’ (2014) Energy Policy DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2014.05.001.
300 See generally Ellerman and Buchner (n 275); D Ellerman, C Marcantonini and A Zaklan, ‘The EU 
ETS: Eight Years and Counting’ (2014) EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2014/04 <http://cadmus.eui.
eu/bitstream/handle/1814/29517/RSCAS_2014_04.pdf> accessed 8 December 2015; Ferdinand (n 
276).
301 Ellerman, Marcantonini and Zaklan (n 300) 11.
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to near zero in September 2007.302 At the beginning of Phase II (2008-2012), prices 
picked up and reached near €30/tCO2 to yet again start declining in late 2008.
303 
The price decline has since continued and the beginning of the third trading phase 
in 2013 saw one of the lowest carbon prices since 2007 with prices reaching below 
€5/tCO2. Allowance prices have since not broken the €10/tCO2 mark, contributing 
to the EU ETS’s 2 billion allowances surplus.304
Three major factors are widely believed to have caused the allowance oversupply. 
The first concerns the economic crisis since 2009 which led to a decline in industrial 
output and emissions.305 The second relates to a combination of increased inflow 
of offset credits during phase II, the early auctioning of Phase III allowances in the 
final years of the second Phase, and the release of allowances in the New Entrants 
Reserve.306 The third factor is an effect of an interaction between the EU ETS and 
other climate policies, notably renewable and energy efficiency policies.307
Since 2010/11 the Commission has been consulting on several short- and long-
run policy options to address the problem of oversupply and increase the resilience of 
the EU ETS to demand-side shocks. For the short-run, the Commission is deferring 
the auctioning of 900 million allowances (known as ‘back-loading’) withheld from 
302 Ellerman and Buchner (n 275).
303 Ferdinand (n 276).
304 COM (2014) 20 final; C Hepburn and others, ‘Introduction: The Economics of the EU ETS Market 
Stability Reserve’ (2016) 80 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 1.
305 Commission, ‘The state of the European carbon market in 2012’ COM (2012) 652 final; de Perthuis 
and Trotignon (n 293) 102-103; Weishaar, ‘Incentivising Technologic Change’ (n 281).
306 Weishaar, ‘Incentivising Technologic Change’ (n 281).
307 COM (2012) 652; de Perthuis and Trotignon (n 293) 102-103. For a differing view, see N Koch 
and others, ‘Causes of the EU ETS Price Drop: Recession, CDM, Renewable Policies or a Bit of 
Everything? – New Evidence’ (2014) 73 Energy Policy 676. The effect of renewable energy and energy 
efficiency policies on the allowance surplus in the EU ETS is known in the literature as the ‘waterbed 
effect’. Renewable energy policies increase the supply of energy from renewable sources, displacing 
energy from fossil fuel-fired power plants and freeing up emissions allowances that would otherwise be 
used. When the allowances freed up by the displacement are brought to the market, allowance prices 
decrease, and covered entities in other sectors are incentivised to increase their emissions. As a result, 
additional policies, rather than delivering additional emissions reduction, simply redistribute emissions 
reduction among covered sectors. See Weishaar, Emissions Trading Design (n 288) 67-68. See also E 
Begemann, L Lam and M Neelis, ‘The Waterbed Effect and the EU ETS: An Explanation of a Possible 
Phasing out of Dutch Coal Fired Power Plants as an Example, (2016) Ecofys CSPNL16521 <http://
www.ecofys.com/en/publications/the-waterbed-effect-and-the-eu-ets> accessed 22 October 2016.
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2014 to 2016 auction volumes to the end of the third phase.308 This is aimed at 
temporarily relieving the carbon market from the oversupply and help prices pick-
up. Although the back-loaded allowances were initially expected to return to the 
market by the end of the current trading phase,309 it is now proposed that they 
would instead return to the MSR.310
The MSR, scheduled to commence in 2019, is expected to address the problem 
supply-demand imbalance in the long-run.311 It manages allowance surplus in the 
market by adjusting annual auction volumes when the overall allowance surplus 
is outside a predefined range.312 If the surplus exceeds 833 million, it absorbs 12 
per cent of the surplus by withholding them from future auction volumes.313 If the 
allowance surplus falls below 400 million, the MSR releases 100 million allowances 
from the reserve and adds them to future auction volumes.314 If the reserve has less 
308 Commission Regulation (EU) No 176/2014 of 25 February 2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 
1031/2010 in particular to determine the volumes of greenhouse gas emission allowances to be 
auctioned in 2013-20 [2014] L 56/11 (hereafter: Back-loading Regulation). 
309 Back-loading Regulation, art 1.
310 Decision (EU) 2015/1814 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2015 
concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse 
gas emission trading scheme and amending Directive 2003/87/EC [2015] OJ L 264/1, art 1(2) 
(hereafter: The Market Stability Reserve Decision).
311 In addition to implementing the MSR, the Commission has also proposed as part of the EU ETS’s 
phase IV (2021-2030) revision agenda to increase the linear reduction factor – the rate at which 
the EU ETS’s cap tightens annually – from 1.7 per cent (the rate since 2013) to 2.2 per cent. 
See Commission, ‘A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030’ 
(Communication) COM (2014) 15 final.
312 The allowance surplus is defined as the difference between the total number of allowances issued and 
international credits submitted from 1 January 2008 to the end of a given year, and verified emissions 
recorded since 2008 and the number of allowances in the MSR in the relevant year. See The Market 
Stability Reserve decision, art 1(4). See also COM (2014) 20 final, 3.
313 The Market Stability Reserve Decision, art 1(5). The European Parliament passed a vote on 15 
February 2017 outlining its position on the EU ETS’s post-2020 reform. It agreed, inter alia, to 
permanently cancel 800 million allowances held in the MSR in 2021 and to double the rate at which 
the MSR absorbs surplus allowances from the market from 12 per cent to 24 per cent during the 
period 2019-2022. At the time of writing (20 February 2017), the Council has yet to finalise its joint 
position on the the post-2020 EU ETS reform before trilogue negotiations between the Commission, 
the Parliament and the Council could start. See International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP), 
‘European Parliament Passes Proposal for Reforming the EU ETS’ ICAP (Berlin, 17 February 2017) 
<https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/news-archive/443-the-european-parliament-passes-proposal-for-
reforming-the-eu-ets> accessed 20 February 2017.
314 The Market Stability Reserve Decision, art 1(6).
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than 100 million allowances, all allowances in reserve will be released. Whenever the 
allowance surplus remains between the 400 million and 833 million thresholds, the 
MSR plays no role.315
The Commission argued that the MSR provides a rule-based, non-discretionary 
and predictable mechanism of addressing supply-demand imbalances in the long-
run.316 It also indicated that several stakeholders supported the idea of a quantity 
mechanism of supply management. Alternative proposals, especially direct price-
management schemes, could not garner as much support because they are against 
the ‘central principles’ of the EU ETS ‘as an instrument based on volume not on 
price’.317 The Commission further noted that ‘agreeing on the “right” price thresholds 
would be very contentious, if not impossible’.318
4.3.2. The Korean ETS’s approach to market stabilisation
The Korean ETS, which commenced on 1 January 2015, is a cap-and-trade scheme 
covering 66 per cent of South Korea’s annual emissions.319 It is structured into several 
phases, each running for five years, except that the first two phases run for three years 
each.320 Each period operates under a separate set of rules outlined in an allocation 
plan.321 The allocation plans specify, inter alia, the cap for a given phase, the total 
number of allowances for each compliance year, the types of sectors and businesses 
to be covered by the ETS, and the distribution criteria of emissions allowances.322
The Korean ETS incorporates several instruments that authorities may deploy 
to address market instability. Regulatory measures may be taken if either of the 
following conditions is met: (i) the average allowance price in the preceding six 
315 There is an exception to this. The MSR will release 100 million allowances annually if a measure is 
adopted according to Article 29a of Directive 2003/87/EC, which specifies the conditions under 
which measures to control sudden allowance price spikes could be taken. See The Market Stability 
Reserve decision, art 1(7).
316 COM (2014) 20 final, 17.
317 COM (2014) 20 final, 14.
318 COM (2014) 20 final, 14.
319 International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP), ‘Emissions Trading Worldwide: International 
Carbon Action Partnership Status Report 2016’ (ICAP 2016) 57.
320 Act on the Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse Gas Emission Permits [Act No 11690, 23 March 
2013], art 2(4) (hereafter: Allocation and Trading Act). See also Park and Hong (n 299) 3.
321 Allocation and Trading Act, art 5.
322 Allocation and Trading Act, art 5.
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consecutive months increases by more than threefold of the average allowance price 
in the past two years; (ii) the average allowance price in the preceding six consecutive 
months is more than twofold the average allowance price in the previous two years 
and the average trading volume of one month is at least twice the volume of the same 
month in the past two years; or (iii) the average price of allowances in the preceding 
month falls below 60 per cent of the average price for the two preceding years.323
The fulfilment of either of the aforementioned conditions is not, however, a 
sufficient condition to introduce market stabilisation measures. The enabling statute 
of the Korean ETS and its accompanying enforcement decree state that the Minister 
of Environment, in consultation with the Emission Permits Allocation Committee 
(EPAC),324 ‘may take measures for stabilising markets’ if any of the aforementioned 
conditions are met.325 If the Minister of Environment decides to take market 
stabilisation measures, it can choose to: (i) release additional allowances not 
exceeding 25 per cent of the total allowance reserve; (ii) set a temporary price floor 
or price ceiling; (iii) increase or decrease the quota on the use of offset credits;326 (iv) 
increase or decrease allowance borrowing between compliance years;327 (v) require 
compliance entities to hold a maximum or a minimum number of allowances.328
In stark contrast to the EU ETS’ MSR, the Korean ETS’ market stabilisation 
measures are neither rule-based nor non-discretionary. Whereas predefined quantity-
based triggers set the MSR in motion, the ultimate decision whether to take market 
stabilisation measures in the Korean ETS rests with the Minister of Environment 
323 Allocation and Trading Act, art 23; Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Allocation and Trading of 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Permits [Presidential Decree No 24429, 23 March 2013], art 30 (hereafter: 
Enforcement Decree of the Allocation and Trading Act).
324 The EPAC, chaired by the Minister of Finance and Strategy, is constituted of not more than 20 
persons. Its members include ‘public officials at the level of Vice Minister’ from several Ministries and 
private individuals appointed by Minister of Finance and Strategy. The EPAC plays several critical 
roles in the governance of the Korean ETS including allowance allocation, market stabilisation, and 
linking the Korean ETS to other markets. See Allocation and Trading Act, arts 6 and 7.
325 Allocation and Trading Act, art 23.
326 Currently, covered entities may cover up to 10 per cent of their emissions in a compliance year using 
domestic offset credits. Allocation and Trading Act, art 29(3); Enforcement Decree of the Allocation 
and Trading Act, art 38(4); ICAP (n 319) 57.
327 Covered entities are allowed, under some conditions, to borrow allowances from future compliance 
periods to cover up to 10 per cent of their obligation in a given compliance period. Allocation and 
Trading Act, art 28; Enforcement Decree of the Allocation and Trading Act, art 36.
328 Allocation and Trading Act, art 23; Enforcement Decree of the Allocation and Trading Act, art 30.
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and the EPAC.329 Also, whereas the MSR ceases to absorb or release allowances 
based on quantity-based triggers that are set in advance, market stabilisation 
measures will not be withdrawn from the Korean ETS unless the EPAC decides that 
the objectives of introducing the measures are achieved.330 It also remains unclear 
how the different measures will be implemented. Will the price floor, for instance, 
be implemented through a government buyback scheme, a fee payable by covered 
entities, or something else? As will be discussed in the next Section, the answers to 
these questions have efficiency, environmental integrity and regulatory implications 
for the ETS and its prospects for linking.
4.4. Market stabilisation measures and linking
The previous Section showed that the EU and Korean ETSs apply different types 
of market stabilisation measures. The differences can be summarised into three. 
First, while the EU ETS uses a system of scarcity management, the Korean ETS 
predominantly uses direct price control mechanisms. Second, the Korean ETS’ 
market stabilisation measures are less immune from political influence than those 
of the EU ETS’. While the EU ETS’ MSR is rule-based, non-discretionary, and 
automatic, the market stabilisation measures of the Korean ETS are deployed only 
after a decision to that effect is taken by a political body – the EPAC. Third, the EU 
ETS sets quantity-based triggers for the MSR while, on the other hand, the Korean 
market stabilisation measures use price-based triggers.
This Section examines the efficiency, environmental integrity, and regulatory 
implications of allowing a mix of the EU and Korean market stabilisation measures 
operate side-by-side in a linked EU-Korean carbon market.
4.4.1. Efficiency implications
Unlike the triggers of the EU ETS’s MSR, the price-based triggers of the Korean ETS 
are not fixed. The trigger prices will move following the average price of allowances 
over the preceding two years. The triggers do not thus afford as much price certainty 
as fixed price triggers. Two additional factors compound the uncertainty. First, the 
deployment of the market stabilisation measures in Korea is not automatic. Measures 
329 Allocation and Trading Act, arts 8(1) and 23(1); Enforcement Decree of the Allocation and Trading 
Act, arts 6(1) and 30.
330 Enforcement Decree of the Allocation and Trading Act, art 30(7&8).
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can be deployed only after the EPAC takes a decision to that effect. Second, it 
remains unclear which and how many of the several instruments will be deployed if 
the price-based triggers are met.
The absence of fixed price triggers, the lack of clarity about the type and number 
of instruments that will be deployed to address too low or too high prices, and the 
room for political manoeuvre through the EPAC sow uncertainty. Because linking 
creates interdependence between the climate policies of the linking jurisdictions 
and a regulatory intervention in one jurisdiction affects the other, the uncertainty 
pervading the Korean carbon market would also impact the EU ETS by obstructing 
price discovery.
The differences in the nature of the respective schemes’ triggers may also invite 
incoherent regulatory interventions. The MSR is designed to absorb or release 
allowances based on a relative surplus in the market irrespective of the level of the 
carbon price. If the MSR absorbs allowances, prices will increase. The price increase 
may, in turn, activate the Korean price ceiling or other similar measures, increasing 
allowance supply in the market that may in turn again activate the quantity-based 
triggers of the MSR to absorb allowances. The mix of the EU and Korean market 
stabilisation measures may thus set off a cycle of regulatory intervention that sows 
uncertainty, distorts price discovery, and erodes credibility in the market. Ironically, 
the measures designed to bring stability and predictability to the market might 
create instability and erode confidence in the carbon market.
In addition, the mechanisms through which the market stabilisation measures 
of the Korean ETS will be implemented will have different efficiency implications. 
This could be illustrated by showing how alternative ways of implementing a price 
floor affect economic efficiency. Wood and Jotzo outline three alternative ways of 
implementing a price floor: an auction reserve price, a government buyback scheme, 
or a (fixed or flexible) fee or tax that covered entities pay in addition to surrendering 
allowances to cover their emissions in a compliance year/period.331 An auction reserve 
331 Wood and Jotzo (n 291) 1748-1750. Taxes are legally and conceptually distinct from fees. A critical 
distinction between taxes and fees concerns the benefits that payers receive. Because taxes are 
characterised as ‘compulsory and unrequited’, benefits that taxpayers receive from government are 
not usually in proportion to their payment. On the other hand, fees are paid ‘for services rendered and 
… [should be] in proportion to the costs incurred.’ See SE Weishaar, ‘Fault Lines between Fees and 
Taxes: Legal Obstacles for Linking’ in L Kreiser and others (eds), Carbon Pricing: Design, Experience 
and Issues (Edward Elgar 2015) 37. See also JE Milne, ‘Environmental Taxes and Fees: Wrestling with 
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price sets a minimum price for allowances auctioned, and no allowances are sold 
below the reserve price.332 Whether an auction reserve price establishes an effective 
floor price depends on the share of auctioned allowances relative to those distributed 
free of charge. The larger/smaller the share of auctioned allowances, the higher/lower 
the likelihood that an auction reserve price guarantees a minimum price.
In a buyback scheme, the government guarantees to buy an unlimited number 
of allowances if prices fall below a specified threshold.333 While easy to implement 
and effective, a buyback scheme could be financially burdensome. Finally, a fixed 
fee functions as an additional carbon tax on the emissions that regulated entities 
must cover by surrendering allowances.334 Alternatively, a flexible fee can be levied 
by setting a threshold (floor) price and requiring covered entities to pay the fee only 
if allowance prices fall below the threshold price. When allowance prices fall below 
the threshold, covered entities pay a fee equivalent to the difference between the 
threshold price and the allowance price.335
In the context of the Korean ETS, an auction reserve price cannot guarantee a 
minimum allowance price because the share of (to be) auctioned allowances in the 
Korean ETS is too small to guarantee a minimum allowance price.336 A government 
buyback scheme would be effective but financially burdensome not least because the 
government generates (almost) no revenue from selling allowances. The third option 
– imposing a fixed fee per tonne of CO2 in addition to requiring covered entities 
to surrender an allowance covering the relevant emission – will increase the cost of 
abatement in an EU-Korean carbon market. To show this, I will discuss the effect 
of the fee on allowance prices in the Korean ETS both in autarky and after linking 
one after the other.
Theory’ in L Kreiser and others (eds), Environmental Taxation and Green Fiscal Reform: Theory and 
Impact (Edward Elgar 2014). This conceptual distinction, Weishaar argues, has legal implications. 
Since our analysis is not concerned with the legal characterisation of taxes and fees, the concepts are 
used here interchangeably.
332 Wood and Jotzo (n 291) 1749.
333 Wood and Jotzo (n 291) 1748.
334 Wood and Jotzo (n 291) 1749.
335 Wood and Jotzo (n 291) 1749-1750.
336 The share of auctioned allowances in the first, second and third trading phases is, respectively, zero, 
three and ‘more than 10’ per cent. Korea Environment Institute, ‘Emissions Trading Scheme’ (2015) 7, 
Korea Environmental Policy Bulletin Vol XIII Issue 1 <http://eng.me.go.kr/eng/file/readDownloadFile.
do?fileId=133612&fileSeq=1> accessed 23 December 2016. See also ICAP (n 319) 57.
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A profit maximising firm covered by an ETS must decide whether to continue 
emitting GHGs (and procure allowances to cover those emissions) or to reduce 
its emissions by adopting, say, low-carbon production methods and processes. A 
firm decides whether to abate or to buy allowances based on its MAC function 
and the price of emissions allowances. Given the firm’s abatement cost function, an 
increase/a decrease in the price of allowances makes one abatement option more/less 
attractive than the other. If prices increase, the firm’s opportunity cost of switching 
to (previously unattractive) low-carbon abatement options will decrease. On the 
other hand, if allowance prices decrease, previously affordable abatement options on 
the firm’s cost of abatement schedule will become off limits.
Suppose the carbon price is below the level the government thinks it should 
be. It decides to levy a fee. Let’s examine the effects of the fee on the overall level of 
abatement and the price of allowances. In a cap-and-trade system, the overall level of 
abatement is determined by the cap. The carbon price does not affect the overall level 
of abatement; it only directs the distribution of abatement efforts among regulated 
entities. As a result, with or without the fee, the level of the overall abatement in 
a cap-and-trade system remains at the level of the cap. However, the fee will affect 
allowance prices. The imposition of the fee incentivises firms to increase their 
abatement efforts, leading to a decrease in demand for emissions allowances and a 
downward shift in the demand curve. With a downward shifting demand curve and a 
constant supply curve, the equilibrium price decreases and the equilibrium quantity 
(overall level of emissions abatement) remains unaffected by the fee. Since the levy 
compensates for the extra fall in allowance prices, the effective carbon price – now 
comprising the fee and the market-based allowance price – remains unaffected.337 In 
sum, the fee will neither lead to a change in the overall level of abatement nor to a 
higher effective carbon price than a situation without the fee.338 To be sure, the fee 
ensures price certainty by keeping the effective carbon price at or above the level of 
the fee.339
In the context of a bilateral link between the EU and Korean ETSs, the fee 
would be asymmetric as the EU ETS lacks (or does not envisage) a similar system. 
337 S Fankhauser, C Hepburn and J Park, ‘Combining Multiple Policy Instruments: How not to Do It’ 
(2011) 7-9, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Paper 
No 38 <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/37573> accessed 9 December 2015.
338 Fankhauser, Hepburn and Park (n 337) 9.
339 Wood and Jotzo (n 291) 1749-1750.
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The pre-linking symmetry between an increase in the level of the fee and the 
corresponding decrease in allowance prices will be lost after the Korean ETS links 
with the EU ETS. In this asymmetric setting, the unilateral fee will be added on 
top of the international carbon price that the Korean ETS – given its relatively 
small size compared to the EU ETS – hardly influences. This would increase the 
effective carbon price (marginal cost of abatement) in the Korean ETS above the 
international carbon price by the level of the fee or a little less than that.
The increase in the marginal cost of abatement shifts more abatement to the 
Korean ETS than would happen in a linking scenario without the fee/tax. Since 
efficiency requires equalisation of firms’ MACs across the linking-partner ETSs, the 
unilateral fee leads to inefficiencies as it prevents equalisation of MACs of Korean 
and EU entities. This means that abatement will not be shifted to wherever it may 
be achieved at the least cost, increasing the overall cost of mitigation and reversing, 
at least in part, the gains from trade.
4.4.2. Environmental integrity
The environmental effectiveness/integrity of a cap-and-trade scheme depends on 
its cap, a robust system of monitoring, reporting and verification, and a credible 
compliance and enforcement system.340 Provided that the cap is set at a socially 
desirable level and it is backed by a robust and credible monitoring and compliance 
system, a cap-and-trade scheme is environmentally effective. Linking does not 
affect this because it simply shifts abatement within the participating cap-and-trade 
schemes without affecting the aggregate level of emissions.
The conclusion that the post-linking aggregate emissions would be a sum of the 
individual linking-partner schemes’ caps in autarky rests on the assumption that each 
linking-partner ETS has a cap that is fixed ex ante and is immune from adjustment ex 
post. If either of the linking-partner ETSs deviates from these assumptions, aggregate 
emissions under linking may be higher or lower than in autarky. The Korean ETS, 
for instance, foresees adjustment of its cap ex post through the setting of a temporary 
price ceiling that addresses allowance price spikes.341 In theory, the government 
could, if the price ceiling is triggered, issue an unlimited number of allowances, 
340 Tietenberg, ‘The Tradable Permits Approach’ (n 282) 200-201; Weishaar, Emissions Trading Design (n 
288) 40-41.
341 Allocation and Trading Act, art 23; Enforcement Decree of the Allocation and Trading Act, art 30.
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require firms to pay the ceiling price in lieu of surrendering allowances, or set up 
a limited pool of allowances that will be released to the market when prices reach 
the ceiling level.342 Each of these options for implementing the price ceiling will 
undermine the environmental integrity of an EU-Korean carbon market.
A significant price increase in an EU-Korea carbon market is likely to largely 
reflect changing market fundamentals in the EU ETS. Any measure that aims 
to address the price increase should address those market fundamentals. If the 
government implements the price ceiling through the issuance of an unlimited 
number of emissions allowances or by requiring firms to pay the ceiling price instead 
of surrendering allowances, it will have to address a surge in demand for emissions 
allowances both from the Korean ETS and the EU ETS. Korea’s price ceiling will 
propagate to the EU ETS and aggregate emissions under linking will exceed the level 
in autarky.
Regarding the option of setting up a limited pool of allowances to be released 
if the price ceiling is triggered, the Korean ETS already allows releasing additional 
allowances not exceeding 25 per cent of the total allowance reserve to address 
high allowance prices.343 Because releasing additional allowances is provided as an 
alternative instrument of addressing price volatility to other instruments such as a 
price ceiling, it seems unlikely that it will be used as a mechanism of implementing 
the temporary price ceiling. If it is used as such, the government must release, as 
discussed above, far more number of additional allowances under linking than it 
would in autarky, undermining environmental integrity.
Finally, the Korean ETS’s borrowing provisions will also threaten environmental 
effectiveness of a linked EU-Korean carbon market.344 Borrowing provisions, which 
allow firms to borrow emissions allowances from future compliance periods for 
current compliance, could address problem of price volatility by instilling temporal 
flexibility, helping firms to spread abatement over time.345 However, they may also 
undermine environmental integrity of an ETS by creating problems of moral hazard 
342 See Murray, Newell and Pizer (n 287); Fell and others (n 288).
343 Allocation and Trading Act, art 23(2).
344 To address a sudden increase in allowance prices, the EPAC may increase the borrowing limit that is 
currently set at 10 per cent of a firm’s compliance obligation in a given compliance period. Allocation 
and Trading Act, art 28; Enforcement Decree of the Allocation and Trading Act, art 36.
345 See Fankhauser and Hepburn, ‘Carbon Markets in Time’ (n 286).
Carbon Market Stabilisation Measures and Linking
89
4
and adverse selection.346 Firms may borrow from future compliance periods and 
exit the market before achieving the time-shifted emissions (a problem of moral 
hazard). Financially troubled firms are also likely to borrow more than solvent firms 
(a problem of adverse selection). In both cases, the environmental integrity of the 
relevant ETS is undermined. Intuitively, the margin by which the borrowing limit 
will be increased is likely to be higher under linking than in autarky, propagating 
the Korean ETS’s borrowing provisions to the EU ETS and compounding the 
environmental integrity concerns associated with these provisions.
4.4.3. Regulatory implications
Linking ETSs establishes trade in emissions rights between firms covered under the 
linking-partner ETSs. This Section discusses, first, whether price volatility increases 
or decreases under linking relative to autarky. Second, it discusses the implications 
of the interdependence created by linking ETSs for the regulatory autonomy of the 
linking-partner jurisdictions and the effectiveness of unilateral market stabilisation 
measures.
Compared to a pre-linking scenario, does linking increase/decrease price 
volatility in the linking-partner ETSs? This is likely to be affected by the relative size 
of the linking-partner ETSs and whether the source of the price volatility is global 
or local. In the case of a global price shock affecting relevant linking-partner ETSs 
equally, linking is likely to help them absorb the price shock by increasing liquidity 
and flexibility. This is vital especially to small ETSs that inevitably face limited 
flexibility and liquidity due to their size. In the context of the EU and Korean ETSs, 
the liquidity benefits of linking would be greater to the Korean ETS – an ETS about 
a fourth of the size of the EU ETS.
Where the price shock is local, the inter-system trading in allowances increases 
the risks of contagion of the shock from one ETS to others.347 The disrupting 
346 See H Fell, E Moore and RD Morgenstern, ‘Cost Containment under Cap and Trade: A Review 
of the Literature’ (2011) 5 International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics 285; 
Weishaar, Emissions Trading Design (n 288) 61-63.
347 WJ McKibbin, A Morris and PJ Wilcoxen, ‘Expecting the Unexpected: Macroeconomic Volatility 
and Climate Policy’ (2008) Brookings Global Economy and Development Working Paper No. 28 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1324938> accessed 7 December 2015. A fitting example is what ensued 
after the EU and Australia announced in August 2012 a proposed link between their respective ETSs 
commencing in July 2015. The expected price of ACUs – Australia’s primary carbon ‘currency’ – for 
2015 slumped from near A$30/tCO2 to just A$12.1. See Point Carbon (n 280). Although linking 
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impacts of such price shocks crucially depend on the relative size of the linking-
partner ETSs. In a bilateral link between ETSs with significant variation in size, 
price shocks originating from the larger ETS may lead to more instability in the 
smaller ETS than the other way round. This is likely to be the case in a full bilateral 
linking between the EU and Korean ETSs because the demand-supply dynamics in 
the EU ETS will largely determine the post-linking carbon price and the Korean 
ETS will become a price-taker.
Linking also creates interdependence in the linking-partners’ climate policies. 
Each jurisdiction’s climate policies will become less immune to regulatory 
interventions in other jurisdictions. The cross-border impacts of the regulatory 
interventions depend again on the relative size of the linking-partner ETSs. In a 
linking between ETSs with significant variation in size, regulatory measures taken in 
the bigger market largely shape the supply-demand dynamics in the linked carbon 
market. The smaller market becomes a price-taker and its regulatory measures only 
marginally influence the overall carbon market.348
While the smaller market suffers from localised price shocks originating from the 
bigger market, its regulatory measures become relatively ineffective in addressing the 
ensuing market instability. This can be illustrated using the Korean ETS’s price floor. 
Trying to set the price floor through an auction reserve price would be ineffective 
because almost all allowances are allocated free of charge. Even if the Korean ETS 
were to auction all its allowances, an auction reserve price would not guarantee a 
price floor without a similar scheme in the EU ETS. By contrast, a government 
scheme that buys back allowances at a threshold price could guarantee a price floor. 
However, this requires buying allowances also flowing from the EU ETS. Because of 
linking, the financial burden of buying back allowances balloons.
As Flachsland and his colleagues pointed out, localised price shocks will be 
unavoidable in so far as the economies of the linking-partners remain idiosyncratic, 
making each linking-partner jurisdiction better placed to respond to such shocks 
ETS is expected to cause permit prices to increase in one scheme and to decrease in another, the 
price slump in the Australian CPM reflected the contagion of the EU ETS’s regulatory uncertainty 
concerning allowance oversupply. The linking brought policy uncertainties of EU ETS to the shores 
of the Australian carbon market.
348 It has to be noted that regulatory actions of a small ETS could, in some circumstances, have significant 
implications for the interconnected carbon market. This is, for instance, the case when a small ETS 
enforces a price ceiling through an unlimited issuance of allowances.
Carbon Market Stabilisation Measures and Linking
91
4
independently.349 Yet, linking reduces the effectiveness of unilateral regulatory 
measures, especially by smaller ETSs. Faced with ineffective unilateral measures, 
linking-partner jurisdictions could be driven to agreeing on a harmonised set of 
market stabilisation measures or put in place other governance structures that 
dynamically address the instability of the interconnected carbon market.350
However, neither agreeing on a harmonised set of measures nor ceding 
regulatory autonomy to, for instance, an independent agency is easy especially if the 
linking-partner jurisdictions pursue different climate policy priorities. In the context 
of the EU ETS, for instance, the EU has shown an aversion to price-based market 
stabilisation instruments.351 The Commission portrayed price-based instruments as 
incompatible with the EU ETS for they ‘would fundamentally modify the EU ETS, 
as the system would no longer be a quantity-based [instrument].’352 It further argued 
that price-based instruments would leave the decision on prices to policymakers.353 
Instead the EU opted for a rule-based and predictable system scarcity management 
that foresees no significant role for the Commission or the Member States.354 The 
EU seems to (implicitly) favour high and predictable carbon prices that will drive 
investment and innovation in low carbon technologies.355
In contrast, Korea liberally drew from both price and quantity instruments in 
setting up its market stabilisation measures. The market stabilisation measures are, 
unlike the EU ETS’s MSR, discretionary and foresee an active involvement of the 
349 C Flachsland, R Marschinski and O Edenhofer, ‘To Link or not to Link: Benefits and Disadvantages 
of Linking Cap-and-Trade Systems’ (2009) 9 Climate Policy 358, 366.
350 For a discussion of institutional arrangements of linking, see MA Mehling and E Haites, ‘Mechanisms 
for Linking Emissions Trading Schemes’ (2009) 9 Climate Policy 169; B Görlach, MA Mehling and 
E Roberts, ‘Designing Institutions, Structures and Mechanisms to Facilitate the Linking of Emissions 
Trading Schemes’ (German Emissions Trading Authority 2015).
351 See, for instance, Weishaar, ‘Incentivising Technologic Change’ (n 281) 141. 
352 COM (2014) 20 final, 21.
353 COM (2014) 20 final, 21.
354 COM (2014) 20 final, 17-21.
355 This need not imply that too high carbon prices are not a concern in the EU ETS. They are. After 
all, the MSR is designed to address both too high and too low allowance prices. Also, Article 29a 
of Directive 2003/87/EC stipulates the institutional mechanisms of addressing too high allowance 
prices. Yet since the first phase, there has been a growing concern that the EU ETS has not been able 
to deliver a predictable and sufficiently high carbon price to incentivise research and development and 
long-term investments in low-carbon technologies. The recent discussion about structural reforms 
was also started largely due to concerns about the dynamic efficiency of the ETS.
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government. Korea seems to be concerned about the economic consequences of high 
allowance prices especially during the early years of the ETS. It is no coincidence that 
the EPAC is largely composed of senior officials from several Ministries and that it 
housed within the Ministry of Strategy and Finance. These different policy priorities 
and preferences are likely to make addressing the regulatory challenges of linking by 
pooling sovereignty or putting in place other forms of coordination difficult.
4.5. Conclusion
This Chapter analysed if and how different market stabilisation measures affect the 
linking ETSs by taking the EU and Korean ETSs as examples. The two jurisdictions 
differ not only in their policy arsenal targeting market instability but also in the 
policy priorities they would like to achieve through their respective measures. In 
terms of instrument choice, the EU excludes price-based instruments from it policy 
arsenal. By contrast, Korea cobbles together both quantity-based and price-based 
instruments. That the two jurisdictions use different policy instruments will have 
profound implications for the efficiency and environmental integrity of an EU-
Korean carbon market.
From the perspective of safeguarding efficiency and environmental integrity, a 
linked EU-Korean carbon market is likely to be better served by a harmonised set of 
market stabilisation measures or other governance structures such as dynamic supply 
management by a supranational independent agency. Neither is easy given the 
jurisdictions’ seemingly incompatible policy priorities. This may partly be explained 
by the different stages of development of the respective carbon markets.
At the early stages of the EU ETS, policymakers focused on garnering stakeholders’ 
support for an ‘alien’ climate policy instrument.356 Despite the Commission’s implicit 
plea for a centralised scheme with a bigger share of auctioning in the allocation 
of allowances, the EU ETS commenced as a decentralised scheme, and almost all 
allowances were allocated for free. These were the ‘prices’ paid to garner industry 
support. Over the years, the ETS has undergone several changes, culminating in the 
current centralised scheme that aspires to phase out free allocation gradually and 
to deliver high and predictable prices that incentivise investments in low-carbon 
technologies.
By contrast, as a newcomer to the global landscape of emissions trading, Korea 
356 See the discussion in Section 6.2.2 below in Chapter 6 on the politics of pricing carbon in the EU.
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seems to be concerned about carbon prices spiralling out of control. This might 
explain the diversity of its policy arsenal targeting market instability and the active 
government involvement in their operation. In time, the respective jurisdictions’ 
climate policy priorities may align to one another. Without this, linking the 
two systems with their current set of market stabilisation measures raises serious 





offset ProvIsIons And lInkIng
5.1. Introduction
Several emissions trading systems (ETSs) recognise offset credits as alternative 
compliance instruments.357 When offset credits are accepted in ETSs, they expand 
the size of the market across space and reduce compliance costs.358 They also mitigate 
the short-term costs of transitioning an economy to a low-carbon future while, in the 
long-run, new technologies are developed, and structural transformations are made, 
preventing the premature retirement of assets.359 Offset credits accepted by several 
ETSs, such Certified Emission Reduction (CER) from the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), also indirectly link otherwise fragmented carbon markets.360
The use of credits in several ETSs is subject to restrictions. The restrictions can be 
broadly subdivided into three categories: qualitative, geographic, and quantitative. 
357 International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP), ‘Emissions Trading Worldwide: International 
Carbon Action Partnership Status Report 2016’ (ICAP 2016) 29-67.
358 S Fankhauser and C Hepburn, ‘Designing Carbon Markets. Part II: Carbon Markets in Space’ (2010) 
38 Energy Policy 4381; R Trotignon, ‘Combining Cap-and-Trade with Offsets: Lessons from the EU-
ETS’ (2011) 12 Climate Policy 273.
359 EPRI, ‘Emissions Offsets: The Key Role of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Offsets in a U.S. Greenhouse 
Gas Cap-and-Trade Program’ (Electric Power Research Institute 2010) 14, <http://www.epri.com/
abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspx?ProductId=000000000001019910> accessed 9 December 2015.
360 RN Stavins and J Jaffe, ‘Linking Tradable Permit Systems for Greenhouse Gas Emissions: 
Opportunities, Implications, and Challenges’ (IETA 2007) Report for International Emissions 
Trading Association <http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IETA_Linking_Report.pdf> accessed 
7 December 2015, 13-14; A Tuerk and others, ‘Linking Carbon Markets: Concepts, Case Studies and 
Pathways’ (2009) 9 Climate Policy 341.
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Qualitative restrictions define the types of (in)eligible credits or offset projects. An 
example is a ban on credits from industrial gas projects in the EU ETS,361 or a ban 
on credits from the CDM in the Californian and Quebec cap-and-trade schemes.362 
Geographic restrictions spell out the countries or regions from which eligible credits 
must come. For instance, the EU ETS requires that new CERs (CERs generated 
from projects registered after 2012) must come from Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs).363 Most ETSs in China accept only Chinese CERs.364 Finally, quantitative 
restrictions define a quota on the use of credits in a compliance period.
ETSs differ in the types and geographic origins of credits they accept and the 
quota they impose on the use of eligible credits. It is often argued that differences 
in offset provisions between to-be-linked ETSs could pose significant barriers to 
linking.365 The central thesis of this argument is that if ETSs with different offset 
provisions are linked, their offset provisions automatically propagate into each 
other’s ETSs, each ETS becoming a ‘back-door’ through which more restrictive 
offset provisions of a linking-partner ETSs are ignored. We, however, argue that, 
seen from an economic perspective, differences in offset provisions need not 
constitute impediments to linking. We show this by examining the efficiency and 
environmental integrity effects of differences in offset provisions for a linked carbon 
market. Yet, political considerations may trump economic considerations, leading to 
differences in offset provisions constituting impediments to linking.
361 Commission Regulation (EU) No 550/2011 of 7 June 2011 on determining, pursuant to Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, certain restrictions applicable to the 
use of international credits from projects involving industrial gases [2011] OJ L 149/1 (hereafter: 
Regulation to Ban Credits from Industrial Gas Projects).
362 Cal Code Regs, tit 17, paras 95991-95995 and para 95854; ICAP (n 357).
363 Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
scheme of the community [2009] OJ L140/63, arts 11a(4) and 11a(5) (hereafter: The Revised 
Emissions Trading Directive). See also Commission, ‘A policy framework for climate and energy in the 
period from 2020 to 2030’ (Communication) COM (2014)15 final, 6; D Meadows, Y Slingenberg 
and P Zapfel, ‘EU ETS: Pricing Carbon to Drive Cost-Effective Reductions Across Europe’ in J 
Delbeke and P Vis (eds), EU Climate Policy Explained (Routledge 2015) 53-54.
364 See text to notes 406 –409 below.
365 See, for instance, Tuerk and others (n 360) 346-348; J Jakob-Gallmann, Regulatory Issues in the 
Carbon Market: The Linkage of the Emissions Trading System of Switzerland with the Emissions Trading 
Scheme of the European Union (Schulthess 2011) 140-142; House of Commons Energy and Climate 
Change Committee, Linking Emissions Trading Systems (HC 2014-15, HC 739) 14.
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The chapter is structured into four Sections. Section 5.2 discusses the economics 
of offsets. It discusses the benefits of and concerns about recognising offset credits 
as alternative instruments of compliance in a domestic ETS. Section 5.3 reviews 
the offset provisions of several major ETSs. Section 5.4 analyses the implications 
for linking of differences in the offset provisions of to-be-linked ETSs. Section 5.5 
concludes the chapter.
5.2. The economics of offsets
Offset credits represent emissions reductions or removals from sectors and regions 
not covered by an ETS (known as uncapped sectors and regions).366 If recognised as 
instruments of compliance in a given ETS, covered entities can use them to ‘offset’ 
(compensate) their emissions. There are several advantages to recognising the use 
of offset credits as alternative instruments of compliance in an ETS. Their use is 
also not without costs and controversies. Ideally, an offset policy maximises the net 
benefits of using offset credits in an ETS. This Section discusses the benefits and 
costs of using offset credits in an ETS and the trade-offs involved in designing an 
offset policy.
5.2.1. Benefits of offsets
Combining offsets with an ETS has several advantages. First, offset credits could 
serve as cost-containment mechanisms.367 Without offsets, emissions reductions 
need to be achieved within sectors covered under a carbon trading scheme. This 
may not only result in higher compliance costs to covered sectors, but it may also 
undermine political acceptability for an ETS. Offset credits help reduce costs of 
compliance by increasing flexibility and liquidity in the allowance market. They, 
therefore, help to control allowance price spikes and reduce compliance costs for 
covered sectors and the economy at large. 
366 LP Olander and BC Murray, ‘Offsets: An Important Piece of Climate Policy Puzzle’ (2008) 1, 
Duke University Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions Policy Brief <https://
nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/climate/mitigationbeyondcap/offsetseries1> accessed 9 December 2015.
367 Olander and Murray (n 366) 1; JL Ramseur, ‘The Role of Offsets in a Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Cap-and-Trade Program: Potential Benefits and Concerns’ (2008) 12, CRS Report for Congress 
Order Code RL34436 <http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RL34436.
pdf> accessed 9 December 2015; JB Bushnell, ‘The Economics of Carbon Offsets’ (2010) 2, NBER 
Working Paper No 16305 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w16305> accessed 9 December 2015.
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Second, offsets ease a transition to a carbon-constrained world. By attaching 
a price tag to every unit of regulated greenhouse gas, emission trading induces 
decarbonisation through structural transformations in existing production facilities. 
However, transitioning to a carbon-constrained economy needs time as new low-
carbon technologies have to be developed, tested and deployed. Offsets can play 
a crucial role by serving as near-term, low-cost compliance option while, in the 
long-term, new technologies are developed, and such structural transformations are 
made. This allows currently stranded assets to be utilised longer, reducing premature 
retirement of assets.368 
Third, offsets engage uncapped sectors and regions in the global climate change 
mitigation efforts.369 An offset programme rewards sectors and regions outside the 
coverage of a carbon trading scheme for reducing their emissions below a fixed 
baseline. The economic gain from trading in offset credits could incentivise emission 
reductions or removals and spur innovation in the uncapped sectors and regions 
that would otherwise remain untapped. For instance, the CDM – the world’s largest 
international project-based offset scheme – not only aims to stimulate sustainable 
development and emission reductions in developing countries, but it also offers 
industrialised nations alternative ways of achieving their emission reduction 
targets.370 
Fourth, an international offset scheme such as the CDM may serve as a hub 
for indirect linkages between separate ETSs.371 Even in the absence of a direct link 
between individual ETSs, trading between specific schemes and a common offset 
scheme (such as the CDM) influences how prices develop in the ETSs, reducing 
the inefficiencies from different allowance prices in the respective schemes in 
autarky.
368 EPRI (n 369) 14.
369 Olander and Murray (n 366) 2.
370 See generally MW Wara and DG Victor, ‘A Realistic Policy on International Carbon Offsets’ 
(2008) Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies Working Paper No 74 <https://
law.stanford.edu/publications/a-realistic-policy-on-international-carbon-offsets> accessed 9 
December 2015.
371 Stavins and Jaffe, ‘Linking Tradable Permit Systems for Greenhouse Gas Emissions’ (n 360) 13-14; 
Tuerk and others (n 360).
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5.2.2. Concerns about offsets
Offsets are not without controversies. The major concerns relate to the environmental 
integrity of offset credits. Additionality constitutes ‘the single most contentious 
issue’ about offsets and casts doubt over their environmental integrity.372 An offset 
programme is considered as additional if the emission reductions or sequestrations 
it realises would not have happened but for the economic incentive created by the 
offset programme. Additionality tests have been used as proxies to test whether or 
not an offset project is additional.373 However, quantifying what would happen in the 
absence of a project (baseline scenario) requires imagining a ‘what if ’ (counterfactual) 
scenario, hence inherently difficult and imprecise. The concern is that offset credits 
may end up representing ‘phantom’ emissions reductions or removals; i.e. emissions 
reductions that are unreal and that would have happened.374
Because setting the ‘baseline scenario’ is difficult, offset project proponents 
have incentives to seek credits for emissions reductions/removals that would have 
happened anyway. An offset programme may thus become a magnet for those 
sources that would have reduced their emissions notwithstanding the incentive 
from the offset scheme. In addition, emissions sources might also be reluctant to 
introduce measures to curb their GHG emissions for this raises the baseline against 
which eligibility of offset projects might be assessed and takes away the credits 
they could have earned otherwise. Worse, an offset programme might incentivise 
372 See MC Trexler, DJ Broekhoff and LH Kosloff, ‘A Statistically Driven Approach to Offset-Based 
GHG Additionality Determinations: What can We Learn?’ (2006) 6 Sustainable Development Law 
and Policy 30, 30-31.
373 These include regulatory additionality, financial additionality, common practice test, and barrier test. 
Regulatory additionality tests whether an offset project being undertaken complies with national 
regulatory requirements or it goes in excess of those requirements. Unless a project reduces emissions 
below official policies, regulations and standards, it is not deemed additional. Under the financial 
additionality test, the project proponent needs to establish that had it not been for the financial 
incentives of the offset scheme, the project would not have been economically viable and a rational 
economic actor would not have undertaken it. The common practice test requires that an offset 
project that is considered as additional has to bring more emissions reductions than others which 
produce the same products and services using common practice technologies. Under the barriers test, 
a project proponent should prove that there are significant obstacles (such as local resistance to new 
technologies) to the implementation of the offset project. See Trexler, Broekhoff and Kosloff (n 372) 
31. 
374 DM Driesen, ‘Linkage and Multilevel Governance’ (2009) 19 Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law 389, 399-401.
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prospective participants to artificially inflate their emissions so that emission 
baselines can be set at modest levels. Rather than reducing their carbon footprints, 
emissions sources would continue emitting far greater volumes as doing so would 
be profitable.375
Additional environmental integrity concerns stem from issues of permanence 
and leakage. Permanence is most readily associated with carbon sequestration 
offset projects. Biological carbon sequestration (such as planting trees) absorbs 
atmospheric carbon and thereby removes CO2 that is already in the atmosphere. 
The danger with regard to biological carbon sequestration is that the carbon 
that is absorbed by the natural ecosystem may be released back into the air due 
to human-induced (intentional or otherwise) reversals or natural catastrophes 
such as fire, land use change, and pest attack.376 Leakage occurs when an offset 
project in one place/sector induces an increase in emission in other locations/
sectors.377 For instance, a decrease in deforestation in one place as a result of a 
carbon sequestration offset project may shift demand for timber to another place, 
increasing logging. The offset programme, rather than reducing emissions, shifts 
them to other areas/regions.
375 Wara and Victor (n 370) 11-12; Bushnell (n 367) 5.
376 RJ Carpenter, ‘Implementation of Biological Sequestration Offsets in a Carbon Reduction Policy: 
Answers to Key Questions for a Successful Domestic Offset Program’ (2010) 31 Energy Law Journal 
157, 158. In addressing risks of impermanence, liability could be imposed on buyers or sellers, or 
absorbed by the system. If financial liability is imposed on buyers, buyers will have the incentive to 
assess the quality of offset credits ex ante. If liability is imposed on sellers, buyers seek the cheapest 
offset credits irrespective of their quality. Alternatively, buyers and sellers could be allowed to assign 
liability through contracts (known as negotiated agreement approach). Although this may lead 
to efficient allocation of liability, it increases transaction costs. Under a system liability regime, 
an ETS absorbs risks of reversals and exonerate buyers and sellers from liability. Internalizing 
risks of reversals requires periodic tightening of the overall cap or otherwise the environmental 
effectiveness of the scheme may be compromised. Moreover, a system liability approach causes 
subsidization of poor-performing offset projects by those performing well. See BC Murray and 
LP Olander, ‘Addressing Impermanence Risk and Liability in Agriculture, Land Use Change, and 
Forest Carbon Projects’ (2008) 5-8, Duke University Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy 
Solutions Policy <https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/climate/policydesign/offsetseries3> accessed 9 
December 2015.
377 WA Jenkins, LP Olander and BC Murray, ‘Addressing Leakage in a Greenhouse Gas Mitigation 
Offsets Program for Forestry and Agriculture’ (2009) 2, Duke University Nicholas Institute 
for Environmental Policy Solutions <https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/climate/policydesign/
offsetseries4> accessed 9 December 2015.
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These environmental integrity concerns have given rise to a plethora of 
restrictions on the use of offset credits as compliance instruments in domestic 
ETSs.378 The restrictions come in different forms including qualitative rules 
specifying the types of (in)eligible credits that could be used for compliance 
purposes in a relevant ETS; quantitative restrictions that specify a quota on the 
number of credits that covered entities may surrender over a compliance period; 
or a ban on the use of offset credits altogether. In setting these restrictions, 
countries face tradeoffs.
There is a clear trade-off between an environmental objective of ensuring 
offset credits represent real, additional and permanent emissions reductions and 
an economic objective of using offset credits as cost-containment measures in a 
domestic ETS. While strict qualitative restrictions increase the likelihood that the 
offset credits accepted in the relevant jurisdiction represent real and additional 
emissions reductions, they eliminate low-cost abatement options that would 
otherwise bring real emission reductions. On the other hand, lenient qualitative 
restrictions increase the likelihood that credits representing phantom emissions 
reductions will be accepted as valid instruments of compliance in a domestic ETS, 
undermining environmental integrity. They, however, ensure that large volumes of 
low-cost credits are supplied to the market.
In addition, allowing unlimited use of (cheap) offset credits lowers 
compliance costs for entities covered under an ETS and the entire economy. This, 
however, weakens an ETS’s carbon price signal and slows down an economy’s 
transition to a carbon-constrained world, or worse, impedes the transition by 
locking-in inefficient high carbon intensity production assets. If an ETS allows 
the use of domestic offset credits, the use of (unlimited) international offset 
credits may face political opposition from sectors participating in the domestic 
offset scheme.
5.3. Offsets provisions in domestic ETSs
This Section reviews the offset provisions of selected ETSs across the globe and 
outlines the ETS’ qualitative and quantitative restrictions on the use of offset credits 
in the relevant system.
378 Driesen (n 374) 402-403.
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5.3.1. The EU ETS
The EU ETS bans international credits from nuclear and land use, land-use change 
and forestry (LULUCF) projects and requires that credits from large hydroelectric 
projects (more than 20 Megawatt of installed capacity) meet international standards, 
including those in the 2000 report of the World Commission on Dams.379 As of 1 
May 2013, credits from the destruction of industrial gases (HFC-23 and nitrous 
oxide (N2O)) are also banned.
380 The revised ETS Directive (2009/29/EC) requires 
that CERs generated from projects registered after 2012 must come from projects 
hosted by LDCs.381 The EU plans to ban the use of international credits altogether 
as of 2021.382
The credit utilisation limit for Phase III (2013-2020) is coupled to the Phase II 
(2008-2012) allocations and credit entitlements. Existing operators or installations 
are entitled to use credits up to either their Phase II credit utilisation limit or 11 per 
cent of their Phase II free allowance allocations, whichever is higher.383 New entrants 
379 Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within 
the Community, in respect of the Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms [2004] OJ L 338/18, art 
11(6).
380 Regulation to Ban Credits from Industrial Gas Projects.
381 Because the EU ETS Directive was adopted prior to the 2009 United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Copenhagen, the rules for the use of international offset credits are crafted under the 
expectation that an international agreement on climate change succeeding the Kyoto Protocol might 
be reached in Copenhagen. Had an international agreement succeeding the Kyoto Protocol been 
reached in Copenhagen, only CERs and ERUs generated in countries that ratified the international 
agreement would have been acceptable. Absent an international agreement by 31 December 2009, 
the Directive allows the use of ‘credits from projects or other emission reducing activities (…) in 
accordance with agreements concluded with third countries.’ In the event that no international 
agreement is adopted and that an agreement between the EU and third countries is reached, article 
11a(4-5) prohibits the use of CERs generated beyond 2013 unless they are from LDCs. As no 
international agreement had been adopted in Copenhagen, nor had the EU concluded agreements 
with third countries, the default situation provided by article 11a(4-5) applies. The Revised Emissions 
Trading Directive, arts 11a(4) and 11a(5). See also Commission, ‘Questions and answers on use 
of international credits in the third trading phase of the EU ETS’ (14 November 2011) <https://
ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2011111401_en> accessed 27 May 2017.
382 COM (2014)15 final, 6.
383 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1123/2013 of 8 November 2013 on determining international 
credit entitlements pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
[2013] OJ L 299/32, art 1(1) (hereafter: International Credit Entitlements Regulation).
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may use international credits to cover up to 4.5 per cent of their verified emissions 
in 2013-2020.384
5.3.2. The New Zealand ETS
The New Zealand ETS was launched in 2008 with the purpose of achieving the 
country’s Kyoto Protocol commitment and reducing greenhouse gas emissions in a 
cost-effective manner.385 When launched, the ETS allowed the use of most Kyoto 
Units - Assigned Amount Units (AAUs), CERs, Emission Reduction Units (ERUs), 
and Removal Units (RUs) – except that imported AAUs, Temporary CERs (tCERs), 
Long-term CERs (lCERs) and credits from nuclear projects were excluded.386 In 
addition, New Zealand imposed no quantitative restriction on the use of eligible 
credits, giving covered entities unrestricted access to eligible Kyoto Units and turning 
the ETS into an uncapped scheme.
A review of the ETS in 2011 by an independent panel of experts recommended 
banning the use of CERs generated from the destruction of HFC-23.387 The reasons 
for the recommendations were twofold. The first concerns environmental integrity 
concerns.388 Because HFC-23 is a by-product of HFC-22 and that credits could be 
earned through the CDM by destroying HFC-23, project developers increased their 
production of HFC-22 – an Ozone depleting potent greenhouse gas. The perverse 
incentive created by the CDM harms the environmental integrity of the credits 
generated from the destruction of HFC-23. 
The second reason arises from the EU ETS’s ban on the use of credits from 
industrial gas projects.389 Because the EU banned credits generated from industrial 
gas projects (including HFC-23), it was conceivable that, if accepted, these credits 
would flood the New Zealand market and drive down prices of New Zealand 
Units (NZUs) – the domestic carbon ‘currency’. Following a subsequent public 
384 International Credit Entitlements Regulation, art 1(2).
385 Climate Change Response Act 2002 (NZ) s 3(1).
386 Climate Change Response Act 2002, s 4 and s 18CB; New Zealand Emission Unit Register, ‘Guide 
to Surrender of Units’ (2013) <http://www.eur.govt.nz/how-to/guides-hmtl/guides-pdf/Guide%20
to%20Surrender%20of%20Units_%20Jan%202013.pdf> accessed 10 December 2015.
387 Emissions Trading Scheme Review Panel, ‘Doing New Zealand’s Fair Share. Emissions Trading 
Scheme Review 2011: Final Report’ (Ministry for the Environment 2011) 77.
388 Emissions Trading Scheme Review Panel (n 387) 77.
389 Emissions Trading Scheme Review Panel (n 387) 77.
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consultation,390 the government banned, effective from 18 December 2012, the use 
of CERs generated not only from HFCs but also from N2O.
391 The ban was later 
expanded to cover ERUs generated from these two industrial gases and CERS and 
ERUs generated from large hydroelectricity dams.392
In 2012 New Zealand formally withdrew from the second commitment period 
of the Kyoto Protocol, which runs from 2013 to 2020. This entails, according to a 
decision taken at the 18th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 18) to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Doha, 
that New Zealand is unable to ‘transfer and acquire’ Kyoto Units valid for the second 
commitment period unless it invests in CDM projects and earn the relevant CERs 
directly.393 Kyoto Units eligible during the first commitment period remained valid 
instruments of compliance until 18 November 2015 (known as ‘true-up period’) 
– the last day of the period in which countries with binding emissions reduction 
obligation during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol have to retire 
enough Kyoto Units to comply with their obligations.394 After the true-up period, 
Kyoto Units of the first commitment period become ineligible for compliance under 
the New Zealand ETS except that New Zealand AAUs and RMUs can be carried 
390 New Zealand Government, ‘Consultation on Proposed Regulations Restricting the Use of HFC-23 
and N2O CERs in the NZ ETS’ (Ministry for the Environment 2011) Ref Info 624 <http://www.
climatechange.govt.nz/consultation/hfc-23-n2o-cers/consultation-document/index.html> accessed 
10 December 2015.
391 New Zealand Government, ‘Guidance on the use of Emission Reduction Units and Certified 
Emission Reduction units in the ETS’ (Ministry for the Environment 2012) Ref Info 676 <http://
www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme/building/regulatory-updates/guidance-
emission-reduction-units-certified-emission-reduction-units-ets.pdf> accessed 10 December 2015.
392 New Zealand Government, ‘Consultation on proposed regulations restricting the use of certain 
international units in the NZ ETS’ (Ministry for the Environment 2012) Ref Info 6070 <http://www.
climatechange.govt.nz/consultation/ets/consultation-on-proposed-regs-nzets-units.pdf> accessed 10 
December 2015; New Zealand Government, ‘Guidance on the use of Emission Reduction Units’ (n 
366).
393 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), ‘Report of the Conference 
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its eighth session, held 
in Doha from 26 November to 8 December 2012. FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1. Decision 1/
CMP.8, paras. 12-15.
394 Environmental Protection Authority, ‘Kyoto Protocol First Commitment Period True-up process 
in the Emissions Trading Scheme’ (Environmental Protection Authority 2015) Information Sheet 
<http://www.epa.govt.nz/Publications/Kyoto_Protocol_Trueup_Infosheet.pdf> accessed 10 
December 2015.
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over to the period beyond 18 December 2015.395
5.3.3. The Californian and Quebec cap-and-trade schemes
The Californian cap-and-trade programme and the Quebec cap-and-trade system 
have been bilaterally linked since 1 January 2014 as part of the Western Climate 
Initiative – a collaborative framework that aims at implementing multi-state 
ETSs.396 Neither scheme accepts international offset credits.397 With respect to 
domestic offset credits, each scheme has a separate list of eligible offset credits. 
The Californian ETS accepts credits from five types of U.S-based projects: U.S. 
forest projects,398 urban forest projects,399 projects capturing and destroying CH4 
from manure management,400 projects destroying Ozone depleting substances, 
and mine CH4 capture projects.
401 A sixth project – rice cultivation – is under 
395 Environmental Protection Authority (n 394); S Bridges, ‘Decisions on Kyoto Protocol emission units’ 
(New Zealand Government, 6 December 2013) <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/decisions-kyoto-
protocol-emission-units> accessed 10 December 2015.
396 See California Air Resource Board and the Gouvernement du Quebec, ‘The Harmonisation and 
Integration of Cap-and-Trade Programs for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions’ <http://www.arb.
ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/ca_quebec_linking_agreement_english.pdf> accessed 16 December 
2015 (hereafter: California-Quebec Linking Agreement).
397 California’s cap-and-trade programme foresees accepting international credits generated from sectoral 
crediting mechanisms in developing countries and approved by the CARB. The CARB has yet to 
approve any such programme. If approved, credits from international sectoral crediting mechanisms 
could be used to cover up to 2 per cent of a covered entity’s compliance obligations during the initial 
two compliance periods (2013-2017) and up to 4 per cent in the third compliance period (2018-
2020). See Cal Code Regs, tit 17, paras 95991-95995 cum para 95854.
398 California Air Resource Board, ‘Compliance Offset Protocol: U.S. Forest Projects’ (California 
Environmental Protection Agency 2015) <http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/protocols/usforest/
forestprotocol2015.pdf> accessed 16 December 2015.
399 California Air Resource Board, ‘Compliance Offset Protocol: Urban Forest Projects’ (California 
Environmental Protection Agency 2011) <http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/
copurbanforestfin.pdf> accessed 16 December 2015.
400 California Air Resource Board, ‘Compliance Offset Protocol: Livestock Projects – Capturing and 
Destroying Methane from Manure Management Systems’ (California Environmental Protection 
Agency 2014) <http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2014/capandtrade14/ctlivestockprotocol.pdf> accessed 
16 December 2015.
401 California Air Resource Board, ‘Compliance Offset Protocol: Ozone Depleting Substances Projects 
– Destruction of U.S. Ozone Depleting Substances Banks’ (California Environmental Protection 




consideration.402 The Quebec ETS accepts credits from Quebec-based projects for 
destroying methane (CH4) emissions from manure and landfill sites and Canada-
based projects for the destruction of certain Ozone depleting substances.403 Both 
schemes accept credits from their eligible offset projects up to 8 per cent of an 
entity’s verified emissions in a compliance period.404 Despite the differences in the 
types of eligible offset projects, each jurisdiction recognises credits accepted by the 
other jurisdiction.405
5.3.4. The Chinese ETSs
China operates pilot ETSs in five provinces (Chongqing, Guangdong, Hubei, 
Shenzhen, and Tianjin) and two cities (Beijing and Shanghai).406 All the ETSs 
generally accept credits from Chinese CDMs. Chongqing ETS allows the use of 
Chinese CERs only if emissions exceed allocations by a maximum of 8 per cent.407 
Beijing, Chongqing, Guangdong, and Hubei ETSs also require that some or all 
of the credits be generated from projects hosted within their territories.408 Credit 
utilisation limits vary from five per cent (Beijing and Shanghai ETSs) to 10 per cent 
(Hubei ETS) of an entity’s annual allocations to 10 per cent of an entity’s annual 
compliance obligations in Guangdong, Shenzhen, and Tianjin ETSs.409
5.3.5. The Korean ETS
The Korean ETS, which commenced on 1 January 2015, bans the use of international 
credits during its first Phase (2015-2017).410 Credits from domestic CDM projects 
402 California Air Resource Board, ‘Compliance Offset Protocol: Rice Cultivation Projects’ (California 
Environmental Protection Agency 2015) <http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/protocols/rice/
riceprotocol2015.pdf> accessed 16 December 2015.
403 See Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emission allowances, Decree 
No 1297-2011 <http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.
php?type=3&file=/Q_2/Q2R46_1_A.HTM> (hereafter: Quebec Cap-and-Trade System Regulation) 
s 70.1-70.22 and app D.
404 Cal Code Regs, tit 17, para 95854; Quebec Cap-and-Trade System Regulation, s 20.
405 California-Quebec Linking Agreement, s 6; Cal Code Regs, tit 17, para 95943; Quebec Cap-and-
Trade System Regulation, app B.1.
406 SE Weishaar, Emissions Trading Design: A Critical Overview (Edward Elgar 2014).
407 ICAP (n 357) 60.
408 ICAP (n 357) 59-62.
409 ICAP (n 357) 59-65.
410 J Kim, ‘K-ETS: Facts and Issues: Learning from its First Commitment Year’ (presented at Workshop 
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and other domestic offset schemes that meet international standards may be used 
to cover up to 10 per cent of an entity’s annual compliance obligations.411 Eligible 
offset activities include those eligible under the CDM and carbon capture and 
storage, and the projects must be implemented after 14 April 2010.412 As of the 
third phase (2021-2025), international credits will be accepted up to 50 per cent of 
the maximum offset utilisation limit.413
5.3.6. The Australian CPM
The now defunct Australian CPM accorded a preferential treatment to domestic 
offset credits over international credits.414 During its fixed-price phase (2012-
2015), the CPM banned the use of international credits altogether, but accepted 
eligible domestic offset credits up to 5 per cent of a liable entity’s obligations in a 
compliance year.415 During its flexible-prices period (from 2015 onwards), the CPM 
on International Climate Policy after Paris and Marrakesh – Developments in China and Korea and 
Its Implications for the EU, The Hague, 7 December 2016).
411 Korea Environment Institute, ‘Emissions Trading Scheme’ (2015) 10, Korea Environmental 
Policy Bulletin Vol XIII Issue 1 <http://eng.me.go.kr/eng/file/readDownloadFile.
do?fileId=133612&fileSeq=1> accessed 23 December 2016; ICAP (n 357) 57; Kim (n 387).
412 ICAP (n 357).
413 Act on the Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse Gas Emission Permits [Act No 11690, 23 March 
2013], art 29(2); Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Permits [Presidential Decree No 24429, 23 March 2013], art 38(4); ICAP (n 357).
414 The Australian CPM, in operation from July 2012 to July 2014, covered approximately 300 of 
Australia’s largest polluters from all major sectors except agriculture and forestry. The CPM had a 
fixed-price phase and a flexible-prices phase. During the fixed-price phase (2012-2015), carbon prices 
were fixed at AU$23/tCO2 for 2012/13, increasing by 5 per cent annually. The CPM would have 
transitioned to flexible carbon prices in July 2015. From 2015 to 2018, it would have operated under 
a price floor and a price ceiling. The price floor was set at AU$15/tCO2 for 2015/16, increasing in 
real terms by 4 per cent annually. The price ceiling was to be set at AU$20/tCO2 above the expected 
price of European Union Allowances – the EU ETS’s carbon currency – for 2015/16, rising by 5 
per cent annually afterwards. L Caripis and others, ‘Australia’s carbon pricing mechanism’ (2011) 
2 Climate Law 583; Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy Future: The Australian 
Government’s Climate Change Plan (Australian Government 2011).
415 Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy Future (n 414) 107-108. Australia’s domestic 
offset programme is known as the Carbon Farming Initiative (CFI). The CFI awards Australian 
Carbon Credit Units (ACCUs) for emissions reductions or sequestrations realised under the 
programme. Depending on whether the credited emissions reductions or sequestrations could be 
counted towards meeting Australia’s emissions reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol or any 
successor international agreement, ACCUs are categorised into Kyoto and non-Kyoto ACCUs. Only 
Kyoto-compliant ACCUs were accepted as valid instruments of compliance under the CPM. Non-
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limited the use of eligible international credits to half of a liable entity’s emissions 
in a compliance year, but imposed no quota on the use of credits from the CFI.416 
Finally, during the period the CPM was to operate under a price floor (2015-2018), 
covered entities wishing to surrender cheap international credits would have paid 
an international surrender charge that would have been equivalent to the difference 
between the prevailing price floor and price of the international credit.417 The charge 
was designed to ensure that prices of international credits were kept at or above the 
prevailing price floor. Domestic credits were, by contrast, were exempted from the 
price floor. 
When Australia agreed to link the CPM to the EU ETS in 2012, it had to 
revise some of its offset provisions.418 First, it abolished the CPM’s price floor and, 
consequently, the internal surrender charge, ending the preferential treatment 
accorded to credits from the CFI. Second, the quota on the use of international 
credits was revised from 50 per cent to 12 per cent of a covered entity’s compliance 
obligation in a compliance period.
5.4. Do different offset provisions impede linking?
The previous Section shows that the policy framework for using offset credits for 
compliance purposes in domestic ETSs is dotted with qualitative, quantitative and 
other restrictions. Some of the restrictions are based on the type of the offset projects. 
For instance, the Californian and Quebec ETSs ban CDM credits altogether 
while most other ETSs accept CDM credits provided that the credits meet some 
qualitative, geographic origin or qualitative requirements. Whereas the EU and NZ 
Kyoto ACCUs were traded only in voluntary carbon markets. See generally A Macintosh and L 
Waugh, ‘An Introduction to the Carbon Farming Initiative: Key Principles and Concepts’ (2012) 
Centre for Climate Economics and Policy Working Paper 1203, Crawford School of Public Policy, 
Australian National University <http://ccep.anu.edu.au/data/2012/pdf/wpaper/CCEP1203.pdf> 
accessed 23 December 2014.
416 The eligible international credits were CERs, ERUs, and RMUs except that temporary and long-term 
CERS, ERUs/CERs from nuclear projects, large hydroelectric projects and the destruction of N2O 
from adipic acid plants or trifluoromethane were banned. See Commonwealth of Australia, Securing 
a Clean Energy Future (n 414) 107-108.
417 Clean Energy Act 2011 (No. 131) 2011 (Cth), s 124; Caripis and others (n 414) 591-592 and 595.
418 See Commission, ‘Australia and European Commission agree on pathway towards fully linking 
Emissions Trading Systems’ European Commission (Brussels, 28 August 2012) <http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-12-916_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 8 November 2016.
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ETSs ban credits from industrial gas projects and restrict the use of credits from 
large hydroelectric projects, these credits are accepted in the Chinese and Korean 
ETSs. The Australian, Californian, Chinese, Korean, and Quebec ETSs provide 
varying levels of preferential treatment to offset credits be generated from projects 
in their respective jurisdictions over international credits. The EU ETS also requires 
that CERs generated as of 2012 must come from LDCs.
The relevant question for linking is whether and how the differences in the 
offset provisions affect linking ETSs. This Section addresses this issue.
5.4.1. Credit eligibility
As pointed out earlier, differences in the types of offset credits accepted for compliance 
between to-be-linked ETSs are considered as ‘significant challenges for linking.’419 
If ETSs with different credit eligibility requirements link, the intersystem trading 
in emissions rights allows entities covered under one ETS to comply with credits 
accepted in their respective scheme, but banned in another linking-partner ETS, and 
free up corresponding domestic carbon units that could be sold to participants in 
the linking-partner ETS.420 Because each linking-partner ETS’s least restrictive offset 
eligibility rules propagate and replace their more restrictive counterparts in other 
linking-partner ETSs, the linked carbon market will de facto operate under a menu 
of the least restrictive offset eligibility provisions from each linking-partner ETS.
However, the view that differences in credit eligibility requirements ‘pose 
significant challenges for linking’ is more about politics than economics. Often, credit 
eligibility criteria reflect the respective jurisdictions’ concerns over the environmental 
integrity, socio-economic and biodiversity impacts of particular offset projects. In so 
far as countries set their offset policies unilaterally, they will continue to hold different 
perspectives on these issues. Credits banned from some ETSs will continue to be 
accepted in other ETSs even if the ETSs with different credit eligibility requirements 
remain separate. From the perspective of safeguarding environmental integrity, it 
is irrelevant whether such credits are used in a domestic ETS or an interconnected 
supra-national ETS.421 Either way, the environment will suffer.
419 Tuerk and others (n 360) 348. See also Jakob-Gallmann (n 365) 140-142; House of Commons 
Energy and Climate Change Committee (n 365) 14.
420 Jakob-Gallmann (n 365) 140-142.
421 Under some stylised assumptions, however, linking ETSs may increase the quantity of offset credits 
relative to autarky. See the discussion in Section 5.4.2 below.
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While there are potential gains – both economic and political – from the linking 
ETSs, abandoning linking because of differences in credit eligibility requirements 
brings no apparent gains. If anything, it would sustain the competitive edge that 
entities covered under an ETS with lax offset rules enjoy over entities covered under 
an ETS with more restrictive offset rules.
5.4.2. Credit utilisation limits
As discussed earlier, several jurisdictions impose varying levels of quota on the use 
of offset credits in their respective ETSs. This Section discusses the efficiency and 
environmental integrity effects of differences in offset utilisation limits between 
linking-partner ETSs.
In autarky, the lower the quota on the use of offset credits in an ETS, the higher 
the efficiency gains (cost savings) from their use. Assuming away considerations 
other than (static) efficiency,422 there is a clear economic case for allowing unlimited 
use of offset credits in an ETS, namely reducing costs of abatement. Linking two (or 
more) ETSs that enforce different levels of quota on the use of offset credits need 
not raise efficiency concerns. Given the offset utilisation limits of the linking-partner 
ETSs, the effect of linking would be to redistribute abatement to wherever it could 
be achieved at the least possible abatement cost, further enhancing the efficiency 
linking-partner ETSs.
The environmental integrity implications of differences in credit utilisation 
limits between linking-partner ETSs vary depending on regulated entities’ use of 
offset credits for compliance in autarky and whether linking increases or decreases 
allowance prices in the linking-partner ETSs. We could illustrate the implications 
of these factors for environmental integrity with an example. Assume that two ETSs 
– A and B – establish a full bilateral link. Assume further that in both systems 
regulated entities fully utilise their credit quota before using domestic emissions 
units for compliance.423 Assume also that the linking increases allowance prices in 
ETS-A and decreases them in ETS-B.
Since offset credits are substitutes for ‘regular’ emissions allowances, an 
422 See Section 5.4.3 below for a discussion on why policy considerations other than economic efficiency 
and environmental integrity may become stumbling blocks for linking.
423 Because offset credits are cheaper instruments of compliance than domestic carbon currencies, it 
could be reasonably assumed that entities covered under an ETS would exhaust their credit utilisation 
limits before resorting to buying domestic carbon ‘currencies’.
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increase (a decrease) in the price of the ‘regular’ allowances will increase (decrease) 
the demand for offset credits. As a result of the linking of ETS-A and ETS-B, 
the demand for offset credits increases in the former and decreases in the latter. 
Although entities covered under ETS-B are likely to need fewer offset credits than 
in autarky, they could use up their offset limit and sell the extra units to entities 
covered under ETS-A. This will not, however, increase the aggregate emissions 
under linking relative to autarky because, as we assumed above, entities covered 
under each linking-partner ETSs used to use up their credit limits in autarky. In 
sum, assuming full credit utilisation in autarky, linking ETSs cannot lead to more 
aggregate emissions than in autarky.
If we dispense with the assumption of ‘full credit utilisation in autarky’, we 
will reach a slightly different conclusion. Let’s keep the same assumptions as above 
except that, in autarky, entities covered under ETS-A used up their credit limits 
while entities covered under ETS-B used up only part of their credit utilisation 
quota. If allowance prices rise in ETS-A and fall in ETS-B, the demand for offset 
credits will likely rise in ETS-A and fall in ETS-B. Relative to the level of emissions 
in autarky, aggregate emissions after linking may increase (if the rise in demand for 
offset credits from ETS-A is greater than the fall in demand (increase in supply) from 
ETS-B), decrease (if the fall in demand for (increase in supply of ) offset credits from 
ETS-B more than offsets the increase in demand from ETS-A), or remain the same 
(if the demand for credits increases and decreases, respectively, in ETS-A and ETS-B 
by an equal margin).
Finally, the environmental integrity implications of linking an ETS that 
imposes a quota on the use of offset credits (ETS-A) and another without any limit 
on the use of offsets (ETS-B) are different from those discussed above. In autarky, 
ETS-A’s level of emissions in a given compliance period is equivalent to the sum 
of allowances issued and the number of credits that covered entities are entitled 
to surrender. In ETS-B, by contrast, the level of emissions cannot be known ex 
ante because it depends on, in addition to the number of carbon units issued, the 
quantity of credits that covered entities choose to surrender in a given compliance 
period. If ETS-A and ETS-B are bilaterally linked, entities in ETS-B will be able to 
sell their domestic carbon currencies to ETS-A entities and comply entirely with 
offset credits. The post-linking aggregate emissions could thus increase by as many 
numbers of allowances issued under ETS-B, leading to more aggregate emissions 
under linking than in autarky.
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The thrust of the preceding analysis is that it is not a given that differences in offset 
utilisation limits between linking-partner jurisdictions undermine environmental 
integrity. Surely, there are instances in which different offset utilisation limits may 
undermine environmental integrity. Yet these depend on the type of assumptions 
one makes about regulated entities’ compliance behaviour and how strongly demand 
for offset credits responds to a post-linking increase or decrease in allowance prices 
in the linking-partner ETSs. Stated differently, although linking ETSs with different 
offset utilisation limits may lead to more aggregate emissions than in autarky, the 
logic for this is more nuanced than explained by the ‘backdoor problem’ described 
in the linking literature. 
5.4.3. Domestic policy priorities in offsets policy and linking
Countries’ offset policies might be shaped by other policy considerations than 
just only economic efficiency or environmental integrity. For instance, the EU 
ETS’s requirement that CERs generated from projects registered after 2012 must 
originate from LDCs is more about encouraging advanced developing countries to 
move beyond pure offsetting mechanisms and embrace sectoral crediting or trading 
mechanisms than a response to the environmental integrity or socio-economic 
concerns over offset projects hosted by non-LDC countries.424 Countries may use 
linking negotiations strategically as an opportunity to ‘export’ their perspectives 
on offsets to other jurisdictions by insisting on harmonisation of credit eligibility 
requirements.
424 See the Revised Emissions Trading Directive, recital 31. Sectoral trading functions essentially as a 
cap-and-trade system. A developing country accepts an absolute emissions target which is below 
business as usual emissions and receives emissions rights up to the level of the emissions target in 
much the same way as annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol received Assigned Amount Units 
up to the level of their Kyoto commitments. The country is then allowed to trade in the emissions 
rights with other nations. The international rules will not prescribe mechanisms of achieving the 
required emissions target. The relevant country may, for instance, establish a cap-and-trade scheme 
or use other policy instruments. A sectoral crediting mechanism sets a crediting threshold for a 
sector or subsector. If the relevant developing country reduces the covered sector’s emissions below 
the pre-defined crediting threshold, the country earns credits which can be sold to other countries. 
Unlike the sectoral trading approach, the country faces no sanctions for failing to achieve the 
crediting threshold. See generally W Sterk, ‘New Mechanisms for the Carbon Market? Sectoral 
Crediting, Sectoral Trading, and Crediting Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions’ (2010) 
Wuppertal Institute JIKO Policy Paper 4/2010 <http://wupperinst.org/en/publications/details/
wi/a/s/ad/1283/> accessed 16 December 2015.
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Similarly, differences in offset policies may also reflect inconsistencies in the 
linking-partner’s climate and energy policy priorities. A jurisdiction that aspires to 
transform its economy into a low-carbon future quickly, to create an internationally 
competitive low-carbon industry, and to reduce reliance on fossil fuels may require 
that a large share of the overall abatement be realised domestically, leading to tighter 
quantitative restrictions on the use offsets than a jurisdiction that aims at just achieving 
a given emissions reduction target at the lowest possible cost. Although differences 
in credit utilisation limits may not undermine the efficiency and environmental 
integrity of the linked carbon market, establishing linking may become challenging 
because of the jurisdictions’ different policy priorities.
The challenges arising from different offset utilisation limits of linking-partner 
jurisdictions highlight a trade-off between some policy priorities and linking ETSs. 
A policy that sets strict offset utilisation limits to encourage regulated entities to 
realise a certain share of the overall abatement domestically is inconsistent with the 
economic intuition of linking as a free trade ideal. The central economic promise 
of linking ETSs lies in that it helps linking-partner jurisdictions to achieve their 
aggregate emissions reductions at the least possible abatement cost. This necessarily 
requires that entities with the lowest marginal cost of abatement realise a larger share 
of the overall abatement. Because linking ETSs inevitably redistributes abatement 
between the linking-partner jurisdiction, lead to more abatement being realised in 
one jurisdiction than in the other, it requires trading off a policy priority of realising 
a specified share of the overall abatement domestically with realising the overall 
abatement at the least possible cost.
This trade-off was seen in practice when Australia and the EU agreed in 2012 
to link up their ETSs from 2015. Before the linking agreement, CFI credits enjoyed 
a preferential treatment over other carbon units, signalling the government’s aim to 
encourage abatement from sectors participating in the CFI. The exemption meant 
that entities covered under the CPM were incentivised to prefer CFI credits over 
other emissions units until, at least, the price for CFI credits went above the price 
floor. The linking agreement resulted in the abolition of the CPM’s price-floor and 
the international surrender charge, removing CFI credits’ shield from international 
competition and trumping the policy of encouraging abatement from sectors 
participating in the CFI.425 To be sure, the linking would have allowed Australia to 
425 See Point Carbon, ‘Australia Offset Scheme Hits Milestone but Future Uncertain’ Thompson Reuters (Oslo, 
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achieve its emissions reduction target at a significantly lower abatement cost than 
the pre-linking scenario. Following the announcement of the linking agreement, the 
expected carbon price in Australia for 2015 dropped from approximately A$30/tCO2 
to A$12/tCO2, suggesting significant differences in marginal abatement costs between 
the EU and Australia and the gains from trade as a result of the linking agreement.426
5.5. Conclusion
This Chapter reviewed the offset provisions of several ETSs and found significant 
differences in their offset provisions. The differences relate to the types of accepted 
credits (credit eligibility), the number of credits that covered entities could use in a 
compliance year (credit utilisation limits), and other restrictions such as requirements 
that credits be generated in particular countries or regions. The Chapter then 
discussed the efficiency and environmental integrity consequences, if any, of linking 
ETSs with different offset provisions. The aim was to assess if the claim in the linking 
literature that differences in offset provisions are likely to pose ‘significant challenges’ 
for linking is grounded in welfare analysis. 
As explained before, differences in offset eligibility requirements between to-be-
linked ETSs do not raise efficiency concerns. Nor do they undermine environmental 
integrity especially if we assume that regulated entities under the linking partner 
ETSs would use up their respective quota in autarky. To be sure, there are instances 
in which linking ETSs with different credit utilisation limits may lead to more 
aggregate emissions under linking than in autarky. Although this supports the claim 
that differences in offset provisions between linking-partner ETSs are likely to pose 
significant challenges for linking, it holds true only under specified assumptions 
about regulated entities compliance behaviour and the effect of linking on pre-
linking allowance prices in the linking-partner ETSs. The assertion in the linking 
literature that differences in offset provisions create a ‘back-door problem’ is far from 
a general statement of truth.
Differences in offset provisions may, however, preclude linking if they 
are reflections of inconsistent climate policy priorities of the linking-partner 
13 December 2013) <http://www.pointcarbon.com/polopoly_fs/1.3366648!CMANZ20131213.
pdf> accessed 11 February 2014.
426 Point Carbon, ‘Australia Takes A$6 Billion Write-down after EU CO2 Price Fall’ Thompson Reuters 
(Oslo, 24 May 2013) <http://www.pointcarbon.com/polopoly_fs/1.2386086!cmanz20130524.pdf> 
accessed 11 February 2014.
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jurisdictions. It is not inconceivable that a jurisdiction may want to use its ETSs 
as an instrument of driving innovation and investment in low-carbon technology. 
Another jurisdiction may, on the other hand, may want to use its ETS to just achieve 
a given emissions reduction target at the least possible abatement cost. The former 
is likely to impose a tighter limit on the use of offset credits than the latter. With 
linking, the generous credit utilisation limits of the latter may undermine the policy 
priorities of the former, potentially posing a challenge for linking. Even under such 
cases, the challenge for linking does not stem from different credit utilisation limits 
per se; but rather from inconsistent climate policy priorities of the linking-partner 
jurisdictions. 
In sum, in as far as countries continue to set their offset policies, offset policies 
are likely to remain different. These differences, however, need not impede linking 
as their efficiency and environmental integrity implications are, for the most part, 
independent of linking. In this regard, the linking between the Californian and 
Quebec cap-and-trade schemes – carbon markets with significant differences in their 





ClImAte PolICy durAbIlIty And lInkIng
6.1. Introduction
The durability of linking-partner emissions trading systems (ETSs) is vital both from 
an efficiency and governance perspective. A linked carbon market that is durable 
is likely to enhance dynamic efficiency by enabling firms to plan ahead and take 
into account the policy in their operational and investment decisions. If, however, 
firms expect that any of the linking-partner ETSs is likely to unravel, they will defer 
investments until the uncertainty relating to the durability of the ETS is resolved, 
or they require higher rates of return. Also, if linking-partner jurisdictions can 
anticipate the unravelling of either of their ETSs, they might be able to organise the 
linking agreement in such a way that it imposes high costs of exit, thereby using the 
linking agreement as a commitment device.
The global emissions trading landscape has seen both politically sustainable and 
unsustainable ETSs. The EU ETS, up and running since 2005, remains the world’s 
largest and oldest mandatory cap-and-trade system. It remains a central pillar of 
EU climate policy. By contrast, the Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM), 
a hybrid system combining features of a tax and an ETS, entered into force in 
July 2012 and was abolished in 2014.427 Both the enactment and durability of the 
EU ETS and the quick unravelling of the Australian CPM are peculiar for several 
reasons.




One would intuitively expect that the complex institutional architecture of the 
EU, with its multiple veto players with diverse interests and preferences,428 would 
make climate governance difficult. Second, the enactment of the EU ETS was 
preceded by fierce opposition in the 1990s by both Member States and businesses 
against an EU-wide carbon tax proposed by the European Commission.429 Third, 
the EU ETS has faced several post-enactment challenges that could potentially 
undermine its credibility and political sustainability. These include an over-allocation 
problem in Phase I (2005-2007) that precipitated the allowance price crash of April 
2006,430 a controversy over the free allocation of allowances especially to electricity 
generators that were able to pass on the costs of carbon to electricity consumers (the 
issue of windfall profits),431 and a glut in the supply of allowances that depressed 
allowance prices since 2008.432
The quick unravelling of the Australian CPM is no less peculiar than the 
enactment and durability of the EU ETS. The Australian CPM was designed with 
an eye on making it prosper in an uncertain political future. It included design 
features that were welcomed as ‘institutional innovations.’433 These include a system 
of cap-setting that combines flexibility and predictability;434 an independent Climate 
Change Authority (CCA) that was expected to instil flexibility to the CPM and lend 
428 Tsebelis defines veto players as ‘actors whose agreement is required for a change of the status quo.’ 
G Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Russell Sage Foundation and Princeton 
University Press 2002) 17. The veto players could be institutional or partisan. Institutional veto 
players, such as parliament, are usually specified by the country’s constitution. Partisan veto players, 
on the other hand, often result from a country’s political system such as parties in a coalition 
government.
429 See text to notes 472–474 below.
430 D Ellerman, C Marcantonini and A Zaklan, ‘The EU ETS: Eight Years and Counting’ (2014) 
11, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2014/04 <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/29517/
RSCAS_2014_04.pdf> accessed 8 December 2015. See also T Jong, O Couwenberg and E 
Woerdman, ‘Does EU Emissions Trading Bite? An Event Study’ (2014) 69 Energy Policy 510.
431 See E Woerdman, O Couwenberg and A Nentjes, ‘Energy prices and emissions trading: windfall 
profits from grandfathering?’ (2009) 28 European Journal of Law and Economics 185.
432 Commission, ‘Impact assessment accompanying the document concerning the establishment and 
operation of a Market Stability Reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme 
and amending Directive 2003/87/EC’ COM (2014) 20 final. See also SE Weishaar, ‘Incentivising 
Technologic Change in Emissions Trading Systems: The Case of Excess Supply’ in L Kreiser and others 
(eds), Environmental Taxation and Green Fiscal Impact: Theory and Impact (Edward Elgar 2014).
433 L Caripis and others, ‘Australia’s Carbon Pricing Mechanism’ (2011) 2 Climate Law 583, 587-589.
434 See text to notes 550–553 below.
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scientific integrity to Australia’s climate policy;435 several revenue recycling schemes 
that aimed at building new constituencies and turning adversaries of the CPM into 
policy clientele by forcing them to shoulder short-term costs.436 The Australia-EU 
agreement in 2012 to link their respective ETSs in 2015 could also theoretically 
create an external institutional constraint, increasing the costs of unravelling the 
CPM.437
Although it seems intuitive to expect the enactment of the EU ETS to face 
more hurdles than that of the Australian CPM due to the EU’s complex institutional 
architecture and businesses’ opposition against the carbon tax proposed in the 
1990s, the politics of enacting the Australian CPM was in fact more fraught than 
that of the EU ETS. Although the CPM’s ‘institutional innovations’, its revenue 
recycling schemes, and its link with the EU ETS should make, at least in theory, 
its unravelling cumbersome and costly (by erecting institutional hurdles, creating 
constituencies whose benefit hinge on its sustainability and generating a self-
reinforcing cycle of positive policy feedback), neither was able to shield it from its 
ultimate demise. Finally, whereas the EU ETS’s post-enactment challenges could 
potentially undermine its credibility and sustainability, the EU ETS has in fact 
navigated through the challenges by adopting several reforms.
This Chapter aims to identify factors that explain the durability of the EU ETS 
and the unravelling of the Australian CPM. In doing so, it draws on two distinct 
strands of literature: credible commitments and veto players. The literature on credible 
commitments focuses on commitment devices such as voting rules and delegation to 
an independent agency as mechanisms of increasing the costs of unravelling a policy. 
The veto players literature focuses on political polarisation among relevant veto 
435 Caripis and others argue that the establishment of the CCA ‘engenders some confidence in the scope 
for improvement of the [CPM]’. See Caripis and others (n 433) 588. Keenan and others also argue 
that the CCA ‘provides some assurance that caps and emissions-reduction targets will be informed by 
the latest science and have scientific integrity.’ See RJ Keenan and others, ‘Science and the Governance 
of Australia’s Climate Regime’ (2012) 2 Nature Climate Change 477, 477.
436 See text to notes 576–582 below.
437 See Commission, ‘Australia and European Commission agree on pathway towards fully linking 
Emissions Trading Systems’ European Commission (Brussels, 28 August 2012) <http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-12-916_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 8 November 2016 (hereafter: Australia-
EU Linking Agreement). See also S Brunner, C Flachsland and R Marschinski, ‘Credible Commitment 
in Carbon Policy’ (2012) 12 Climate Policy 255, 268; WA Pizer and AJ Yates, ‘Terminating 




players in a given political system as a constraint on policy change. Instead of using 
each strand of literature as an alternative explanation to policy (un)sustainability, we 
assess the dynamics between the two, analysing the effect political polarisation may 
have on the success of commitment devices as mechanisms of making policy change 
cumbersome and costly.438
The Chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 describes the politics of pricing 
carbon in Australia and the EU. Section 6.3 outlines our analytical framework 
drawing on veto players theory and credible commitments literature. Section 6.4 
applies the theoretical framework and examines why the EU ETS has proved durable 
while the Australian CPM unravelled. It also outlines the interface between policy 
durability and linking ETSs. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2. The comparative politics of pricing carbon
The politics of pricing carbon in Australia has been more partisan and polarised 
than in the EU. In the following, we explain the history of climate politics in both 
jurisdictions focusing on their main political actors.
6.2.1. The politics of pricing carbon in Australia
Australia is one of the most carbon-obese countries in the world, with the second 
highest emissions per capita in the OECD area.439 A highly emissions-intensive energy 
production, an economy that specialises in the export of emissions-intensive primary 
products, and soaring emissions from transport largely account for the Australia’s 
exceptionally high per capita emissions.440 Despite a growing public anxiety about 
438 For a similar approach, see T Frye, ‘The Perils of Polarisation: Economic Performance in the Post-
Communist World’ (2002) 54 World Politics 308; P Keefer and D Stasavage, ‘The Limits of Delegation: 
Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy’ (2003) 97 American 
Political Science Review 407; M Breen and I McMenamin, ‘Political Institutions, Credible Commitment, 
and Sovereign Debt in Advanced Economies’ (2013) 57 International Studies Quarterly 842.
439 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), ‘Air and GHG Emissions 
Indicator’ (2016), doi: 10.1787/93d10cf7-en, accessed on 26 December 2016.
440 Energy emissions (stationary energy, transport and fugitive emissions) accounted for approximately 78 
per cent of Australia’s aggregate emissions in 2014. Between 1990 and 2014 emissions from stationary 
energy and transport increased by, respectively, 40.6 per cent and 51.3 per cent. See Commonwealth 
of Australia, National Inventory Report 2014 (Revised) (Australian Government 2013, vol. 1) 31-33. 
Minerals and fuels, especially, iron ore and coal made up nearly half (48.1 per cent) of Australia’s 
exports in 2014. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Trade at a Glance 2015 (Australian 
Government 2015) 2-6.
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climate change since the early 1980s – the period the Australian government was 
first alerted to climate change, Australia failed to take decisive action against climate 
change.441 This has largely to do with the country’s highly partisan climate politics 
that has made climate governance challenging.
Australia has a long history of a highly partisan climate politics with the two 
major parties – the Coalition and Labor – rarely supporting each other’s climate 
policy initiatives. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, neither party had any impressive 
climate policy accomplishments. Domestic climate policy initiatives remained 
‘sporadic and piecemeal’, and ‘governments were only really concerned to appear 
concerned, to placate public opinion while doing nothing to confront the real 
problems.’442 Internationally too, Australia has been a climate laggard. Emblematic of 
this was Australia’s refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 under John Howard’s 
Coalition-led government. Howard argued that it was not in the interest of Australia 
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol because of its highly emissions-intensive economy.443
The 2007 federal election was primarily fought on the issue of climate change.444 
Kevin Rudd, then Labor leader, cunningly used climate change to his electoral 
advantage and promised a raft of climate policy reforms including ratifying the 
Kyoto Protocol and launching an ETS.445 Cornered by Labor’s aggressive campaign, 
the Coalition-led government promised to introduce an ETS. This was, however, 
regarded as ‘too little too late’.446 In what was later defined as ‘Australia’s first climate 
change election’, 447 the Coalition lost to Labor and Rudd became prime minister.
441 V Burgmann and HA Baer, Climate Politics and the Climate Movement in Australia (Melbourne 
University Press, 2012) 53-54.
442 Burgmann and Baer (n 441) 54-56.
443 P Lawrence, ‘Australian Climate Policy and the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development 
and Climate (APP). From Howard to Rudd: Continuity or Change?’ (2009) 9 International 
Environmental Agreements 281, 284. See also G Pearse, High and Dry: John Howard, Climate Change 
and the Selling of Australia’s Future (Viking 2007) 131.
444 Burgmann and Baer (n 441) 62-67.
445 P Kelly, Triumph and Demise: The Broken Promise of a Labor Generation (Melbourne University Press 
2014) 130-131.
446 Burgmann and Baer (n 441) 60.
447 A Brohé, N Eyre and N Howarth, Carbon Markets: An International Business Guide (Earthscan 
2009) 199-206; Burgmann and Baer (n 441) 62-67. For a different perspective, see C Rootes, ‘The 




In December 2007, Rudd ratified the Kyoto Protocol. In late 2008, the Labor-
led government floated a proposal to launch a national ETS, known as the Carbon 
Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS).448 However, the CPRS came under fire from all 
quarters.449 Brendan Nelson, who replaced John Howard as leader of the Coalition, 
initially rejected the CPRS to later reverse his position under the influence of his 
party members, leading to his ouster by Malcolm Turnbull in September 2008.450 
The fossil fuel industry lamented the CPRS as hurting the Australian economy by 
pricing carbon before Australia’s major trading partners, notably in the adjacent 
Asia-Pacific region, would take similar policy measures.451
The Greens, on the contrary, argued that the mid-term and long-term emission 
reduction targets were not ambitious enough and that the industry assistance 
scheme was overly generous.452 The Greens instead proposed a transitional fixed 
carbon price starting at A$23 per tonne of CO2 until a more ambitious ETS would 
be launched.453 Rudd rejected the Greens’ proposal and chose to negotiate with the 
Coalition.454 Following the negotiation, Malcolm Turnbull, leader of the Coalition, 
backed the CPRS in exchange for an increase in the industry assistance schemes and 
a decrease of the role of auctioning in allowance allocation.455 Despite these revisions 
and backing from Malcolm Turnbull, the Greens sided with Coalition backbenchers 
and voted down the CPRS in the Senate.456
Turnbull’s support for the CPRS proved unpopular within his own Party, 
448 Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Green Paper’ (Australian 
Government 2008).
449 K Crowley, ‘Climate Policy Failure: Was Australia’s CPRS More Politics than Policy?’ in K Crowley 
and KJ Walker (eds), Environmental Policy Failure: The Australian Story (Tilde University Press 2011) 
35-36.
450 Kelly (n 445) 240.
451 I Bailey and others, ‘The Fall (and Rise) of Carbon Pricing in Australia: A Political Strategy Analysis 
of the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme’ (2012) 21 Environmental Politics 691, 697.
452 S Brenton, ‘Policy Traps for Third Parties in Two-Party Systems: The Australian Case’ (2013) 51 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 283, 296.
453 Burgmann and Baer (n 441) 117. See also Point Carbon, ‘Greens Push Government on Carbon 
Levy’, Thompson Reuters (Oslo, 23 April 2010) <http://www.pointcarbon.com/polopoly_
fs/1.1438881!CMANZ20100423.pdf> accessed 11 February 2014.
454 Burgmann and Baer (n 441) 117-118.
455 Burgmann and Baer (n 441) 75-76. See also Bailey and others (n 451).
456 Burgmann and Baer (n 441) 79; Brenton (n 452) 296.
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leading to his ouster by Tony Abbott in December 2009.457 Abbott rejected the 
proposed CPRS. Amid continued opposition, Rudd finally shelved the CPRS in 
April 2010. Rudd was accused of abandoning his signature issue without much of a 
fight.458 In June 2010 – just months before the 2010 election – he was deposed by 
his deputy, Julia Gillard, in an internal leadership contest.
The 2010 election led to the first hung parliament in 70 years with no major 
party winning a majority in the House of Representatives to form a government. 
Unlike the large parties, the Greens enjoyed the best electoral results on record, 
getting a seat in the House of Representatives for the first time in their history and 
increasing their Senate seats to record numbers.459 Labor managed to negotiate a deal 
with the Greens and three independent MPs and formed a minority government. 
As part of the coalition agreement, Labor agreed to tackle climate change and that 
this ‘will require a price on carbon’.460 In September 2010, a Multi-Party Climate 
Change Committee (MPCCC) was formed to explore options for implementing a 
carbon price. The Coalition refused to be represented in the Committee.
In July 2011, the Committee released a Clean Energy Agreement which recognises 
emissions trading as the most cost-effective mechanism for reducing Australia’s 
emissions.461 The Clean Energy Act, which included the Australian CPM, was finally 
passed by parliament in November 2011. The introduction of the CPM, which 
included a three-year fixed-price period starting at A$23/tCO2, triggered a storm 
of opposition mainly from the Coalition and the fossil fuel industry.462 The leader 
of the Coalition, Tony Abbott, vowed to dismantle the CPM if elected in the (then 
upcoming) 2013 election. He accused Julia Gillard of breaking a promise of ‘no carbon 
tax under the government I lead’ that she made in the lead up to the 2010 election.463 
457 Kelly (n 445) 241-265.
458 Kelly (n 445) 282-294.
459 C Rootes, ‘Denied, Deferred, Triumphant? Climate Change, Carbon Trading and the Greens in the 
Australian Federal Election of 21 August 2010’ (2011) 20 Environmental Politics 410, 413-414.
460 — — The Australian Greens & the Australian Labor Party Agreement (1 September 2010) <http://
braidwood.nsw.greens.org.au/2010/09/01/australian-greens-labor-commit-to-agreement-for-stable-
government> accessed 7 April 2014.
461 Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Multi-Party Climate Change Committee Clean Energy Agreement’ 
(Australian Government 2011).
462 — — ‘Australia’s Carbon-Tax Drama’ (2011) 17 Strategic Comments 1.
463 quoted in ‘Australia’s carbon-tax drama’ (n 462) 2.
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In the lead up the 2013 federal election, the Coalition successfully pitched 
the issue of pricing carbon as an economic one that threatens Australia’s economic 
prosperity.464 Gillard’s popularity plummeted in the lead up to the election, 
culminating in her ouster in June 2013 by Kevin Rudd – the man she deposed in 
2010. Although Rudd proposed to end the CPM’s fixed-price period a year earlier 
to quell concerns about the relatively high initial carbon price – a rallying issue for 
critics of the CPM, Labor lost the election to the Coalition.465 Abbott honoured his 
promise and abolished the CPM on 17 July 2014.466
6.2.2. The politics of pricing carbon in the EU
Climate policy arrived on the EU’s institutional agenda in the mid-1980s.467 During 
the early years, Member States took the lead by setting unilateral policy targets for 
reducing/stabilising their emissions.468 In March 1990, the European Commission 
proposed a common target of stabilising emissions at 1990 levels by 2000. The 
Council endorsed the proposal in November 1990.469 In the words of Jordan and 
Rayner, ‘the EU’s leadership aspirations were … rapidly becoming more ambitious 
and more concrete.’470 Underlying such leadership has been ‘a dynamic process 
of competitive multilevel reinforcement among the different political poles’ that 
included a group of pioneering Member States, the European Parliament, and the 
464 See Kelly (n 445) 270-274.
465 The Australian, ‘Kevin Rudd Shifts to Emissions Trading Scheme’ The Australian (Sydney, 14 July 
2013) <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/kevin-rudd-shifts-to-emissions-trading-scheme/
story-e6frg6n6-1226679039589> accessed 17 June 2014.
466 See Carbon Tax Repeal Bill.
467 A Jordan and T Rayner, ‘The Evolution of Climate Policy in the European Union: A Historical 
Overview’ in A Jordan and others, Climate Change Policy in the European Union: Confronting the 
Dilemmas of Mitigation and Adaptation? (Cambridge University Press 2010) 53.
468 By 1990 Sweden, the Netherlands, UK, Denmark and Italy had already set unilateral emissions 
reduction targets. See Jordan and Rayner (n 467) 56; M Paterson, Global Warming and Global Politics 
(Routledge 1996) 40.
469 See Jordan and Rayner (n 467) 57.
470 See Jordan and Rayner (n 467) 56. However, EU’s approach towards a quantified and legally binding 
emission reduction/stabilisation target was greeted with scepticism or, worse, fierce opposition from 
other developed nations notably the United States, Japan and Russia. The latter questioned EU’s 
approach in light of uncertainties in the science of climate change at the time. See Jordan and Rayner 
(n 467) 58. See also F Yamin, ‘The Role of the EU in International Climate Negotiations’ in J Gupta 
and M Grubb (eds), Climate Change and the European Leadership: A Sustainable Role for Europe? 
(Kluwer Academic 2000) 49.




The adoption of the common emission target was also significant because 
the Commission was mandated to explore and propose policies to achieve the 
common emissions target, opening the door for discussions on instrument choice. 
The Commission floated several policy options including energy conservation and 
efficiency measures, the development of renewable energies, and an EU-wide carbon/
energy tax.472 While the other proposed measures were less controversial, the carbon/
energy tax ‘proved far too radical for the majority of Member States to stomach.’473 It 
triggered a storm of opposition and an intense lobbying by businesses. On 26 May 
1992, the Council failed to reach unanimity on the proposed tax, leading to the 
protest resignation of the Environment Commissioner, Ripa di Meana, just before 
the Rio Earth Summit.474
Emissions trading had not been on the EU’s policy menu until after the Kyoto 
Protocol of 1997. The EU attempted unsuccessfully to exclude emissions trading 
from the Protocol fearing that it might endanger environmental integrity and 
might be used by rich countries to buy their way out of emissions reductions.475 
Post-Kyoto, a previously emissions trading-sceptic EU quickly embraced emissions 
trading. A number of factors contributed to a change of heart over the issue of 
emissions trading.
Following the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, the DG Environment saw a change 
in personnel, leading to the replacement of old staff that favoured command-and-
471 MA Schreurs and Y Tiberghien, ‘European Union Leadership in Climate Change: Mitigation 
through Multilevel Reinforcement’ in K Harrison and L Sundstrom (eds), Global Commons, Domestic 
Decisions: The Comparative Politics of Climate Change (The MIT Press 2010) 26.
472 Jordan and Rayner (n 467) 58-59.
473 Jordan and Rayner (n 467) 59.
474 See JB Skjærseth and J Wettestad, EU Emissions Trading: Initiation, Decision-Making and 
Implementation (Ashgate 2008) 32.
475 In the lead-up to Kyoto, the United States expressed willingness to accept in principle a quantified 
and legally binding emissions reduction commitment subject, however, to the availability of 
maximum flexibility such as emissions trading. The EU was deeply suspicious of the idea of flexibility 
because of its fear that it may endanger the environmental integrity of the international climate policy 
architecture under the umbrella of the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
and that it may give rich countries the opportunity to buy their way out of their emissions reduction 
commitments. The EU later accepted the inclusion of international emissions trading in the Kyoto 
Protocol and other flexible mechanisms to engage the United States into signing the Protocol. See 
Skjærseth and Wettestad (n 474) 32-35; 65-67.
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control instruments with economists with a natural inclination towards market-
based instruments.476 The new bureaucrats played the central role in firmly planting 
emissions trading on the EU’s institutional agenda.477 The policy entrepreneurship of 
a few Member States, notably Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK, complemented 
the Commission’s leadership.478 Denmark had already launched a domestic ETS in 
2000. The UK government also launched its ETS in 2002. These domestic initiatives 
created pressure from below for an EU-wide carbon market.479 Emissions trading 
was also preferred from an institutional perspective in that it could be adopted, 
unlike a carbon tax that needed unanimity, by a qualified majority in the Council.480
In 2000 the Commission floated the Green Paper to establish an EU-wide 
carbon market.481 The Green Paper implicitly argued for a centralised ETS with a 
harmonised system of cap-setting and the auctioning of allowances.482 During the 
ensuing consultations, the green paper enjoyed broad-based support from Member 
States, businesses, and other stakeholders.483 The European Parliament (hereafter, 
the Parliament) also favoured a centralised ETS and a mandatory auctioning of a 
share of the overall allowance pool.484 Businesses and several Member States, on the 
other hand, preferred a decentralised ETS with the free allocation of allowances.485
When the ETS Directive (2003/87/EC) was passed in October 2003, the ETS 
adopted a decentralised approach with Member States entrusted with decisions 
relating to allocation and cap-setting with some guidance from the Commission.486 
476 Skjærseth and Wettestad (n 474) 74.
477 DA Ellerman, F Convery and C de Perthuis, Pricing Carbon: The European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (Cambridge University Press 2010) 26-28; J Meckling, Carbon Coalitions: Business, Climate 
Politics, and the Rise of Emissions Trading (The MIT Press 2011) 114-118.
478 Schreurs and Tiberghien (n 471) 40-42; Meckling (n 477) 114-118.
479 Meckling (n 477) 104.
480 Skjærseth and Wettestad (n 474) 74.
481 See Commission, ‘Green Paper on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading within the European Union’, 
COM (2000) 87 final.
482 COM (2000) 87 final, 11-19.
483 See, generally, Skjærseth and Wettestad (n 474) 103-158.
484 Ellerman, Convery and de Perthuis (n 477) 24.
485 Skjærseth and Wettestad (n 474) 41 and 106.
486 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and 
amending Council Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L275/32 arts 9 and 11 (hereafter: ETS Directive).
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Rather than a mandatory auctioning of a share of the overall allowance pool, Member 
States were allowed to auction a limited percentage of allowances.487
6.2.3. Explaining Australia’s polarised climate politics
Australian climate politics – both pre- and post-enactment of the CPM – has been 
highly partisan. Between 2007 and 2013 alone, climate politics contributed to the 
downfall of five leaders of the two major political Parties – three from the Coalition 
and two from Labor. Both Labor and the Coalition rarely supported each other’s 
climate policy initiatives. Labor has been an advocate of an ETS in its purest form.488 
The Coalition, on the other hand, supported neither an ETS, a carbon tax, nor any 
combination thereof.
In contrast, the pre-enactment level of political polarisation of the EU ETS can 
be characterised as low relative to that of the Australian CPM. The EU institutions 
played a mutually reinforcing leadership role during the design and adoption of 
the EU ETS.489 The Parliament was proactive both in supporting the Commission’s 
487 ETS Directive, art 10; SE Weishaar, Towards Auctioning: The Transformation of the European 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System. Present and Future Challenges to Competition Law (Kluwer 
Law International 2009) 98-101.
488 Although the Australian CPM – a hybrid scheme combining features of an ETS with a tax – was 
passed under a Labor-led government, Labor has never enthusiastically embraced the idea of a fixed 
carbon price. Before the 2010 election, Rudd’s Labor-led government dismissed the Greens’ call for 
a fixed carbon price. After establishing a parliamentary coalition with the Greens following the 2010 
election, Labor had to give in to the Greens’ demand for an inclusion of a fixed-price scheme in the 
new climate policy. Julia Gillard was quoted as saying that ‘she would prefer to move straight to an 
emissions trading scheme, but that a period of fixed pricing is necessary to accommodate the Greens.’ 
See Point Carbon, ‘Australia Needs A$60 Carbon Price in 2020: Report’ Thompson Reuters (Oslo, 
25 March 2011) <http://www.pointcarbon.com/polopoly_fs/1.1521533!CMANZ20110325.pdf> 
accessed 11 May 2014. See also Burgmann and Baer (n 441) 82 and 117-118; The Australian, ‘Labor to 
Stand by Emissions Trading Scheme, Says It Won’t be Bullied by Tony Abbott’ The Australian (Sydney, 
1 November 2013) <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/policy/labor-to-stand-by-
emissions-trading-scheme-says-it-wont-be-bullied-by-tony-abbott/story-e6frg6xf-1226751373905> 
accessed 17 June 2014.
489 Schreurs and Tiberghien argue that the cycle of reinforcing leadership was ‘triggered by and dependent 
on the public’s strong support and normative commitment’ to action on climate change. Schreurs and 
Tiberghien (n 471) 26. That climate politics was less partisan in the EU than in Australia should not, 
however, be construed to mean that there is a unified interest behind the climate agenda in the EU. 
There were different ‘camps’ with differing perspectives in the EU too. As Skjærseth explains, there 
were deep divisions between ‘greener’ Member States such as Denmark and the Netherlands, on the 
one hand, and the southern Member States such as Greece, Portugal and Spain, on the other. Despite 
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proposals for an EU-wide carbon market and in serving as a channel for green 
interests to influence the EU’s climate policy.490 The Commission saw climate change 
policy as a means of empowering itself ‘with new regulatory tools and monitoring 
powers’,491 ‘deepen political integration within Europe, … [and] enhance EU’s 
credibility overseas.’492
That the politics of pricing carbon has been more polarised in Australia than 
in the EU might be explained by electoral contestation and advantage. The EU 
institutions are not subjected to anything near the level of electoral competition 
on European issues compared to Australia. The supranational structure of the EU 
helped in shielding the EU institutions from the kind of electoral competition 
seen in Australia, sheltering climate policy from being used as an electoral ploy and 
dampening political polarisation over climate policy.
The issue of pricing carbon has been firmly in the firing line of Australian 
electoral politics since 2007. Both the Coalition and Labor attempted to carve out 
a distinct profile and gain electoral advantages from climate change. In 2007 Labor 
capitalised on the Coalition’s rejection of the Kyoto Protocol and won the election.493 
Gillard’s promise in the lead up to the 2010 election not to price carbon without first 
establishing ‘a deep and lasting community consensus’494 was also aimed at taking 
away potential electoral benefits from the Coalition by neutralising the issue of 
pricing carbon at a time when public support for climate change policy was fading 
following the disappointing results of the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference.495
Similarly, the Coalition attempted to use the issue of pricing carbon to get 
electoral advantages over Labor. As the Coalition is close to the fossil fuel industry, 
this, climate policy development at the early stage had proceeded ‘remarkably rapidly and smoothly.’ 
See JB Skjærseth, ‘The Climate Policy of the EC: Too Hot to Handle?’ (1994) 32 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 25, 27. See also Meckling (n 477) 103-131.
490 Schreurs and Tiberghien (n 471) 40.
491 Schreurs and Tiberghien (n 471) 39.
492 Jordan and Rayner (n 467) 56. See also Schreurs and Tiberghien (n 471) 39.
493 See Kelly (n 445) 131-132.
494 Quoted in Kelly (n 445) 342.
495 Surely, it is Gillard’s Labor-led government that saw the introduction of the CPM. However, had it 
not been for the contingent majority that Labor held following the 2010 election, it is doubtful if the 
CPM would have been legislated, at least, as early as it did. After all, Labor shunned The Greens while 
negotiating the CPRS and rejected their proposed fixed carbon price – a key feature of the CPM. See 
Burgmann and Baer (n 441) 117-118; Kelly (n 445) 271.
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supporting the pricing of carbon, so the argument went, would alienate it from its 
support base.496 Howard’s proposal to introduce an ETS starting in 2011 in the 
lead up to the 2007 election was a response to the then public craze for climate 
change policy.497 The party infighting over supporting or opposing Rudd’s CPRS 
was primarily on differences as to which stance would translate into a better electoral 
outcome in the (then upcoming) 2010 election.498
6.3. Conceptualising policy durability
In general, public policies suffer from a credibility deficit, and a climate policy is 
no exception. A government that enacts a policy may not remain in power forever 
to protect it from unravelling. If the government loses power, forces opposed to 
the policy will assume power and can try to unravel the policy.499 This is known in 
the literature as political uncertainty/instability variant of the credible commitment 
problem. Even if political actors that saw the policy enacted remain in office, their 
interests and preferences may change over time, and they may try to undermine 
‘their’ policy by adopting amendments or repealing it altogether.500 This variant of 
the credible commitment problem arises because of time-inconsistent incentives 
facing political actors.501 Patashnik explains in the context of American politics that 
496 It could also be argued that the Coalition’s opposition against pricing carbon was also rooted more 
in ideology than in electoral contestation and advantage. Yes, the Coalition is not only known to 
harbour climate change sceptics, but it also used to treat emissions trading as ‘an ideological issue, a 
left-wing agenda to constrain economic freedom in the name of a suspect cause.’ See Pearse (n 443) 
133. However, if the Party’s policy flip-flop on the issue since the 2007 election shows anything, it 
must be that ideology played, at best, a marginal role in the Coalition’s stance over carbon pricing.
497 Burgmann and Baer (n 441) 60.
498 Some members, notably Turnbull, argued that supporting the CPRS would neutralise the issue, 
allowing the Coalition to fight Labor on the issue of the economy. Others argued against supporting 
the CPRS anticipating failure to agree a binding international agreement on climate change at the 
15th Conference of the Parties (COP-15) in Copenhagen in 2009 would help the Coalition to pitch 
the issue of pricing carbon as an economic one that threatens Australia’s prosperity. See Kelly (n 445) 
244-251; 270-274.
499 See T Moe, ‘The politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy’, in OE 
Williamson (ed), Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond (Oxford 
University Press 1990) 122-125.
500 See KA Shepsle, ‘Discretion, Institutions and the Problem of Government Commitment’ in P 
Bourdieu and J Coleman, Social Theory for a Changing Society (Westview Press 1991) 247; P Pierson, 
‘Limits of design: Explaining Institutional Origins of Change’ (2000) 13 Governance 491.
501 See Shepsle (n 500) 247.
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Members of Congress who supported the adoption of the 1986 Tax Reform Act 
later went to sponsor other bills that unravelled the Tax Reform Act because ‘it was 
profitable’.502
Climate change policies are susceptible to policy reversal due to both political 
uncertainty/instability and time-inconsistent incentives of political actors. Climate 
policy reforms such as an emissions trading system (ETS) impose short-term costs 
for benefits that are diffuse and distant.503 While the interest groups such as the fossil 
fuel industry that shoulder the short-run costs can easily organise and lobby against 
strong climate action, the public – the beneficiary of the policies – is too diffuse to 
organise and defeat the narrow interest groups. The short time horizon of electoral 
politics also amplifies the short-run costs of climate change action and discount 
the long-term benefits of climate change mitigation and consequences of climate 
change.504
Climate policy-making is also apt to ideological diversity with multiple veto 
players holding diverse policy preferences, which can lead to a vexing problem of 
cycling.505 With complex issues such as climate change and multiple preferences 
502 See E Patashnik, ‘Making Reforms Sustainable: Lessons from the American Policy Reform Experience’ 
in EA Lindquist, S Vincent and J Wanna, Delivering Policy Reform: Anchoring Significant Reforms in 
Turbulent Times, (Australian National University Press 2011) 29.
503 See for instance, J Hovi, DF Sprinz and A Underdal, ‘Implementing Long-Term Climate Policy: Time 
Inconsistency, Domestic Politics, International Anarchy’ (2009) 9 Global Environmental Politics 20; 
RJ Lazarus, ‘Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the 
Future’ (2009) 94 Cornel Law Review 1153, 1159-1161.
504 P Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton University Press 2004) 
41-42; Lazarus (n 503) 1159-1161.
505 The cycling paradox was discovered by Marquis de Condorcet, an eighteenth-century French 
mathematician and philosopher. For discussions about the cycling paradox, See DA Skeel, ‘Public 
Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-Influenced Legal Scholarship’ (1997) 50 Vanderbilt Law 
Review 647. Kenneth Arrow built upon Condorcet’s proposition and showed that it is impossible 
for any decision rule to aggregate individual preferences into social orderings and, at the same time, 
satisfy a short list of fairness requirements. For a discussion of Arrow’s ‘Impossibility Theorem’, see 
EM Penn, ‘Impossibility Theorems and Paradoxes in Collective Choice Theory’, in JJ Cochran (ed), 
The Wiley Encyclopaedia of Operations Research and Management Science (John Wiley & Sons 2011). 
Institutions that outline agenda-setting and voting procedures may contain voting behaviour that 
leads to cycling, leading to ‘structure-induced equilibrium’. For a review of the literature about why 
endless cycling may not happen in real-life policymaking, see KA Shepsle and BR Weingast, ‘Why 
So Much Stability? Majority Voting, Legislative Institutions, and Gordon Tullock’ (2012) 152 Public 
Choice 83.
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among voters (multi-peaked preferences), a majority voting rule may lead to a 
situation whereby no outcome trumps all others, and the result endlessly cycles 
among the alternative outcomes. If cycling occurs, no policy option trumps all 
others, making any climate policy initiative inherently unstable. Because the order 
in which proposals are voted upon affects the outcome, interest groups invest in 
influencing the rules and institutions governing agenda-setting rather than adapting 
themselves to the new policy landscape. As Levmore argues, interest groups’ activity 
is expected to be especially potent with the possibility of majority cycles because the 
probability of success increases with instability.506
Both political uncertainty and time-inconsistent incentives of political actors 
undermine the credibility of a climate policy, increase the risk of policy reversal, 
discourage long-term investments, and encourage regulated entities to challenge the 
policy.507 How, then, is sustaining a climate policy over time possible? The next three 
subsections discuss, respectively, commitment devices, positive policy feedback, and 
political polarisation as constraints on policy change.
6.3.1. Commitment devices
Commitment devices foster credibility and design resilience into policies.508 
They constrain a government from reneging on its commitments and encourage 
other actors to commit to a certain course of action.509 They come in two forms: 
institutional constraints and delegation of authority to an independent agency.510 
Institutions such as supermajority voting requirements to pass certain types of 
amendments can be used to increase political transaction costs and make policy 
506 S Levmore, ‘Voting Paradoxes and Interest Groups’ (1999) 28 The Journal of Legal Studies 259, 261.
507 Levmore (n 506); Frye (n 438).
508 See A Jordan and E Matt, ‘Designing Policies that Intentionally Stick: Policy Feedback in a Changing 
Climate (2014) 47 Policy Sciences 227, 233-234. See also C Hepburn, ‘Regulation by Prices, 
Quantities or Both: A Review of Instrument Choice’ (2006) 22 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 
226, 234; Lazarus (n 503) 1209.
509 Designing resilience into a public policy inevitably raises questions about democratic accountability 
by foreclosing avenues that future lawmakers may use to change a policy. See, for instance, K Cole, 
‘Genius vs. Zombies: To Address Climate for the Long Haul, Empower the Innovators, but Don’t 
Disinter the “Dead Hand”’ (2010) 40 Environmental Law & Policy Annual Review 10757, 10757-
10759. Lazarus argues that there are good reasons for doing so. See Lazarus (n 503) 1194-1195.
510 Shepsle (n 500) 247.
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change cumbersome.511 An institutional constraint could come in the form of 
shared power among different actors. The involvement of various institutional 
actors increases political transaction costs and makes policy change cumbersome.512 
North and Weingast argue, for instance, that shared power between the King and 
Parliament in post-1688 England provided a credible commitment to the protection 
of property rights.513 Institutional constraints could also be external to a jurisdiction 
in the sense that they couple a policy to a country’s international commitments and 
bind a government through an international agreement vis-à-vis international actors 
and institutions.514
Political actors may also increase the credibility of a given policy by delegating 
decision-making or advisory functions to independent institutions.515 Delegation 
shifts decision-making/advisory functions from the partisan arena to a technocratic 
sphere, allowing decisions/recommendations to be taken/made by bureaucrats who 
may have time-consistent incentives.516 This enables political actors to ‘”stack the 
deck” in favour of their preferred policy outcomes in a bureaucratic decision-making 
environment that is more durable than the electoral coalition that created it.’517 In 
addition, if an independent regulatory agency is established, the agency becomes a 
political constituency, and its officials become new forces to reckon with whenever 
the government tries to unravel the relevant policy.518
511 See D North and BR Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional 
Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England’ (1989) 49 The Journal of Economic 
History 803, 818; Shepsle (n 500) 247; Breen and McMenamin (n 438) 848.
512 Breen and McMenamin (n 438) 848.
513 North and Weingast (n 511) 818.
514 T Ginsburg, ‘Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law’ (2006) 
38 International Law and Politics 707, 727; Brunner, Flachsland and Marschinski (n 437) 256-257; 
Lazarus (n 503) 1209. See also PF Stienberg, ‘Welcome to the Jungle: Policy Theory and Political 
Instability’ in PF Steinberg and SD Vandeveer (eds), Comparative Environmental Politics (The MIT 
Press 2012) 273. Steinberg argues that establishing ‘meaningful linkages outside the … [climate] 
policy subsystem’ helps in sustaining the climate policy reform by spreading regulatory responsibilities 
and building constituencies across different government departments and levels of government.
515 DJ Levinson, ‘Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment’ (2011) 
124 Harvard Law Review 657, 679-680; Brunner, Flachsland and Marschinski (n 437) 263-264.
516 Moe (n 499) 125. See also Breen and McMenamin (n 438) 843-844.
517 Levinson (n 515) 679.
518 One of the fundamental insights of Public Choice is that bureaucrats are self-interested individuals that 
are in pursuit of maximising their utility (whether it is income, power, prestige or something else). See G 
Tullock, A Seldon and GL Brady, Government Failure: A Primer in Public Choice (Cato Institute 2002) 15.
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The creation of an independent central bank constitutes a classic example of 
delegation of decision-making authority. By establishing an independent central 
bank, political actors forgo pursuing economic policies for short-run economic gains 
and ‘shut out their opponents by shutting themselves out too.’519 The establishment 
of the UK’s Committee on Climate Change (CCC) , which is tasked with advising 
the UK government on emissions reduction targets, has been presented as an 
example enhancing the credibility of a climate policy through the delegation of 
advisory and monitoring functions to an independent agency.520. In sum, political 
actors bind themselves and their successors by removing ‘certain options from their 
future menu’,521 and help a (climate) policy ‘survive and prosper in an uncertain 
political future’.522
While designing commitment devices into a policy increases resilience, it may 
lead to inflexibility. A climate policy that is ‘frozen in time’ lacks credibility because 
it constrains policymakers from making adjustments in response to new information 
in climate science and technology and exogenous shifts in the economy.523 A policy 
could balance durability and flexibility by including monitoring and review systems, 
allowing periodic assessment and adjustment of the policy.524 A policy may also 
include procedural rules that establish the conditions under which it may be 
revisited to take into account changing circumstances.525 In climate policy, this may, 
for instance, take the form of coupling the revision of the policy to international 
climate-related commitments of the relevant country.
6.3.2. Positive policy feedback
Institutions alone are unlikely to protect a policy from unravelling. While generally 
more durable than policies, institutions are themselves outcomes of political 
compromises and could be undone by opposing forces. As Patashnik puts it, a 
519 See Moe (n 499) 125.
520 Climate Change Act 2008 (UK), s 32(1); Brunner, Flachsland and Marschinski (n 437) 263-264; M 
Lockwood, ‘The Political Sustainability of Climate Policy: The Case of the UK Climate Change Act’ 
(2013) 23 Global Environmental Change 1339, 1343; Keenan and others (n 435) 477.
521 P Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’ (2000) 94 American 
Political Science Review 251, 262. See also Pierson, ‘Limits of design’ (n 500) 491.
522 Moe (n 499) 124.
523 See Jordan and Matt (n 508). See also Hepburn (n 508) 234; Lazarus (n 503) 1209.
524 See Jordan and Matt (n 508).
525 See Jordan and Matt (n 508).
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policy’s political sustainability hinges on ‘the reactions, expectations, and behavioural 
change’ it generates over time.526
Because climate policy reforms impose short-term costs on concentrated interest 
groups, it is expected that they generate negative policy feedback from regulated 
entities. The public – the beneficiary of the climate policy reforms – is too diffuse to 
organise and fight back attempts to unravel the policies. The positive policy feedback 
needs to come from organised interest groups. A positive policy feedback cannot, 
however, be left to chance. It needs to be actively generated through skilful policy 
design choices. Some of the mechanisms of generating positive policy feedback and 
neutralising negative feedback include organising and empowering constituencies 
that have a stake in the durability of the reform, disempowering interest groups that 
oppose the reform, and changing the cognitive mind-set of narrow interest groups 
by persuading them that they have more to gain by adapting than continuing to 
fight.527
Cap-and-trade systems, for instance, create new constituency groups in the 
finance and banking sector with a stake in the continuation of the systems. Once 
new constituencies are created, ‘old’ market forces, faced with the new reality, will 
have to adapt by adopting new agendas and strategies lest they will lose market 
share.528 Instruments that require groups opposed to a policy bear short-term costs 
by, for instance, making upfront investments, may help in turning them to become 
‘clienteles with a strong stake in the policies continuation.’529 Defining long-term 
targets also shapes private actors’ expectations and encourages them to commit to a 
policy by making long-term investments, creating sunk costs.
These induce a cycle of positive feedback whereby a policy becomes self-
sustaining. With the positive feedback getting momentum and accumulating 
over time, a policy entrenches itself, creating path dependence. Path dependence 
increases ‘the costs of exit – of switching to some previously plausible alternative’,530 
526 E Patashnik, Reforms at Risk: What Happens after Major Policy Changes are Enacted (Princeton 
University Press 2008) 29.
527 Patashnik, Reforms at Risk (n 526) 29; Stienberg (n 514) 273; Levinson (n 515) 687.
528 P Pierson, ‘The Study of Policy Development’ (2005) 17 Journal of Policy History 34, 45; Patashnik, 
Reforms at Risk (n 526) 28.
529 Jordan and Matt (n 508) 235.
530 Pierson, ‘Increasing returns’ (n 521) 252.
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‘limits the design space’,531 and entrenches a policy, making its reversal ‘all but 
unthinkable’.532
6.3.3. Political polarisation and commitment devices
Whether institutional constraints and delegation of decision-making authority, 
in fact, enhance credibility depends, in addition to their design, on the political 
conditions under which they operate. Keefer and Stasavage find evidence that high 
political polarisation among veto players increases the discretion a central bank enjoys 
to determine monetary policy, thereby enhancing its credibility.533 Frye, on the other 
hand, found a correlation between high political polarisation and a decline in faith 
private actors attach to economic policies.534 Breen and McMenamin, analysing the 
credibility of sovereign debtors in advanced economies, found a correlation between 
low political polarisation and high credibility of sovereign debtors in advanced 
economies.535 Although the outcomes of these studies are mixed, they suggest that 
political polarisation affects the success of commitment devices as mechanisms of 
fostering credibility.536
Political polarisation is studied extensively within the veto players literature 
pioneered by George Tsebelis.537 The literature examines policy stability along three of 
veto players’ attributes: their number, congruence (political polarisation in a relevant 
531 M Howlett, ‘From the “Old” to the “New” Policy Design: Design Thinking Beyond Markets and 
Collaborative Governance’ (2014) 47 Policy Sciences 187 as cited in Jordan and Matt (n 508) 232.
532 Patashnik, Reforms at Risk (n 526) 25-26. It is also plausible that the opposite could happen. A 
policy’s positive feedback may be dampened by negative policy feedback especially when the policy 
imposes costs on concentrated groups (as in climate policy). See RK Weaver, ‘Paths and Forks or 
Chutes and Ladders? Negative Feedbacks and Policy Regime Change’ (2010) 30 Journal of Public 
Policy 137; Jordan and Matt (n 508) 232. Positive policy feedback may also be dampened or blocked 
due, for instance, to weak design, poor timing, and inadequate or conflicting institutional support. 
E Patashnik and JE Zelizer, ‘When Policy does not Remake Politics: The Limits of Policy Feedback’ 
(Presented at the Republic of Statutes Conference, Yale Law School, December 2010) 3.
533 Keefer and Stasavage (n 438) 420-421.
534 See, for instance, Frye (n 438).
535 See, for instance, Breen and McMenamin (n 438) 851.
536 For a review of the literature, see M Hallerberg, ‘Empirical Application of Veto Payer Analysis and 
Institutional Effectiveness’ in T Konig, G Tsebelis and M Debus (eds), Reform Processes and Policy 
Change: Veto Players and Decision-Making in Modern Democracies (Springer 2010) 36-39.
537 See generally G Tsebelis, ‘Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, 
Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism’ (1995) 25 British Journal of Political Science 
289; Tsebelis, Veto Players (n 428).
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policy direction), and cohesion (the unity of each veto player in an issue area).538 
Assuming that veto players are cohesive, policy stability increases with an increase 
in the number and political polarisation of veto players. Political polarisation gauges 
the degree to which veto players hold dissimilar policy preferences over an issue. 
Because a significant change to policy needs to be agreed by all the veto players, 
policy change becomes more difficult (i.e., policy stability increases) the higher the 
number of the veto players and the greater the political polarisation among them.539 
With ideological polarisation among them, the veto players will find it difficult to 
agree on an alternative to the status quo. Stated otherwise, the composition of the 
government (involving, for instance, multiple veto players with different policy 
preferences) serves as a commitment mechanism and enables ‘political actors credibly 
to commit that there will be no significant policy changes.’540 
Because durability by definition implies inter-temporal stability, political 
polarisation among successive governments is also critical in assessing policy 
sustainability and the credibility economic actors attach to a given policy. The 
political polarisation between successive governments (known in the literature as 
‘alternation’) affects policy stability in that a government that is much different from 
its predecessor is likely to significantly depart from the status quo by unravelling 
the policies of the previous government and introducing its own. Hence the lower/
higher the ideological distance between the successive governments, the higher/
lesser the probability that the status quo will remain stable.541
6.4. Explaining policy durability
This Section applies the theoretical insights developed in Section 6.3 to explain the 
durability of the EU ETS and the unravelling of the Australian CPM.
6.4.1. Commitment devices and policy durability
This Section identifies design elements of the Australian CPM and the EU ETS and analyses 
whether they might explain the durability of the former and the unravelling of the latter.
538 Tsebelis, ‘Decision Making in Political Systems’ (n 537) 301.
539 G Tsebelis, ‘Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis’ 
(1999) 93 American Political Science Review 591, 594-596.
540 Tsebelis, ‘Veto Players and Law Production’ (n 539) 604.
541 Tsebelis, ‘Veto Players and Law Production’ (n 539) 596; Hallerberg (n 536) 23.
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(a) Commitment devices: Australian CPM
The Australian CPM was designed to counter possible attempts to reverse it. This 
objective was reflected in the design features of the CPM and other policy packages 
that sought to make the CPM resilient to political uncertainty, buy off businesses 
opposed to the CPM, and broaden its support base by building new constituencies. 
The policy packages that aimed at creating new constituencies and reconfiguring 
the interests of the CPM’s adversaries are discussed in the next Section. This Section 
focuses on institutional features that aimed at designing resilience and flexibility into 
the CPM.
The first concerns the establishment of the CCA, which is modelled to a large 
extent after the UK’s CCC.542 The CCA is a statutory body initially set up to, inter 
alia, advise the Australian government on the CPM’s caps and Australia’s long-
term emissions reduction targets and to periodically review the performance of the 
CPM.543 It is composed of nine members – a chair, the chief scientist and seven other 
expert members – appointed by (except the chief scientist) the Climate Change 
Minister.544 The enabling statute of the CCA includes measures to safeguard the 
CCA’s independence and impartiality. For instance, members of the CCA could be 
dismissed only on a limited number of grounds such as physical or mental incapacity 
and bankruptcy.545
In addition, although the Climate Change Minister is allowed to ‘give directions’ 
to the CCA, the instructions ‘must be of a general nature only’.546 In particular, the 
Climate Change Minister is prohibited from giving directions that ‘relate to the 
conduct of a particular review or the content of a report of a particular review’.547 
Once the CCA files a report of its review, the Climate Change Minister is required 
to table the report in each House of the Parliament ‘within 15 sitting days of that 
542 Keenan and others (n 435) 477.
543 Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy Future: The Australian Government’s Climate 
Change Plan (Australian Government 2011) 110-111. After the Coalition-led government abolished 
the CPM in 2014, the powers and functions of the CCA as they relate to the CPM have been 
repealed. See Climate Change Authority Act 2011 (No 143) 2011 (Cth), ss 10-13 (hereafter: Climate 
Change Authority Act).
544 Climate Change Authority Act, ss 17-18.
545 Climate Change Authority Act, s 75.
546 Climate Change Authority Act, s 57(2).
547 Climate Change Authority Act, s 57(3).
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House after receiving the report.’548 If the report specifies recommendations, the 
Climate Change Minister must prepare a statement setting out the government’s 
response to each of the recommendations.549 These measures ensure public scrutiny 
of the government’s response to the CCA’s reviews and recommendations.
The second institutional feature concerns a rolling system of setting the CPM’s 
cap. The CPM’s cap was set on a rolling basis in that it was initially set for five years 
and extended annually for another year through a regulation tabled in parliament.550 
Ideally, the Climate Change Minister tables a proposed pollution caps for the 
first five years of the CPM’s flexible-prices period (2015-2020).551 Afterwards, the 
Minister tables a regulation every year to extend the cap fixed for the first five years 
by one year.552 If the regulation setting out the cap is defeated in either of the Houses 
of the Parliament or if the Minister fails to table the regulation, a default cap that is 
defined in the Clean Energy Act shall be applicable.553
Keenan and others argue that the CCA ‘provides some assurance that caps and 
emissions-reduction targets will be informed by the latest science and have scientific 
integrity.’554 Similarly, Caripis and others argue that the establishment of the CCA 
‘engenders some confidence in the scope for improvement of the [CPM] … as 
Australia embarks on a journey of “learning while doing”.’555 Egenhofer and others 
contend that the rolling system of cap-setting instilled flexibility into Australian 
climate policy as it provided an opportunity to adjust the cap in response to changing 
circumstances.556 Caripis and others further observed that it could ‘guard against a 
548 Climate Change Authority Act, s 60(2).
549 Climate Change Authority Act, s 60(7/a).
550 Caripis and others (n 433) 590.
551 Clean Energy Act 2011 (No. 131) 2011 (Cth), s 16 (hereafter: Clean Energy Act).
552 Clean Energy Act, s 16(5). See also Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth), ch 
2.16 (hereafter: Explanatory Memorandum); Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy 
Future (n 543) 103.
553 The default cap for the financial year of the first flexible charge period was set at 38 Mt less than total 
emissions of liable entities for the year beginning 1 July 2012, and 12 Mt below emissions of the previous 
year for every year thereafter. Clean Energy Act, ss 17-18. See also Caripis and others (n 433) 590.
554 Keenan and others (n 435) 477.
555 Caripis and others (n 433) 588. For a similar assessment, see Keenan and others (n 435).
556 C Egenhofer, A Marcu and A Georgiev, ‘Reviewing the EU ETS Review’ (2012) 18-19, Centre for 
European Studies (CEPS) <https://www.ceps.eu/publications/reviewing-eu-ets-review> accessed 9 
December 2015.
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future government seeking to “loosen” or undermine the cap’.557 In this sense, while 
the establishment of the CCA was seen as a mechanism of fostering credibility to by 
instilling both predictability and flexibility to Australia’s climate policy in general and 
the CPM in particular, the rolling system of cap-setting (coupled with the default 
cap) was seen as a system of designing resilience and flexibility into the CPM. 
Seen against the backdrop of Australian polarised climate politics, it is doubtful 
whether the CCA would cultivate ‘confidence in the scope for improvement 
of the [CPM]’558 or that the system of cap-setting would ‘guard against a future 
government seeking to “loosen” or undermine the [CPM’s] cap.’559 To be sure, as 
discussed before, the UK’s CCC, after which the CCA was modelled, has been 
credited with lending credibility to the UK’s climate policy.560 However, the UK’s 
climate change politics has been much less partisan than that of Australia, with the 
three major parties extending cross-party support to the country’s climate policy.561 
The cross-party support naturally creates a favourable political condition for the 
acceptance of the CCC’s recommendations. The same cannot be said about CCA’s 
recommendations. The highly partisan nature of Australian climate politics creates 
doubts if the recommendations and reviews by the CCA would be accepted.
If one casts doubt on the credibility-enhancing potential of the CCA, it is 
also uncertain whether the system of cap-setting could curtail ex post government 
opportunism. The argument that the system of cap-setting could ‘guard against a 
future government seeking to “loosen” or undermine the cap’562 rests on faith in 
the default cap. To be sure, if the CPM’s cap cannot be extended, the default cap 
will be triggered and serve as a backup. However, adjusting the trajectory of the 
557 Caripis and others (n 433) 590.
558 Caripis and others (n 433) 588.
559 Caripis and others (n 433) 590.
560 Brunner, Flachsland and Marschinski (n 437) 263-264; Lockwood (n 520) 1343; Keenan and others 
(n 435) 477.
561 For instance, in the lead up to the 2015 general election, leaders of the three major parties – David 
Cameron (the Conservative), Ed Miliband (Labour) and Nick Clegg (Liberal Democrats), signed a 
cross-party pledge characterising climate change as ‘a threat … to our national and global security, 
to poverty eradication and economic prosperity.’ See D Carrington, ‘Cameron, Clegg and Miliband 
sign joint climate pledge’ The Guardian (London, 14 February 2015) <https://www.theguardian.
com/environment/2015/feb/14/cameron-clegg-and-miliband-sign-joint-climate-pledge> accessed 18 
November 2016.
562 Caripis and others (n 575) 588.
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default cap set in the Clean Energy Act requires parliamentary assent. Without a 
regulation by the Parliament, the default cap would lock-in an inflexible cap. An 
inflexible cap lacks credibility precisely because it cannot be adjusted in response 
to changing circumstances. Worse, a government could undermine or loosen the 
cap without triggering the default cap. If a government sets a less stringent cap than 
the default, the default cap will not be triggered as this constitutes neither failure to 
table a regulation extending the cap nor a rejection of the proposed regulation by 
Parliament.563
(b) Commitment devices: EU ETS
In stark contrast to the CPM, not only has the EU ETS lacked the types of adhesion 
and flexibility mechanisms, but it has also been beset by several challenges that could 
potentially threaten its sustainability. In Phase I (2005-2008), it faced a problem 
of allowance over-allocation, leading to allowance prices to crash from near €30/
tCO2 to around €13.35/tCO2 in April 2006 and gradually to near zero.
564 Since 
the 2007/08 financial crisis, the EU ETS has been facing a supply glut that resulted 
in over 2 billion excess allowances. The oversupply, expected to outlast the second 
phase (2013-2020), depressed allowance prices and stifled much-needed low-carbon 
long-term investments.
However, these post-enactment challenges do not seem to threaten the durability 
of the EU ETS. For instance, during the April 2006 price crash, the market valued 
dirtier firms less than cleaner firms, which could be indicative of investors’ confidence 
in the inter-temporal stability of the ETS.565 It seems that the relatively low political 
polarisation over climate policy has allowed the EU to credibly commit that the EU 
ETS will be politically sustainable. In addition, the complex institutional architecture 
of the EU makes policy change naturally cumbersome. This is even more so because 
563 It could be argued that because Australia’s emissions target of 5 per cent below 2000 levels by 2020 
enjoys a bi-partisan support, the CCA’s recommendations about the level of the CPM’s cap might 
too enjoy bi-partisan support. However, the bi-partisan support for the overall emissions reduction 
target does not necessarily translate into support for the CPM’s cap because of divisions between the 
Coalition and Labor over the mechanisms of achieving the target. Given its opposition to the CPM, 
it is to be expected that the Coalition might try to undermine the CPM by, for instance, rejecting a 
regulation extending the cap.
564 DA Ellerman and BK Buchner, ‘Over-Allocation or Abatement? A Preliminary Analysis of the EU 
ETS based on the 2005-06 Emissions Data’ (2008) 41 Environmental Resource Economics 267, 285.
565 See Jong, Couwenberg and Woerdman (n 430).
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agenda-setting is controlled by the Commission, which, as discussed above, used 
climate policy as an instrument of furthering the European integration agenda. This 
limits the probability that sweeping changes unravelling the current climate policy 
will be proposed and adopted.
The post-enactment challenges, far from undermining the durability of the EU 
ETS, have instead been used as launching pads for reforming the ETS. The problem 
of over-allocation in Phase I (2005-2007), attributable partly to the decentralised 
nature of cap-setting and a lack of accurate emissions data, led to significant 
changes in the EU ETS’ architecture for the third phase (2013-2020).566 Allowance 
allocation and cap-setting have been centralised at the EU level.567 The EU-wide cap 
has been set by the Commission and has been decreasing annually in a linear fashion 
by 1.74 per cent from 2013.568 Allowances have been allocated based on EU-wide 
harmonised rules and auctioning has been made the default mode of allocation.569 
Introducing auctioning as a dominant mode of allowance allocation also addressed 
the issue of windfall profits, which arose in the initial phase of the ETS because 
energy firms were passing on the costs of carbon to consumers despite receiving 
almost all allowances free of charge.570 The problem of oversupply has similarly kick-
started a reform process to make the EU ETS resilient to demand-side shocks and 
has resulted in the establishment of the Market Stability Reserve.571
566 Ellerman, Convery and de Perthuis (n 477) 36-41. See also Ellerman and Buchner (n 564) 285.
567 See Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
scheme of the community [2009] OJ L140/63, arts 9-10 (hereafter: Revised Emissions Trading 
Directive).
568 Revised Emissions Trading Directive, art 9.
569 See Revised Emissions Trading Directive, arts 10 and 10a. Although the scheme continued with its 
decentralised system of allocation and cap-setting during Phase II (2008-2012), the lessons from the 
first phase led the Commission to follow a strict approach in approving NAPs for the second phase 
(2008-2012). Phase II allocations were cut 5.9 per cent below 2005 verified emissions. Ellerman, 
Convery and de Perthuis (n 477) 80.
570 See generally Woerdman, Couwenberg and Nentjes (n 431).
571 Decision (EU) 2015/1814 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the 
establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission 
trading scheme and amending Directive 2003/87/EC [2015] OJ L264/1. See also Commission, 
‘The state of the European carbon market in 2012’ COM (2012) 652 final; Commission, ‘A policy 




It should be noted that while the complex institutional architecture of the EU 
helps to protect the EU ETS from unravelling, it has created challenges for reforming 
it.572 This has been made worse by the 2007/08 financial crisis that revived carbon 
leakage and competitiveness concerns. Although the EU institutions have had 
differences over the EU ETS since the ETS’s inception, the financial crisis has ‘made 
conflicts deeper and harsher, pushing climate change down the political agenda.’573 
While frontrunner Member States such as the UK advocate for structural changes 
to rescue the ailing EU ETS, several other Member States such as Poland have 
resisted reform options leading to higher carbon prices.574 With signs of political 
polarisation over climate policy emerging in the EU, the very structure that has 
made the EU ETS durable is harming its credibility by making it too inflexible for 
its own good. 
6.4.2. Positive policy feedback and policy durability
A climate policy fares a better chance of prospering in an uncertain future if it sets off 
a cycle of positive feedback, creating path dependence, entrenching itself and making 
policy reversal costly. However, a cycle of self-reinforcing positive feedback is not 
automatic. It has to be actively generated through, inter alia, long-term investment 
schemes and mechanisms of building new constituencies and reconfiguring interests 
of climate policy adversaries.
(a) Policy feedback: Australian CPM
The announcement of the Australian CPM had been hugely unpopular among 
voters, businesses – especially the fossil fuel industry – and the then-in-opposition 
party, the Coalition. The fossil fuel industry attacked the carbon policy as hurting 
competitiveness by imposing a high carbon price before Australia’s major competitors 
started pricing carbon.575 The negative policy feedback persisted despite the several 
assistance and compensation schemes introduced as part the Clean Energy Act. In 
the following, we discuss these schemes and explain why they failed to generate 
positive policy feedback or turn adversaries of the CPM into its clienteles.
572 See generally J Wettestad, ‘Rescuing EU Emissions Trading: Mission Impossible?’ (2014) 14 Global 
Environmental Politics 64.
573 Wettestad (n 572) 75.
574 Wettestad (n 572) 74-76.
575 ‘Australia’s carbon-tax drama’ (n 462) 1-4.
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The Australian CPM was designed with instruments that could, at least in theory, 
create positive policy feedback. First, it was designed as a hybrid ETS, combining 
features of tax and emissions trading. It had a three-year fixed-price period before 
transitioning to flexible prices in 2015.576 Even during the initial years of the flexible 
price period, prices were not to become fully flexible as the CPM had a price floor 
and a price ceiling from 2015 to 2018.577 The hybrid nature of the CPM and its 
price corridors were designed to provide price certainty and promote long-term 
investments, building new constituencies whose benefits hinge on the sustainability 
of the CPM and creating sunk costs that could increase the costs of unravelling the 
CPM.
Second, the CPM included assistance schemes that aimed at easing the carbon 
price burden on businesses and households and helping businesses transition to 
a low-carbon future. Emissions-intensive trade-exposed sectors received varying 
levels of allowances free of charge through a Jobs and Competitiveness Program.578 
Households received assistance through tax cuts, higher family payments, and 
increases in pensions and allowances. A Clean Technology Program, consisting of 
A$1.2 billion over seven years, was included to assist manufacturing industries in 
implementing energy-efficient technologies.579 These assistance and compensation 
schemes could be characterised as mechanisms of building new constituencies and 
reconfiguring the interests of the CPM’s adversaries.
Third, an Energy Security Fund was set up with the stated aim of transforming 
Australia’s highly emissions-intensive energy sector through a ‘payment for closure’ 
scheme and a transitional assistance scheme for electricity generators.580 The ‘payment 
for closure’ scheme, which planned to close 2000 megawatts of electricity generation 
capacity by 2020, was to start a process of replacing highly emissions-intensive power 
generators with cleaner forms of energy production.581 The provisional assistance, 
consisting of A$5.5 billion, was designed to ‘help generators that face sizeable asset 
576 Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy Future (n 543) 107.
577 Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy Future (n 543) 27.
578 Clean Energy Amendment Regulation 2012 (No.1) 2012 (Cth) (hereafter: Clean Energy Amendment 
Regulation).
579 Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy Future (n 543) 37-38; 56; 71-76.
580 Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy Future (n 543) 71-76.
581 Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy Future (n 543) 75.
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value losses under a carbon price.’582 By closing down 2000 megawatts of electricity 
generation capacity and replacing it with cleaner forms of energy production, the 
government could ‘force’ the power sector to shoulder short-term costs and turn 
them from adversaries of the CPM into its advocates. 
Neither of the instruments that was meant to generate positive policy feedback 
and to dampen negative feedback was able to achieve its purpose. The explanation 
to this might lie in understanding firm’s investment behaviour under uncertainty. 
Dixit argues that the value of deferring investment increases if three conditions are 
met.
First, almost as a matter of definition, an investment entails some sunk 
cost, an expenditure that cannot be recouped if the action is reversed at a 
later date. Second, the economic environment has ongoing uncertainty, 
and information arrives gradually. Finally, an investment opportunity 
does not generally disappear if not taken immediately; the decision is 
not only whether to invest, but also when to invest. […] When these 
three conditions are present, waiting has positive value. In the evolving 
environment, time brings more information about the future prospects 
of the project. As long as the opportunity to invest remains available, 
a later decision can be a better one. And because there are sunk costs, 
it does not always pay to take a less perfect action now and change it 
later.583
Dixit’s three conditions were met in the Australian context.584 First, the 
investments that the CPM needed (and attempted) to spur for it to be too costly 
to reverse are low-carbon long-term investments that create sunk costs. Second, 
the CPM’s lack of bi-partisan support had created ‘ongoing uncertainty’ about the 
credibility of the CPM’s long-term carbon price signal. Investors were better off 
waiting until at least the (then upcoming) 2013 federal election cycle passed. Third, 
failure to invest during the early years of the CPM did not entail forgoing investment 
582 Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy Future (n 543) 74.
583 A Dixit, ‘Investment and Hysteresis’ (1992) 6 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 107, 108. See 
also AK Dixit and RS Pindyck, Investment under Uncertainty (Princeton University Press 1994) 
8-9.
584 See F Jotzo, T Jordan and N Fabian, ‘Policy Uncertainty about Australia’s Carbon Price: Expert 
Survey Results and Implications for Investment’ (2012) 45 The Australian Economic Review 395, 
403-405.
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opportunities in the future. The result was that schemes designed to spur long-term 
investments and create sunk costs that could increase the costs of reversing the CPM 
did not function as planned. This could be illustrated by the failure of the ‘payment 
for closure’ programme – the government’s flagship scheme that aimed at creating 
space for low-carbon energy investments by closing down (for compensation) some 
of the most polluting coal-fired power plants.
The ‘payment for closure´ programme was abandoned in September 2012 
because the government and electricity generators failed to agree on a price for the 
closure of five coal-fired power plants.585 It is straightforward to see why the power 
generators and the government were unable to agree on the level of compensation.586 
For the power operators, the increasing popularity of the Coalition, whose leader 
made ‘“a pledge in blood” to repeal the carbon tax as the “first order of business”’ 
if he won the 2013 federal election,587 significantly increased the risk of the CPM’s 
reversal, leading them to value the costs of closing down as high. For the government, 
which was expecting that the CPM would survive the 2013 election, the costs of 
keeping coal-fired power plants up and running were high.
The uncertainty created by the highly partisan climate politics also curtailed the 
potential of the other compensation, funding, and investment schemes in creating 
new policy clienteles, locking in long-term investments, and reconfiguring the 
interest of the CPM’s adversaries. Because of the CPM’s lack of cross-party support, 
businesses had more to gain in the long-run by fighting back and thwarting a costly 
climate policy than becoming policy clienteles by succumbing to the transitional 
assistance and funding schemes. Stated differently, the polarised climate politics gave 
businesses significant scope to resist carbon pricing.
The upshot of this is that policy designs that could in theory help entrench a 
policy be increasing the costs of exit may require favourable political conditions to 
thrive.
585 See Point Carbon, ‘Australia Scraps Dirty Power Station Closure Plan’ Thompson Reuters (Oslo, 28 
September 2012) <http://www.pointcarbon.com/polopoly_fs/1.2002298!CMANZ20120928.pdf> 
accessed 11 February 2014.
586 Another plausible explanation lies in the effect of the 2012 Australia-EU agreement to link their 
respective carbon markets starting in 2015. See the discussion in Section 6.4.3 below.
587 Burgmann and Baer (n 441) 84.
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(b) Policy feedback: EU ETS
In contrast to businesses in Australia, businesses in the EU largely rallied behind 
the EU ETS. A pro-ETS business coalition led by the British Petroleum, Shell and 
other businesses in the electricity sector played a significant role in the acceptance 
of emissions trading.588 To be sure, businesses’ support for the EU ETS was far from 
unified. Some firms, notably the German industry and emissions-intensive sectors, 
mounted fierce opposition to the proposed EU ETS, preferring voluntary climate 
policy instruments.589 They were, however, overwhelmed by the pro-ETS business 
coalition.590 Understanding businesses’ positive feedback in response to the EU ETS 
requires understanding the politics behind the carbon tax proposal of the 1990s that 
both several Member States and businesses fiercely opposed and thwarted.
Member States’ opposition to the tax was rooted, not in pricing carbon per se, 
but in jealously guarding their national prerogatives over taxation. Several Member 
States opposed the carbon tax because they thought taxation as ‘a core value not 
to be relinquished even if the environment would benefit.’591 The botched carbon 
tax, contrary to showing deep divisions among the Member States over the issue 
of pricing carbon, signalled that another form of climate regulation was inevitable, 
arguably paving the way for a favourable reception of the emissions trading proposal 
by businesses.
The relatively low political polarisation over pricing carbon naturally leaves 
limited space for industry to mount significant opposition against the pricing of 
carbon altogether. Faced with an impeding climate regulation, businesses rallied 
behind the proposed EU ETS as a strategy of pre-empting a costlier climate policy.592 
Instead of opposing emissions trading altogether, they lobbied for the ‘spoils’ of the 
ETS, leading to a generous allocation of allowances during Phase I (2005-2007) of 
the EU ETS.593 The broad-based support for the EU ETS during its formative years 
helped cement the EU ETS to take root during its early phase.
588 Meckling (n 477) 111-114.
589 Meckling (n 477) 118-122.
590 Schreurs and Tiberghien (n 471) 32-33; Meckling (n 477) 108-122.
591 Ellerman, Convery and de Perthuis (n 477) 16.
592 Schreurs and Tiberghien (n 471) 32-33; Meckling (n 477) 108-122; Skjærseth and Wettestad (n 474) 
75.
593 E Woerdman, ‘The EU Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme’ in E Woerdman, MM 
Roggenkamp and M Holwerda (eds), Essential EU Climate Law (Edward Elgar 2015) 43-75.
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The EU ETS has, however, failed to deliver sufficiently high and predictable 
prices to incentivise low-carbon investments that hinge on its sustainability. 
Allowance prices have been too low and too unpredictable to incentivise long-term 
investments and innovations in low-carbon technologies.594 Despite this, support for 
the EU ETS has not waned enough to cause its unravelling. While some stakeholders 
(notably the power sector, NGOs, and non-energy intensive industries) favour high 
carbon prices, others (mostly emissions-intensive industries) maintained that the low 
carbon price shows simply that little abatement is needed to meet the ETS’ target.595 
In addition, the emergence of the EU ETS created powerful new constituencies such 
as banks, accounting and law firms that created a new financial market and benefit 
from the new regulation.596 Even with low carbon prices, these sectors are likely to 
continue supporting the EU ETS as they have a stake in its durability.
6.4.3. Linking ETSs as an institutional constraint
As indicated in Section 6.3.1, institutional constraints may also be external to a 
given jurisdiction.597 External institutional constraints may decrease the risk of policy 
reversal by tying a policy to the country’s international commitments. Linking ETSs 
can be seen as an external constraint for it embeds a domestic ETS in international 
climate policy architecture. Brunner and others argue that linking ETSs ‘could 
provide (…) [a] source of external commitment because linking agreements can 
curtail the flexibility for unilateral adjustments to carbon pricing.’598
Even if international law lacks effective enforcement and sanctioning 
mechanisms,599 its violation generally imposes costs in the form of retaliatory 
measures by other parties, reputational sanctions that affect a state’s ability to 
extract concessions in the future, or financial and material sanctions.600 The costs of 
violation are affected by several variables including the legal nature of the agreement 
594 See generally Weishaar, ‘Incentivising Technologic Change’ (n 432).
595 See Commission, ‘Options for Structural Measures to Strengthen the EU Emissions Trading System: 
Main Outcomes of the Public Consultation’ (2012) 4-5, <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/consultations/
docs/0017/main_outcomes_en.pdf> accessed on 05/09/2014.
596 Meckling (n 477) 189.
597 See text to note 514 above.
598 Brunner, Flachsland and Marschinski (n 437) 268 (reference omitted).
599 See generally A Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 278-313.
600 Ginsburg (n 514) 730-731; TL Meyer, Power, Exit Costs, and Renegotiation in International Law’ 
(2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal 379, 393-394.
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and its design.601 Crudely, hard law agreements such as treaties impose a higher cost 
of exit than their soft law counterparts.602 In terms of design, reservation clauses, 
amendment and revision provisions, and rules governing suspension, withdrawal 
and termination lower the costs of exit by allowing flexibility with respect to revision 
of and withdrawal from an international agreement.603 By contrast, provisions 
that stipulate mandatory dispute settlement and monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms increase the costs of exit.604
The 2012 Australia-EU interim deal to link the Australian CPM and the EU ETS 
from 2015 could be seen as an external commitment device that could potentially 
increase the costs of abolishing the CPM for any future government. However, we 
cannot assess why the deal failed to protect the CPM from unravelling because 
the linking negotiation was never completed.605 Australia’s Labor-led government, 
which introduced the CPM and was negotiating with the EU on the linking, lost 
the 2013 federal election to the Coalition that finally saw the CPM repealed. Yet 
the consequences of the Australia-EU link might serve as a cautionary tale about the 
tradeoffs that linking ETSs entails.
The Australian CPM was designed to not only help Australia achieve its short- 
and long-run emissions reduction targets, but also to provide a powerful incentive 
for low-carbon investments and innovation.606 These objectives informed many of 
the CPM’s design features including a three-year fixed price period, a price floor 
601 AT Guzman, ‘The Design of International Agreements’ (2005) 16 The European Journal of 
International Law 579; Ginsburg (n 514); Meyer (600).
602 Meyer (600) 395-396.
603 Meyer (600) 394-396; LR Helfer, ‘Flexibility in International Agreements’ in JL Dunoff and MA 
Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State 
of the Art (Cambridge University Press 2011).
604 Guzman (n 578).
605 See B Görlach, MA Mehling and E Roberts, ‘Designing Institutions, Structures and Mechanisms to 
Facilitate the Linking of Emissions Trading Schemes’ (German Emissions Trading Authority 2015) 
77.
606 The Clean Energy Act, which established the CPM, aimed, inter alia, ‘to put a price on greenhouse 
gas emissions in a way that encourages investment in clean energy, supports jobs and competitiveness 
in the economy, and supports Australia’s economic growth while reducing pollution.’ See Clean 
Energy Act, art 3(4). The Australian government expected the carbon price to ‘play a major role, 
creating powerful commercial incentives to avoid traditional high-pollution solutions and to adopt 
low-pollution alternatives.’ See Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy Future (n 543) 
xvi.
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and a price ceiling, and a flexible system of cap-setting. The CPM’s predictable price 
signal was, however, undermined by its linking with the EU ETS. Following the 
announcement of the CPM-EU ETS link, the expected price of Australian Carbon 
Units – the CPM’s carbon ‘currency’ – for 2015 from fell from A$29 to just A$12.1, 
wiping out A$6 billion from the government’s expected earnings from selling 
allowances, improving the investment and operational outlook of coal-fired power 
plants, and slowing down a shift to cleaner energy sources.607 The price fall was large 
because, first, Australia had to scrap the CPM’s price floor as part of the linking 
arrangement and, second, the linking exposed the CPM to the EU ETS’s oversupply 
problem that has kept EUA prices very low since 2008/09.
To be sure, the linking of the CPM and the EU ETS could have brought 
economic and political benefits to both Australia and the EU. For Australia, in 
addition to embedding the CPM in a bottom-up international climate policy 
architecture, thereby providing an additional layer of protection against attempts to 
unravel the CPM, the link would have created access to a carbon market with cheap 
emissions allowances, neutralising a central criticism against the CPM that its carbon 
prices are too high relative to other jurisdictions.608 For the EU, the link would 
have created an additional, albeit small, demand for European Union Allowances 
(EUAs), propping up EU ETS’s carbon price signal. Politically, it could serve as a 
stepping stone towards greater international cooperation in climate change policy.
In agreeing to link the CPM to the EU ETS, the Australian government traded 
off the CPM’s relatively high and predictable price signal for short-term economic 
and political gains. The significant fall in the CPM’s carbon prices following the 
607 Point Carbon, ‘Australia Takes A$6 Billion Write-down after EU CO2 Price Fall’ Thompson Reuters 
(Oslo, 24 May 2013) <http://www.pointcarbon.com/polopoly_fs/1.2386086!cmanz20130524.
pdf> accessed 11 February 2014. Bourke noted that the price crash changed the investment 
and operational outlook of coal-fired power plants, slowing down a shift from coal to cleaner 
energy sources such as gas. See P Bourke, ‘Australia-EU ETS Linkage to Slow Shift to Gas-Fired 
Generation’ Thompson Reuters (Oslo, 26 October 2012) <http://www.pointcarbon.com/polopoly_
fs/1.2035446!CMANZ20121026.pdf> accessed 11 February 2014. See also Point Carbon, ‘Australia 
Offset Scheme Hits Milestone but Future Uncertain’ Thompson Reuters (Oslo, 13 December 2013) 
<http://www.pointcarbon.com/polopoly_fs/1.3366648!CMANZ20131213.pdf> accessed 11 
February 2014.
608 Greg Combet – then Climate Change Minister – emphasised that the linking ‘provide[s] Australian 
businesses with access to a larger market for cost-effective emission reductions’ and that it ‘reaffirms 
that carbon markets are the prime vehicle for tackling climate change and the most efficient means of 
achieving emissions reductions.’ See Commission, ‘Australia-EU Linking Agreement‘ (n 437).
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announcement of the link was a reflection of the efficiency gains from trade in 
emissions allowances. With linking, Australia and the EU could have achieved their 
aggregate emissions targets at a lower aggregate abatement cost than in autarky, 
confirming the (static) efficiency arguments that underpin the theory of linking. 
However, the short-run welfare and political gains came at the cost of undermining 
the CPM’s long-term carbon price signal that could potentially be instrumental in 
infusing dynamic efficiency.
6.5. Conclusion
This Chapter attempted to explain the durability of the EU ETS and the unravelling 
of the Australian CPM drawing on two strands of literature: credible commitments 
and veto players. The literature suggests that institutional constraints – internal 
and external – help entrench a policy by making policy reversal cumbersome and 
costly; by enticing policy adversaries that they have more to gain by adapting than 
continuing to fight; by encouraging long-term investments; and by creating new 
constituencies that benefit from the system.609
The analysis suggests that the success of institutional constraints in fostering 
credibility and increasing the costs of policy reversal is affected by the level of political 
polarisation in a given jurisdiction. Despite its several institutional innovations, 
the CPM unravelled because the highly polarised climate politics undermined the 
effectiveness of the institutions as constraints on policy change. The polarised climate 
politics also weakened the effectiveness of the CPM’s investment and compensation 
schemes in creating sunk costs and generating a self-reinforcing cycle of positive 
feedback. By contrast, despite the EU ETS’s lack of ingenious institutions such as 
the Australia’s CCA and the rolling system of cap-setting, it has thus far proven 
durable because the low political polarisation among the EU institutions served as a 
far more effective mechanism of credible commitment.
The claim here is not that institutional constraints do not matter; it is rather 
that they need a favourable political climate to thrive and be effective. Institutional 
constraints, delegation and mechanisms of generating positive policy feedback 
enhance credibility and sustainability of an ETS when political polarisation over 
carbon policy is relatively low. This observation is contrary to the view that credibility 
609 Patashnik, Reforms at Risk (n 526) 30; Stienberg (n 514) 273; Jordan and Matt (n 508).
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of a policy increases with an increase in political polarisation.610 The tales of the 
Australian CPM and the EU ETS suggest otherwise. Our conclusion is more in line 
with Frye’s suggestion that high political polarisation erodes private actors’ faith in 
a given policy.611
610 See for instance Keefer and Stasavage (n 438).






This research set out to explain how linking different emissions trading systems 
(ETSs) might affect environmental effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of linked 
carbon markets. We contended that such analysis needs to move beyond examining 
how different theoretical ETS design variants affect economic efficiency and 
environmental integrity and capture the complexity of real-life ETSs. Accordingly, 
this dissertation attempted to address the economic efficiency and environmental 
integrity effects of linking ETSs by using real-life ETSs as case studies. Although the 
analysis primarily focused on assessing the economic efficiency and environmental 
integrity implications of linking ETSs, it also examined the implications of linking 
ETSs for policy priorities of linking-partner jurisdictions.
This Chapter discusses the main findings of the research along the lines of 
economic efficiency (Section 7.1), environmental integrity (Section 7.2), domestic 
policy priorities (Section 7.3), and policy durability (Section 7.4). Section 7.5 
examines the future of linking ETSs and outlines an agenda for further research.
7.1. Linking and economic efficiency
Economic theory holds that linking ETSs leads to greater efficiency than in autarky.612 
612 See generally C Flachsland, R Marschinski and O Edenhofer, ‘To Link or not to Link: Benefits 
and Disadvantages of Linking Cap-and-Trade Systems’ (2009) 9 Climate Policy 358; A Tuerk and 
others, ‘Linking Carbon Markets: Concepts, Case Studies and Pathways’ (2009) 9 Climate Policy 
341; G Gruell and L Taschini, ‘Linking Emission Trading Schemes’ [2012] Economics of Energy & 
Environmental Policy 31; JF Green, T Sterner and G Wagner, ‘A Balance of Bottom-up and Top-
down Linking Climate Policies’ (2014) 4 Nature Climate Change 1064.
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Linking ETSs diversifies abatement options by expanding carbon markets across 
space. The more diverse the abatement options, the higher the aggregate cost saving 
from trading in emissions rights. These economic predictions, predicated on linking 
between idealised ETSs, may not necessarily hold true in reality not least because 
real-life ETSs are different from the idealised permit-trading systems assumed in 
theoretical analyses. The analyses in Chapters 3-6 showed why and how different 
design elements of to-be-linked ETSs might affect economic efficiency.
Chapter 3 explained how different systems of allowance allocation may distort 
abatement decisions by using the free allocation rules of the EU ETS and the 
Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM).613 Whereas both the EU ETS and 
the Australian CPM allocate varying levels of allowances free of charge, each ETS’s 
system of allocation vary along several lines.614 One of these differences concerns 
the emissions-intensity benchmarks (baselines) that each ETS uses to determine the 
number of allowances that emissions-intensive trade-exposed (EITE) entities receive 
free of charge. The EU ETS bases its free allocation largely on product-specific 
benchmarks that are drawn up taking into account the average emissions-intensity of 
the 10 per cent most efficient installations producing the relevant product in the EU 
in the 2007/2008 period.615 The Australian CPM, by contrast, allocated emissions 
allowances free of charge based on emissions-intensity baselines that reflected the 
average of an entire industry engaging in a relevant activity.616
Each allocation system distorts, albeit to differing degrees, firms’ abatement 
decisions.617 The distortion results from firms’ expectation that the allocation 
613 See text to notes 259–263 above in Chapter 3.
614 See text to notes 252–256 above in Chapter 3.
615 See Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
scheme of the community [2009] OJ L140/63, arts 10a(1), 10a(2) & 10a(12) (hereafter: Revised 
Emissions Trading Directive).
616 Clean Energy Amendment Regulation 2012 (No 1) 2012 (Cth), cls 906-907 (hereafter: Clean Energy 
Amendment Regulation). See also Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy Future: The 
Australian Government’s Climate Change Plan (Australian Government 2011) 104-115.
617 The degree to which each system’s allocation rules distort abatement is likely to be different. The 
EU ETS’s allocation rules incentivise installations less efficient than the top 10 per cent to improve 
efficiency, thereby increasing the number of allowances they receive free of charge. However, once an 
installation moves up the efficiency ladder and joins the elite ‘10 per cent most efficient installations’, 
its incentives for further efficiency improvement are limited. By contrast, the Australian CPM’s 




benchmarks (baselines) will likely be updated periodically to take into account 
efficiency improvements realised over time.618 The firms’ expectation of updating 
reduces their incentives to beat the current benchmarks (baselines) as this will likely 
reduce the number of allowances they will receive in future allocation periods. This 
results in firms shying away from improving efficiency further unless the price of 
allowances exceeds the sum of their current marginal abatement cost (MAC) and the 
expected value of future allowances forgone by improving efficiency today.619
The effect of the free allowance allocation rules of the EU ETS and the Australian 
CPM is to create a divergence between a firm’s MAC and the price of allowances.620 
If a firm expects that its current abatement behaviour affects its future allocations, if 
it is a seller, it will not be willing to sell allowances unless allowance prices exceed the 
sum of its MAC and the expected value of allowances that it will forgo by reducing 
output or undertaking abatement currently. If it is a buyer, it will be willing to pay 
a premium price that is well above its MAC. Because of firms’ ‘higher than MAC’ 
valuation of an emissions allowance, the pre-linking or autarky equilibrium does not 
necessarily reflect an optimal allocation of resources where firm’s MAC equals the 
price of allowances.
With trade in emissions allowances between the Australian CPM and the EU 
ETS, emissions abatement may not necessarily shift to a system where it could be 
achieved at a lower cost.621 If Australian EITE entities enjoyed a lower MAC than 
their EU ETS counterparts, they would continue to buy allowances from the EU 
ETS until prices exceed the sum of their MAC and the expected value of future 
allowances that are forgone by undertaking abatement currently, shifting abatement 
relevant activity. Hence firms’ expectation that allocation baselines will be updated distorts abatement 
decisions of the whole industry (rather than just a subset of the installations as is the case in the EU 
ETS).
618 For the fourth phase of the EU ETS (2021-2030), the European Commission has, for instance, 
proposed to revise the current benchmarks to take into account ‘technological progress achieved over 
time.’ See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-carbon 
investments’ COM (2015) 337 final, 6.
619 See, for instance, K Neuhoff, K Martinez and M Sato, ‘Allocation, Incentives and Distortions: The 
Impact of EU ETS Emissions Allowance Allocations to the Electricity Sector’ (2006) 6 Climate Policy 
73, 75-77.
620 Neuhoff, Martinez and Sato (n 619).
621 See text to note 263 above in Chapter 3.
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to a system with a higher MAC. An inefficient outcome. If Australian EITE entities 
had a higher MAC than their EU ETS counterparts, the former would be better 
off buying allowances from the EU ETS, thereby shifting abatement to the EU 
ETS. Even then, they will be willing to pay a premium price as their valuation of 
allowances does not necessarily reflect their MAC.
Chapter 4, which analysed market stabilisation measures of the EU ETS and 
the Korean ETS, further illustrated that the welfare effects of linking ETSs. The 
EU ETS’s Market Stability Reserve (MSR) is designed as a quantity-based system 
of scarcity management.622 It aims to manage scarcity in the EU ETS by adjusting 
annual auction volumes. If the surplus of allowances exceeds 833 million, it 
withholds allowances equivalent to 12 per cent of the surplus from future auction 
volumes.623 If the allowance surplus falls below 400 million, 100 million allowances 
are added from the MSR to future auction volumes.624
The Korean market stabilisation measures differ from that of the EU in three 
key aspects. First, in contrast to the EU ETS’s reliance on a single instrument, the 
Korean ETS has incorporated multiple instruments.625 The measures attempt to 
influence supply-demand dynamics in the Korean ETS through quantity-based 
instruments (an allowance reserve scheme and a system of adjusting offset utilisation 
and allowance borrowing limits), price-based instruments (a temporary price floor 
and price ceiling), or pure fiat (requiring firms to hold a minimum or maximum 
quantity of emissions allowances).626
Second, the Korean ETS applies price-based conditions that are defined in 
622 See generally Commission, ‘Impact assessment accompanying the document concerning the 
establishment and operation of a Market Stability Reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission 
trading scheme and amending Directive 2003/87/EC’ COM (2014) 20 final.
623 Decision (EU) 2015/1814 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2015 
concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse 
gas emission trading scheme and amending Directive 2003/87/EC [2015] OJ L 264/1, art 1(5) 
(hereafter: The Market Stability Reserve decision).
624 The Market Stability Reserve decision, art 1(6).
625 See text to notes 325–328 above in Chapter 4.
626 Act on the Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse Gas Emission Permits [Act No 11690, 23 March 
2013], art 23 (hereafter: Allocation and Trading Act); Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Allocation 
and Trading of Greenhouse Gas Emission Permits [Presidential Decree No 24429, 23 March 2013], 




relative terms to activate its market stabilisation measures.627 This contrasts to the 
MSR’s quantity-based triggers that are defined in absolute terms. Third, in contrast 
to the EU ETS’s rule-based and non-discretionary scarcity management system,628 
the Korean ETS’s market stability measures are discretionary. They leave broad 
discretions to the Emission Permits Allocation Committee (EPAC) – a largely 
political body chaired by the Minister of Strategy and Finance.629 For instance, even 
if the price-based triggers are met, the market stabilisation measures will not be 
activated unless a decision to that effect is taken by the EPAC.630
As pointed out in Section 4.4.1, the broad discretions left for the EPAC in 
stabilising the carbon market and the relative nature of the price-based triggers will 
likely cause policy-induced uncertainty. Because of the broad discretions left for the 
EPAC, it remains unclear whether it would take measures to address too low or too 
high allowance prices, and which of the multiple instruments it would adopt. The 
relative nature of the price-based triggers makes it difficult to anticipate how low or 
how high allowance prices need to become in absolute terms for the EPAC to take 
measures. With an intersystem trade in emissions allowances between the EU ETS 
and the Korean ETS, these policy-induced uncertainties will reach the EU ETS, 
affecting abatement and investment decisions in in the EU ETS.
The difference between the EU ETS and the Korean ETS in the type of triggers 
each employs to activate market stabilisation measures may also invite inconsistent 
policy interventions. If, for instance, the EU ETS’s MSR starts deferring auctioning 
627 For instance, market stabilisation measures addressing ‘too high’ allowance prices may be taken under 
either of the following two conditions: (i) if average allowance prices in the preceding six consecutive 
months more than triple relative to the average allowance price in the past two years; or (ii) if the 
average allowance price in the preceding six consecutive months more than doubles relative to the 
average allowance price in the past two years and that the average trading volume of one month 
is at least twice the volume of the same month in the previous two years. Instruments addressing 
concerns of ‘too low’ allowance price may be introduced if the average price of allowances in the 
preceding month falls by more than 60 per cent relative to the average price for the two preceding 
years. Allocation and Trading Act, art 23; Enforcement Decree of the Allocation and Trading Act, art 
30.
628 COM (2014) 20 final, 17-21
629 See note 324 above in Chapter 4.
630 Article 23 of the Allocation and Trading Act, the statute that established the Korean ETS, states that 
the Minister of Environment, in consultation with the EPAC, ‘may take measures for stabilising 




of allowances because the allowance surplus in the market exceeds the 833 million 
allowances threshold, allowance prices will rise that may, in turn, activate the price-
based triggers of the Korean ETS, prompting the Korean ETS to increase allowance 
supply in the market. The increase in the supply of allowance in the Korean market 
will again swell the allowance surplus, possibly setting the MSR in motion to absorb 
excess allowances. In short, each jurisdiction’s market intervention might reverse the 
effects of the other, undermining price predictability and affecting abatement and 
investment decisions.
Chapter 4 also showed that the mechanisms of implementing Korean ETS’s price 
floor will have implications for the efficiency of an EU-Korean carbon market.631 If, 
for instance, the price floor is implemented through a fixed fee payable by regulated 
entities, it may lead to suboptimal abatement outcomes in a linked EU-Korea carbon 
market. If regulated entities are required to pay a fee and surrender an allowance per 
tonne of CO2, their opportunity cost of switching to low-carbon abatement options 
decreases, leading them to switch to (previously) expensive low-carbon methods 
of abatement.632 The switch to low-carbon abatement options decreases emissions 
and reduces demand for emissions allowances at any given price. Given a perfectly 
inelastic supply curve, the demand curve shifts to the left, resulting in a decrease in 
the equilibrium price.
In autarky, the allowance price drops by the amount of the fee, leaving the 
effective carbon price unaffected.633 As an instrument of increasing allowance prices, 
the fee will fail to achieve its purpose. If anything, it will reinforce the downward 
spiral of allowance prices.634 If the Korean ETS is linked to, say, the EU ETS, the 
decrease in demand in the Korean ETS will be too small to drive down prices by 
the same amount as the fee. With linking, the fee will increase the effective carbon 
price faced by Korean entities by (or a little less than) the level of the fee, creating a 
divergence in the carbon price faced by Korean entities and EU ETS entities. Since 
the efficiency of a linked carbon market rests on the equalisation of carbon prices 
(marginal abatement costs) across the linking-partner ETSs, the price divergence 
631 See text to notes 331–339 above in Chapter 4.
632 S Fankhauser, C Hepburn and J Park, ‘Combining Multiple Policy Instruments: How not to Do It’ 
(2011) 7-9, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Paper 
No 38 <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/37573> accessed 9 December 2015.
633 Fankhauser, Hepburn and Park (n 632).




increases the overall cost of abatement and reverses (part of ) the gains from trade.
In sum, the foregoing analysis shows why and how the welfare implications of 
linking ETSs depend on how the linking-partner ETSs are constructed, underscoring 
the need for a case-by-case analysis of the welfare implications of linking ETSs. This 
need not imply that ETSs with different design features will not gain from trade 
in emissions rights. As Tuerk and others pointed out, ETSs with different design 
features could establish mutually beneficial linkages.635 As discussed in Chapter 5, 
for instance, differences concerning offset credit utilisation limits between linking-
partner ETSs do not undermine economic efficiency.636 Given different offset credit 
utilisation limits of the ETSs, linking merely allows shifting abatement to entities 
with the lowest abatement costs.
7.2. Linking and environmental effectiveness
Environmental effectiveness is a key attribute that gives permit trading an edge 
over price-based instruments such as pollution taxes. In its most basic sense, 
environmental effectiveness refers to whether an ETS achieves a predefined level 
of emissions reduction.637 In theory, a cap-and-trade system is environmentally 
effective.638 It puts an absolute limit on the amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions that regulated entities could emit in a given period by issuing a limited 
number of pollution permits and requiring the entities to surrender a pollution 
permit for every tonne of CO2 they emit over the specified period. Linking two or 
more cap-and-trade systems merely redistributes abatement between the systems, 
leaving aggregate emissions unaffected.
The conclusion that emissions trading, and by implication linking ETSs, is 
environmentally effective rests on the assumption that linking-partner ETSs have 
caps that are fixed ex ante and immune from adjustment ex post. The analyses in 
Chapter 3 (allowance allocation) and Chapter 4 (market stabilisation) showed that 
when either of the linking-partner ETSs allows an ex post adjustment of its cap, 
aggregate emissions under linking might exceed the level in autarky. The claim about 
635 Tuerk and others (n 612).
636 See text to notes 422–423 above in Chapter 5.
637 See SE Weishaar, Emissions Trading Design: A Critical Overview (Edward Elgar 2014) 40-41.
638 See, for instance, E Woerdman, Tradable Emissions Rights, in JG Backhaus (ed), The Elgar Companion 
to Law and Economics (Edward Elgar 2005) 367-368.
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the environmental effectiveness of linking ETSs further assumes that each linking-
partner ETS has a robust monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) standards 
and a credible compliance and enforcement system.
As discussed in Chapter 3, a bilateral link between an ETS with a fixed cap (EU 
ETS) and another that allows ex post adjustment of its cap (Australian CPM) may result 
in more (or less) aggregate emissions than a pre-linking scenario.639 The Australian 
CPM, which coupled the number of allowances firms receive free of charge to their 
level of production in a given period, rewarded firms for increasing their output.640 
The government distributed allowances at the beginning of each compliance period 
based on an estimation of firms’ level of production for the period.641 At the end 
of the compliance period, the number of freely allocated allowances are revised to 
account for firms’ actual production levels, resulting in an increase or a decrease in 
the number of allowances relative to the quantity initially distributed.642
Depending on whether linking between the EU ETS and the Australian CPM 
increases or decreases allowance prices in the latter, aggregate emissions under linking 
may be lower or higher than in autarky. If the bilateral link reduced allowance prices 
in the Australian CPM, aggregate emissions would be higher under linking than 
in autarky. A decrease in allowance prices in the Australian CPM reduces input 
costs for Australian firms, shifting the supply curve in the product market to the 
right. The post-linking equilibrium quantity of Australian firm’s products increases 
relative to the equilibrium quantity in autarky, requiring the Australian government 
to allocate more allowances than it would in autarky. The ultimate result is a level of 
emissions that exceeds the pre-linking level.643
The effect of the linking on environmental effectiveness would be the opposite 
639 See text to notes 269–270 above in Chapter 3.
640 Clean Energy Amendment Regulation, cls 906-907; Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 
2011 (Cth), ch 5.23 (hereafter: Explanatory Memorandum); Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a 
Clean Energy Future (n 616) 104-115.
641 Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy Future (n 616) 114.
642 Explanatory Memorandum, ch 5.23; Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy Future (n 
616) 114.
643 If Australia and the EU went ahead with their planned linking, the aggregate emissions of the Australian 
CPM and the EU ETS would be higher under linking than in autarky. The linking was expected to 
decrease Australian carbon prices, slashing Australian EITE firms’ input costs, incentivising them to 
expand output, and requiring the Austrian government to issue far more emissions allowances under 




if allowance prices in the Australian CPM increased due to linking. The rise in 
allowance prices increases input costs for Australian firms, shifting the supply 
schedule for the firms’ products to the left and decreasing firms’ output relative 
to autarky. The fall in firms’ output means that the Australian government would 
allocate fewer number of allowances than it would in autarky, resulting in lower 
aggregate emissions under linking.
The analysis in Chapter 4, focusing on the market stabilisation measures of 
the EU ETS and the Korean ETS, further illustrates how linking might undermine 
environmental integrity when either of the linking-partner ETSs allows an ex post 
adjustment of its cap.644 The Korean ETS aims to control allowance price spikes 
by, inter alia, setting a temporary price ceiling.645 By setting a price ceiling, the 
government increases the supply of allowances either by selling allowances at the 
ceiling price, allowing firms to comply with their obligation through the payment 
of the ceiling price in lieu of surrendering allowances, or allocating additional 
allowances from an allowance reserve pool.646 Whichever approach is followed, 
in a post-linking world, the Korean government would need to address a surge in 
demand not only from its own regulated entities but also from entities in its linking-
partner ETSs. This would require the government to issue far more allowances than 
it would in autarky, leading to more emissions under linking than in autarky.647
The environmental integrity of an ETS has also come to be associated with 
whether emissions units accepted as instruments of compliance by the ETS represent 
real, permanent and verifiable emissions reductions, which in turn depends on the 
robustness of MRV standards.648 The controversy over the use of offset credits for 
644 See text to notes 340–343 above in Chapter 4.
645 Allocation and Trading Act, art 23; Enforcement Decree of the Allocation and Trading Act, art 30.
646 See text to notes 342–343 above in Chapter 4.
647 It is also plausible to argue that linking ETSs, by increasing liquidity and reducing price volatility, 
may reduce the need for using a price ceiling as a market stabilisation measure. As a result, aggregate 
emissions under linking could be lower than in autarky. On the other hand, linking ETSs also creates 
contagion of localised price shocks from one ETS to linking-partner ETSs, requiring linking-partner 
jurisdictions to use market stabilisation measures more frequently than under a pre-linking scenario. 
See the discussion in Section 7.3 below.
648 See A Prag, G Briner and C Hood, ‘Making Markets: Unpacking Design and Governance of Carbon 
Market Mechanisms’ (2012) 21, Climate Change Expert Group Paper No. 2012(3), OECD/IEA 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k43nhks65xs-en> accessed 4 September 2016. See also T Tietenberg, 
‘The Tradable Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons’ in E Ostrom and others (eds) The 
Drama of the Commons (National Academies Press 2002) 200-201.
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compliance purposes centre on whether the credits represent additional, permanent 
and verifiable emissions reductions.649 These concerns are reflected in several ETS’s 
restrictions on the use of offset credits for compliance purposes.650 Because the 
restrictions on the use of offset credits vary from one ETS to another, their implication 
for linking ETSs have been examined in the linking literature. The literature suggests 
that they constitute significant impediments to linking.651 A bilateral link between 
an ETS that bans certain types of offset credits and another that accepts these credits, 
so the argument goes, creates a ‘backdoor problem’ whereby the latter system is 
used to circumvent the restrictions of the former, undermining its environmental 
effectiveness.
As explained in Chapter 5, the logic behind the ‘backdoor problem’ is 
misleading. First, with or without linking, offset credits that do not represent 
additional, permanent and verifiable emissions reductions will continue to be used 
in ETSs across the world.652 As climate change knows no national borders, it is 
irrelevant whether those offset credits are used with in a (sub)national ETS or a 
linked carbon market. Second, even if it is possible to envisage cases in which linking 
ETSs might lead to a worse environmental outcome relative to autarky, this depends 
on the types of assumptions one makes about firms’ compliance behaviour and the 
effect of linking on allowance prices of the linking-partner ETSs.653 For instance, 
linking ETSs with different credit utilisation limits will not lead to more aggregate 
emissions than in autarky if we assume that firms in both linking-partner ETSs fully 
utilise their credit quota in autarky.654
Under a different set of assumptions, one will arrive at a different conclusion. 
Assume, for instance, that, in autarky, entities covered under one ETS (ETS-A) 
exhaust their credit limits while entities covered under a linking-partner ETS 
(ETS-B) use up only part of their credit utilisation quota. If allowance prices rise in 
649 See, for instance, DM Driesen, ‘Linkage and Multilevel Governance’ (2009) 19 Duke Journal of 
Comparative & International Law 389, 399-401.
650 See the discussion in Section 5.3 above in Chapter 5.
651 See, for instance, Tuerk and others (n 612) 346-348; J Jakob-Gallmann, Regulatory Issues in the 
Carbon Market: The Linkage of the Emissions Trading System of Switzerland with the Emissions Trading 
Scheme of the European Union (Schulthess 2011) 140-142; House of Commons Energy and Climate 
Change Committee, Linking Emissions Trading Systems (HC 2014-15, HC 739) 14.
652 See text to notes 419–421 above in Chapter 5.
653 See text to notes 422–423 above in Chapter 5.




ETS-A and fall in ETS-B following linking, the demand for offset credits will likely 
rise in ETS-A and fall in ETS-B.655 The post-linking level of emissions may increase 
relative to the level of emissions in autarky if the rise in demand for offset credits 
from ETS-A is greater than the fall in demand (increase in supply) from ETS-B. The 
thrust of the preceding analysis is that it is not a given that different offset provisions 
undermine environmental integrity.
7.3. Linking and domestic policy objectives
While cost effectiveness and environmental effectiveness could be considered as the 
overarching objectives of an ETS, they are by no means the only policy objectives 
that guide ETS design. Cap-and-trade systems are often charged with achieving 
additional goals including raising government revenue, ensuring economic growth 
and incentivising investment in clean technologies.656 The attempt to address multiple 
goals raises a daunting issue of how to balance competing societal interests in ETS 
design.657 From the perspective of linking ETSs, the relevant question concerns 
whether and how additional policy priorities of linking-partner jurisdictions might 
affect (be affected by) linking.
First, pursuing additional policy priorities, while legitimate, might come at the 
cost of undermining environmental integrity and economic efficiency. For instance, 
Australian CPM’s production-based allocation system caters for competitiveness 
and carbon leakage concerns, thereby reducing the impact of carbon pricing on 
economic growth.658 Similarly, The EU ETS’s ban on CDM credits from non-
LDCs aims at redirecting funds from advanced developing countries (such 
as Brazil, China and India), which have hosted and benefited from most of the 
655 Since offset credits are substitutes for ‘regular’ emissions allowances, an increase (a decrease) in the 
price of the ‘regular’ allowances will increase (decrease) the demand for offset credits.
656 Weishaar, Emissions Trading Design (n 637) 42-48.
657 Weishaar, Emissions Trading Design (n 637) 39.
658 The Australian CPM’s allocation system constitutes a de facto production subsidy. See D Burtraw 
and others, ‘The Effect of Allowance Allocation on the Cost of Carbon Emission Trading’ (2001) 
29, Resource for the Future Discussion Paper 01-30 <http://www.rff.org/RFF/documents/RFF-
DP-01-30.pdf> accessed 8 December 2015; RN Stavins and J Jaffe, ‘Linking Tradable Permit Systems 
for Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Opportunities, Implications, and Challenges’ (IETA 2007) 37, 
Report for International Emissions Trading Association <http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/
IETA_Linking_Report.pdf> accessed 7 December 2015.
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CDM projects,659 to LDCs, thereby supporting sustainable development efforts of 
the latter.660 The preferential treatment accorded to credits generated domestically 
(over international credits) in the Australian, Chinese and Korean ETSs encourage 
emissions abatement within domestic sources of pollution and broaden the carbon 
price signal to uncapped sectors.661 However, each of these come at the cost of 
reducing the efficiency or environmental integrity of the respective markets. The 
Australian CPM’s production-based allocation system undermines, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, both environmental integrity and economic efficiency.662 The restriction 
on the use of offset credits is antithetical to linking ETSs as a free trade ideal. It 
interferes with the price mechanism of allocating emissions abatement to whichever 
firm that is able to achieve it at the lowest abatement cost, thereby reducing the cost-
effectiveness of an ETS.
Second, linking ETSs might undermine the realisation of some policy priorities. 
The analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 showed, for instance, how the linking between the 
Australian CPM and the EU ETS undermined some of Australia’s policy priorities.663 
The linking, which lead to the abolition of the CPM’s price floor and the consequent 
crashing of the CPM’s expected carbon price for 2015 from near A$30/tCO2 to 
A$12/tCO2, eroded the CPM’s relatively high carbon price signal and undermined 
Australia’s goal of incentivising long-term low-carbon investments.664 The price 
crash also slashed the government’s expected earnings from the sale of emissions 
allowances, reducing government funds available for the many schemes designed to 
transition Australia’s economy to a low-carbon future. The linking also discouraged 
abatement in sectors participating in the domestic offset programme – the Carbon 
Farming Initiative – not only by weakening the CPM’s price signal as a driver of 
abatement but also by ending the preferential treatment that CFI credits enjoyed 
659 China, India and Mexico have hosted approximately a disproportionate 85 per cent of the CDM 
projects. African countries, by contrast, have hosted a meagre 4.4 per cent of the CDM projects. See 
UNEP DTU (United Nations Environment Programme Danish Technical University), ‘Content of 
CDM/JI Pipeline Database 1 December 2016’, <http://cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-region.htm> 
accessed 26 December 2016.
660 See text to note 424 above in Chapter 5.
661 R Trotignon, ‘Combining Cap-and-Trade with Offsets: Lessons from the EU-ETS’ (2011) 12 Climate 
Policy 273.
662 See the discussion in Section 3.4.2 (A and C) above in Chapter 3.
663 See text to notes 425–426 above in Chapter 5 and text to notes 606–608 above in Chapter 6.




prior to the linking arrangement.665
Third, mechanisms of realising additional policy priorities might become 
less effective under linking than in autarky. Chapter 4 illustrated this point by 
outlining the difficulties of implementing the Korean ETS’s price floor through an 
auction reserve price or a government buyback scheme – alternative approaches to 
implementing a price floor.666 Linking ETSs creates regulatory inflexibility because 
it requires each linking-partner jurisdiction to cede some control over its climate 
policy, making some policy responses contingent on linking-partner jurisdictions 
acquiescence.667 Even if we assume away challenges arising from the issue of shared-
sovereignty, linking will render an auction reserve price ineffective and a government 
buyback scheme costly, both relative to a pre-linking scenario. An auction reserve 
price would not establish a floor price in autarky because the share of auctioned 
allowances in the Korean ETS is too small to guarantee a minimum carbon price.668 
Linking the Korean ETS with the EU ETS will compound the problem because 
the EU ETS lacks a similar system of setting reserve prices at auctions. Similarly, 
the financial burden of implementing a price floor through a government buyback 
scheme swells with linking because the Korean government must buy allowances 
coming (also) from the EU ETS.
Fourth, different policy priorities of linking-partner ETSs create political 
obstacles for linking. As explained in Chapter 4, Korea and the EU differ in their 
approaches towards stabilising their respective carbon markets.669 With a blend of 
price and quantity instruments and a broad discretion left for the EPAC, Korea’s 
approach to stabilising its ETS could be characterised as one of ‘keeping all options 
on the table’. The active involvement of the EPAC allows the government to keep a 
tight rein on carbon prices and control the economic effects of the ETS. By contrast, 
the EU has built the MSR as a rule-based, non-discretionary and predictable 
mechanism. It has also shown an aversion to price-based instruments, casting them 
665 See text to note 425 above in Chapter 5.
666 See text to notes 348–350 above in Chapter 4.
667 R Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final Report (Cambridge University Press 2008) 
228. See also S Borghesi, M Montini and A Barreca, The European Union Emission Trading System and 
Its Followers: Comparative Analysis and Linking Perspectives (Springer 2016) 96.
668 See text to notes 348–349 above Chapter 4.
669 See text to notes 351–355 above in Chapter 4.
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as inherently incompatible with the EU ETS’s design as a quantity instrument.670 
In an EU-Korean carbon market, it will become difficult to reconcile Korea’s 
appetite for broad discretions with the EU’s goal of ensuring a rule-based system 
that leaves little or no discretion to policymakers. The EU is also likely to resist the 
idea of regulating prices directly through price floors and price ceilings. Although 
combining price and quantity instruments may make economic sense, politics may 
trump good economics.
7.4. Policy durability and linking
An ETS, as any public policy, faces risks of unravelling because of political uncertainty 
created by electoral politics and time-inconsistent incentives of policymakers.671 The 
durability of linking-partner ETSs is critical for a successful linking. A decision 
to delink or mere speculation about delinking, as Pizer and Yates showed, leads 
to a divergence in allowance prices between the linking-partner ETSs before the 
delinking occurs, increasing the costs of abatement.672 Applying a three-pronged 
theoretical framework focusing on commitment devices, policy feedback and 
political polarisation, we attempted to explain the durability of the EU ETS and the 
unravelling of the Australian CPM and what this means for linking ETSs in general.
The Australian CPM was designed with an eye on making it politically 
sustainable. The wider climate and energy policy reform, which the CPM was a 
part, and the CPM itself incorporated various mechanisms and institutional features 
that could help the CPM prosper in an uncertain political future. These include 
ingenious design features such as an independent Climate Change Authority and a 
rolling system of cap-setting that could make policy change cumbersome and foster 
credibility;673 revenue recycling schemes that could build new constituencies that 
670 COM (2014) 20 final, 21.
671 See generally T Moe, ‘The politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy’, in 
OE Williamson (ed), Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond (Oxford 
University Press 1990); KA Shepsle, ‘Discretion, Institutions and the Problem of Government 
Commitment’ in P Bourdieu and J Coleman, Social Theory for a Changing Society (Westview Press 
1991); P Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton University Press 
2004) 41-42.
672 See generally WA Pizer and AJ Yates, ‘Terminating Links between Emission Trading Programs’ (2015) 
71 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 142.
673 Climate Change Authority Act 2011 (No 143) 2011 (Cth), ss 10-13 (hereafter: Climate Change 




benefit from the CPM and reconfigure the interests of the CPM’s adversaries;674 and 
funding and investment schemes that could increase the costs of unravelling the 
CPM by creating sunk costs.675 The 2012 agreement between Australia and the EU 
to link their respective ETSs as of 2015 could also serve as an external institutional 
constraint, further increasing the costs of abolishing the CPM.676
In contrast, the EU ETS was not designed with the type of institutional 
constraints and investment schemes that accompanied the Australian CPM. If 
anything, its enactment was preceded by a successful opposition by both Member 
States and businesses to a carbon tax proposed by the European Commission in the 
early 1990s.677 In addition, the short history of the EU ETS has been dotted with 
various post-enactment challenges – from over-allocation to oversupply – that could 
erode support for the ETS and threaten its political sustainability.678
In practice, neither of the institutional constraints and funding and investment 
schemes was able to save the Australian CPM from unravelling, and the EU ETS 
manages to survive despite the many challenges it has faced over the years. Our 
analysis suggests a negative correlation between political polarisation over climate 
change policy, on the one hand, and effectiveness of institutional constraints and 
policy feedback, on the other. The pre-enactment politics of the Australian CPM 
is markedly different from that of the EU ETS. Australia has seen a highly partisan 
climate politics relative to the EU.679 This does not come as a surprise not least 
because political parties in nation states are likely to use climate change policy to 
Keenan and others, ‘Science and the Governance of Australia’s Climate Regime’ (2012) 2 Nature 
Climate Change 477.
674 See text to notes 576–578 above in Chapter 6.
675 See text to notes 579–582 above in Chapter 6.
676 Commission, ‘Australia and European Commission agree on pathway towards fully linking Emissions 
Trading Systems’ European Commission (Brussels, 28 August 2012) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-12-916_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 8 November 2016; S Brunner, C Flachsland and R 
Marschinski, ‘Credible Commitment in Carbon Policy’ (2012) 12 Climate Policy 255, 268; Pizer and 
Yates (n 672) 145.
677 A Jordan and T Rayner, ‘The Evolution of Climate Policy in the European Union: A Historical 
Overview’ in A Jordan and others, Climate Change Policy in the European Union: Confronting the 
Dilemmas of Mitigation and Adaptation? (Cambridge University Press 2010) 59; JB Skjærseth and J 
Wettestad, EU Emissions Trading: Initiation, Decision-Making and Implementation (Ashgate 2008) 32.
678 See text to note 564 above in Chapter 6.




carve out distinct profiles in the hope of gaining electoral advantages. In Australia 
too, both the Coalition and Labor have successfully used climate change policy 
for their respective electoral benefits.680 The supranational structure of the EU, by 
contrast, has shielded the EU ETS from being used as an electoral ploy.
Australia’s highly partisan climate politics afforded firms significant scope to 
resist the pricing of carbon, discouraged long-term investments specific to the CPM, 
and limited the effectiveness of the various funding and investment schemes in 
generating a cycle of positive policy feedback.681 Australia’s parliamentary system, 
which concentrates political power, makes initiating and reversing a policy easier. 
Because the two major political parties held opposite views on the CPM, the CPM 
suffered a credibility deficit, increasing firms’ payoff from opposing the CPM and 
discouraging long-term low-carbon investments.
By contrast, the relatively low political polarisation over climate policy in the 
EU, especially during the formative years of the EU ETS, helped not only in turning 
businesses’ historic animosity to carbon pricing into a cautious embrace of the EU 
ETS, but also in rescuing the EU ETS from potentially fatal post-enactment policy 
challenges.682 The EU ETS has also benefited from a stable agenda-setter – the 
Commission – that has historically used climate change policy to empower itself, 
deepen European integration and project EU’s soft power overseas.683
What have all these to do with linking ETSs? The analysis suggests how linking-
partner jurisdictions’ domestic politics might affect the design and structure of 
linking arrangements and the trade-offs involved in using linking as a mechanism 
of increasing the costs of unravelling an ETS. Whether linking ETSs serves as an 
effective external institutional constraint, thereby increasing the costs of unravelling 
the linking-partner ETSs, depends on several factors including the legal form and 
design of the linking agreement and the nature of climate change politics in the 
linking-partner jurisdictions.684 In a continuum between soft law and hard law 
680 See text to notes 493–498 above in Chapter 6.
681 See text to notes 584–587 above in Chapter 6.
682 See text to notes 588–593 above in Chapter 6.
683 Jordan and Rayner (n 677) 56; MA Schreurs and Y Tiberghien, ‘European Union Leadership in 
Climate Change: Mitigation through Multilevel Reinforcement’ in K Harrison and L Sundstrom 
(eds), Global Commons, Domestic Decisions: The Comparative Politics of Climate Change (The MIT 
Press 2010) 39.




instruments, exit costs increase as one moves from soft law to hard law instruments.685 
Although a linking agreement could be designed to impose high costs of exit, doing 
so leaves limited flexibility for the linking-partner jurisdictions to adapt to changing 
circumstances.686
Regarding the effect of political polarisation on the political sustainability of 
ETSs, the more polarised a linking partner’s domestic climate change politics, the 
higher the likelihood that its ETS might unravel. With a less polarised domestic 
politics on climate change, the risk of significant changes from the status quo is 
low, creating a conducive environment for a durable climate policy. If the linking is 
between ETSs with low political polarisation over climate policy, the linking-partner 
jurisdictions enjoy significant scope to structure the linking agreement without the 
need to worry about using the linking agreement to counter risks of policy reversal.
7.5. Looking ahead: the road from Paris
When linking ETSs was flouted in the early 2000s as a cost-effective way of 
achieving aggregate emissions reduction targets of linking-partner jurisdictions, the 
expectation was (and, to an extent, has been) that linkages would start at a bilateral 
level and, in time, expand by adding new members.687 Despite the fact that building 
a truly global carbon market through linking ETSs has proven more difficult than 
initially anticipated, interest in linking has not waned.688
International Law 579; T Ginsburg, ‘Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and 
International Law’ (2006) 38 International Law and Politics 707, 730-731; TL Meyer, Power, Exit 
Costs, and Renegotiation in International Law’ (2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal 379, 
393-396; LR Helfer, ‘Flexibility in International Agreements’ in JL Dunoff and MA Pollack (eds), 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art 
(Cambridge University Press 2011).
685 Meyer (684) 395-396.
686 Meyer (684) 394-396; Helfer (n 684).
687 For instance, when in 2009 the EU set out a goal of connecting carbon markets in the OECD by 
2015, the intuition was that the EU ETS would serve as a centre of gravity, attracting new ETSs and 
growing into a truly multilateral carbon market. Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: Towards a comprehensive climate change agreement in Copenhagen’ 
COM (2009) 39/3 final, 11.
688 For instance, Maroš Šefcovic, European Commission’s Vice President for Energy Union, reiterated 
in 2016 the EU’s readiness ‘to explore with (...) international partners like China, Quebec, Ontario, 
Manitoba, California and South Korea the possibilities of a global system of linked markets.’ See 
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The manner in which bilateral and multilateral linkages develop and evolve over 
time will affect the success of the bottom-up process of liberalising trade in emissions 
rights through linking ETSs. Existing linkages between the EU ETS and the Swiss 
ETS in Europe and that of Californian and Quebec ETSs in North America seem 
to suggest a trend in regionalism — a clustering of ETSs in a similar geographic 
zone into a regional ETS.689 Geographical closeness, strong trade ties and shared 
political institutions will likely facilitate the growth of regionally clustered ETSs.690 
If regionalism continues, it will raise a number of issues. The first issue concerns 
whether regionally clustered ETSs constitute, in trade theory terms,691 ‘building 
blocks’ or ‘stumbling blocks’ to the process of building a global carbon market from 
the bottom-up. As Garnaut suggests, regional ETSs could be welcomed as ‘natural 
stepping stones towards greater international integration.’692 On the other hand, 
regional ETSs may develop idiosyncratic institutional and governance architectures, 
further fragmenting the emissions trading landscape and making the move towards 
multilateralisation difficult.693
The second issue concerns how regional ETSs might evolve into something 
different, requiring exploring mechanisms of multilateralising regional ETSs. An 
ambitious approach of multilateralisation suggested by the World Bank Task Force to 
Catalyse Climate Action is the concept of ‘Networked Carbon Markets’ (NCM).694 
Under the NCM jurisdictions with ETSs voluntarily opt-in and submit their 
Carbon Pulse, ‘The EU Eyes Interlinked Carbon Markets from California to China’ Carbon Pulse 
(London, 25 February 2016) <http://carbon-pulse.com/16116/> accessed 03 June 2017. See also text 
to notes 41–43 above in Chapter 1.
689 The botched link between the EU ETS and the Australian CPM bucked this trend.
690 See generally M Betsill, ‘Regional Governance of Global Climate Change: The North American 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation’ (2007) 7 Global Environmental Politics 11; MA 
Mehling and E Haites, ‘Mechanisms for Linking Emissions Trading Schemes’ (2009) 9 Climate 
Policy 169.
691 J Bhagwati, ‘Regionalism versus Multilateralism’ (1992) 15 World Economy 535. See also RE 
Baldwin, ‘Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to Global 
Free Trade’ (2006) 29 World Economy 1451.
692 See Garnaut (n 667) 228.
693 See MA Mehling, ‘Legal Frameworks for Linking National Emissions Trading Systems’ in Carlarne 
CP, Gray KR and Tarasofsky RG (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law 
(Oxford University Press 2016) 275.
694 See, for instance, J Macinante, ‘Networking Carbon Markets: Key Elements of the Process’ (World 




emissions units for rating by private rating agencies for their ‘mitigation value’. The 
mitigation values will then be converted into exchange rates, allowing convertibility 
of different carbon currencies into one another. This approach has the potential 
to address linking challenges arising from differences in, for instance, the relative 
stringency of the linking-partner jurisdictions’ emissions reduction targets.695 It is 
unclear, however, why political-economy factors that make a conventional bilateral/
multilateral linking difficult will not bog down this approach. In addition, as Mehling 
points out, it will raise difficult political and fairness issues that have long slowed 
progress of climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).696 Multilateralising regional ETSs 
thus requires understanding the balance of political-economy forces that give rise to 
regionalism and how different approaches of multilateralisation affect the balance of 
interests that defined the move towards regionalism.
The Paris Agreement, a global climate deal agreed between 196 Parties in 
December 2015 in Paris, could facilitate the process of multilateralising regional 
ETSs. Article 6 of the Paris Agreement ‘recognises’ voluntary transfer of mitigation 
outcomes among Parties through ‘internationally transferred mitigation outcomes’ 
(ITMOs).697 Voluntary cooperation among Parties through the transfer of ITMOs 
has been interpreted to encompass all types of cooperation including linking different 
climate policy instruments such as command-and-control instruments, carbon taxes 
and ETSs, ushering a new era where diverse climate policy instruments could be 
linked to one another of ETSs.698 Moving beyond liking of ETSs and encompassing 
695 See Mehling (n 683).
696 See Mehling (n 683) 276.
697 Paris Agreement, opened for signature 22 April 2016 (entered into force 4 November 2016) art 6(1).
698 A Marcu, ‘Carbon Market Provisions in the Paris Agreement (Article 6), (January 2016) CEPS Special 
Report No 128 <https://www.ceps.eu/publications/carbon-market-provisions-paris-agreement-
article-6> accessed 7 September 2016, 4. Such a link could take three forms: (i) linking between ETSs 
(‘ETS-only’); (ii) linking between ETSs and carbon tax regimes (‘ETS-tax’); (iii) linking between ETSs 
and carbon tax systems with command-control instruments (‘ETS-tax-regulatory’). However, linking 
different climate policy instruments has its own risks. For instance, linking a quantity instrument such 
as an ETS and a price instrument such as a carbon tax raises environmental effectiveness concerns not 
least because, absent some form of quantitative restriction, an unlimited flow of credits/allowances 
from the tax system to the ETS will dilute the ETS’s price signal and turn it into a de facto tax scheme. 
See C Haug, M Frerk and M Santikarn, ‘Towards a Global Price on Carbon: Pathways for Linking 




other climate policy instruments allows greater coordination of climate change policy 
internationally, allowing countries to achieve their aggregate emissions reduction 
target at a lower cost.699
When countries cooperate through ITMOs, they are required to ‘promote 
sustainable development and transparency, … [and] apply robust accounting to 
ensure, inter alia, the avoidance of double counting.’700 The Agreement, however, 
specified neither the conditions nor the mechanisms of ensuring environmental 
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environmental integrity concerns associated with cross border trade in emissions 
allowances.
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Emissions trading constitutes an important component of several countries’ climate 
change policy arsenal. The number of emissions trading systems (ETSs) in force has 
risen from one in 2005 to 18 in 2017. The number is set to increase in the coming few 
years with several countries, most notably China, planning to launch their respective 
ETSs. Despite the proliferation of emissions trading as a preferred instrument of 
climate policy over the past decade, the global emissions trading landscape remains 
fragmented in that existing ETSs, save a handful of exceptions, are not linked and do 
not recognise each other’s emissions units as instruments of compliance.
Two or more ETSs establish bilateral/multilateral link by recognising each other’s 
emissions units as valid instruments of compliance, creating fungibility between the 
emissions units of the linking-partner ETSs. Economic theory suggests that linking 
ETSs leads to a more efficient allocation of resources relative to autarky. Allowance 
prices vary significantly across existing ETSS, reflecting differences in the costs of 
abatement that firms face in each jurisdiction. The different allowance prices also 
reflect potential welfare gains that could have been realised had trade in emissions 
allowances been allowed between the ETSs. The trade in emissions allowances 
equalises allowance prices (marginal costs of abatement) across the linking-partner 
ETS and lowers total costs of abatement compared to autarky. In short, linking 
ETSs benefits all linking-partner jurisdictions without affecting aggregate emissions.
The theoretical observation that linking ETSs enhances welfare assumes that the 
linking is between ‘properly’ designed ETSs that are themselves internally efficient 
in autarky. Because designing ETSs is a political process, ETSs reflect compromises 
between different constituencies in their relevant jurisdictions. They are also often 
charged with achieving policy goals other than realising some predefined emissions 
reduction targets cost-effectively. The political process of designing ETS, coupled 
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with political-economy conditions that vary across jurisdictions, has resulted in ETSs 
with heterogeneous system designs and different, if not inconsistent, policy priorities. 
Whether linking ETSs in practice achieves the aggregate emissions reduction targets 
of the linking-partner jurisdictions cost-effectively crucially depends on how the 
linking-partner ETSs are constructed, requiring a case-by-case analysis of the welfare 
effects of linking ETSs.
This dissertation analysed, following a law and economics approach, if and 
how linking ETSs affect welfare by using real-life ETSs as case studies. In doing so, 
the research focused on four issue areas – free allocation systems, offset provisions, 
market stabilisation measures, and policy durability. The economic efficiency and 
environmental effectiveness effects of each of the issues (except offset provisions) is 
examined in a bilateral linking scenario involving two of the following ETSs: the 
European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the Australian Carbon Pricing 
Mechanism (CPM), and the South Korean ETS. The analysis on offset provisions 
relies on a review of the offset policies of major ETSs currently in force. Although the 
analysis primarily focuses on assessing the economic efficiency and environmental 
integrity implications of linking ETSs, it also discusses the implications of linking 
ETSs for policy priorities of linking-partner jurisdictions.
The analysis shows why and how the manner in which linking-partner are 
constructed influences the effects of linking ETSs on both economic efficiency and 
environmental integrity. For instance, it shows that the Australian CPM’s and the 
EU ETS’s free allowance allocation systems discourage, in a bilateral linking scenario 
between the two ETSs, firms from shifting emissions abatement to the system with 
a lower marginal abatement cost. Also, the Australian CPM’s system of coupling 
the number of allowances a firm receives free of charge to, inter alia, its level of 
production in a given compliance period could lead to more aggregate emissions 
than a pre-linking scenario, thereby undermining environmental effectiveness. 
Similarly, the different market stabilisation measures of the EU ETS and the Korean 
ETS raise both efficiency and environmental integrity concerns.
The analysis also shows both the costs and difficulties of accommodating policy 
goals other than economic efficiency and environmental integrity in the context 
of linked carbon markets. For instance, although the EU ETS’s ban on Certified 
Emissions Reductions from credits from non-least developed countries (LDCs) 
supports sustainable development efforts of LDCs by redirecting funds from 




allocating emissions abatement to whichever firm that is able to achieve it at the 
lowest possible abatement cost, thereby reducing the cost-effectiveness of an ETS. 
Moreover, the benefits from linking ETSs might come at the cost of undermining 
some policy priorities of the linking-partner jurisdictions. For instance, the linking 
between the Australian CPM and the EU ETS, which resulted in the crashing of 
the CPM’s expected carbon price for 2015 and beyond, eroded the CPM’s relatively 
high carbon price signal, undermining Australia’s goal of incentivising long-term 
low-carbon investments.
Looking ahead, linking ETSs will likely form an essential component of 
international cooperation on climate change mitigation. It is however doubtful if 
a truly global carbon market would emerge from the bottom up process. Existing 
linkages suggest a trend in regionalism with ETSs in a similar geographic area 
clustering to form a linked carbon market. Although the emergence of regional 
ETSs could be seen as an important first step towards building a truly global carbon 
market, there is no guarantee that multilateralization will follow from regionalisation. 
It could very well happen that regionally clustered ETSs may develop idiosyncratic 
institutional and governance architectures, making further linkages between several 
regional ETSs difficult. The latter prospect raises an intellectual and policy challenge 





De handel in emissierechten is voor sommige landen een belangrijk element in het 
arsenaal aan beleidsmiddelen tegen klimaatverandering. Het aantal van kracht zijnde 
emissiehandelssysteem is toegenomen van één in 2005 naar achttien in 2017. Dit 
aantal zal de komende jaren verder toenemen nu diverse landen, waaronder China, 
ook emissiehandelssystemen hebben aangekondigd. De afgelopen tien jaar is de 
emissiehandel uitgegroeid tot voorkeursinstrument voor klimaatbeleid. Toch toont 
de emissiehandel wereldwijd gezien een versnipperd beeld; de regelingen (enkele 
uitzonderingen daargelaten) zijn niet gekoppeld en over en weer worden de emissie-
eenheden niet als nalevingsinstrument erkend.
Wanneer twee of meer emissiehandelssystemen bilateraal of multilateraal worden 
gekoppeld en ze elkaars emissie-eenheden als nalevingsinstrument erkennen, dan 
worden de emissie-eenheden onderling uitwisselbaar. Volgens de economische theorie 
leidt het koppelen van deze systemen tot een efficiëntere verdeling van middelen dan 
bij niet-gekoppelde systemen. De prijzen van de emissierechten in de verschillende 
systemen variëren sterk, omdat ondernemingen in verschillende rechtsgebieden te 
maken hebben met verschillen in kosten die de maatregelen voor emissiereductie 
met zich meebrengen. Deze prijsverschillen laten zien dat er een welvaartswinst kan 
worden verwacht als emissiehandel tussen de diverse systemen zou zijn toegestaan. 
De emissiehandel heeft een nivellerende werking op de prijzen van emissierechten 
(marginale emissiereductiekosten) bij de gekoppelde handelssystemen en leidt ook 
tot lagere algemene emissiereductiekosten dan bij afzonderlijke systemen. Kortom, 
als we handelssystemen koppelen is dat gunstig voor alle betrokken rechtsgebieden 
zonder dat dit de totale emissiehoeveelheid nadelig beïnvloedt.
De theoretische vaststelling dat het koppelen van handelssystemen 
welvaartswinst oplevert, veronderstelt dat de systemen naar behoren zijn opgezet; 
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dat wil zeggen, ze moeten ook afzonderlijk efficiënt functioneren. De ontwikkeling 
van emissiehandelsregelingen is een politiek proces en reflecteert ook compromissen 
die de verschillende belanghebbenden hebben gesloten in hun respectievelijke 
rechtsgebieden. Deze belanghebbenden zijn vaak belast met het behalen van andere 
beleidsdoelen dan het kosteneffectief realiseren van targets voor emissiereductie. 
Het politieke proces waarmee emissiehandelssystemen worden ontwikkeld, in 
combinatie met politiek-economische omstandigheden die per rechtsgebied 
verschillen, heeft geleid tot een heterogene verzameling systemen met verschillende 
of zelfs tegenstrijdige beleidsprioriteiten. Of koppeling van handelssystemen 
er in de praktijk toe leidt dat de totale emissiereductietargets van de gekoppelde 
rechtsgebieden kosteneffectief worden behaald, is in belangrijke mate afhankelijk 
van hoe de afzonderlijke systemen zijn opgezet. Daarom moet elke koppeling van 
handelssystemen afzonderlijk op welvaartseffecten worden geanalyseerd.
In deze dissertatie wordt via een juridisch-economische benadering geanalyseerd 
of en hoe de koppeling van emissiehandelssystemen de welvaart beïnvloedt. Dit 
gebeurt aan de hand van bestaande systemen. Het onderzoek richt zich op vier 
aandachtsgebieden: systemen van kosteloze toewijzing, compensatieregelingen, 
maatregelen voor marktstabilisatie en politieke duurzaamheid. Het effect dat elk 
van deze aandachtsgebieden (met uitzondering van compensatieregelingen) heeft 
op de economische doelmatigheid alsook de effectiviteit van reductiemaatregelen 
worden beoordeeld in een scenario waarin twee van de volgende systemen bilateraal 
worden gekoppeld: het European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), 
het Australische Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM) en het Zuid-Koreaanse ETS. 
De analyse van compensatieregelingen is gebaseerd op een beoordeling van het 
compensatiebeleid binnen belangrijke huidige emissiehandelssystemen. In de analyse 
worden vooral de economische doelmatigheid en de effectiviteit van emissiereductie 
van het koppelen van handelssystemen beoordeeld, maar ook de gevolgen die de 
koppeling heeft voor de politieke prioriteitstelling in de relevante rechtsgebieden.
Uit de analyse blijkt hoe en waarom de opzet van gekoppelde systemen invloed 
heeft op de gevolgen van koppeling van die systemen, zowel wat betreft economische 
doelmatigheid als effectiviteit van de emissiereductie. Zo blijkt dat bedrijven door de 
regelingen van kosteloze toewijzing in het Australische CPM en de EU ETS in een 
bilaterale koppeling worden ontmoedigd om hun emissiereductie over te hevelen naar 
het stelsel dat de laagste reductiekosten biedt. Ook kan het Australische CPM, waarin 




aan onder meer het productieniveau van dat bedrijf in een verplichtingsperiode, 
leiden tot hogere totale emissiewaarden dan in de periode voorafgaand aan de 
koppeling, wat de effectiviteit van de emissiereductie ondermijnt. Op vergelijkbare 
wijze worden zowel de economische doelmatigheid als de effectiviteit van de 
emissiereductie mogelijk nadelig beïnvloed door de verschillende maatregelen voor 
marktstabilisatie van het EU ETS en het Koreaanse ETS.
Daarnaast laat de analyse zien welke kosten en problemen zich aandienen zodra 
in de context van gekoppelde koolstofmarkten andere beleidsdoelen dan economische 
doelmatigheid en effectiviteit van de emissiereductie in ogenschouw worden 
genomen. Het verbod van het EU ETS op gecertificeerde emissiereducties (CER’s) 
uit “credits” van landen die niet tot de minst ontwikkelde landen (LDC’s) behoren 
ondersteunt de inspanningen op het gebied van duurzame ontwikkeling van LDC’s, 
doordat fondsen van meer ontwikkelde landen worden doorgegeven aan LDC’s. 
Dit verstoort echter het prijsmechanisme van de toewijzing van emissiereducties 
aan elke willekeurige onderneming die dat tegen de laagst mogelijke reductiekosten 
kan realiseren. Dit heeft op zijn beurt een nadelige invloed op de kosteneffectiviteit 
van de handelssystemen. Bovendien kan de koppeling van handelssystemen 
beleidsprioriteiten van de gekoppelde rechtsgebieden ondermijnen. De koppeling 
tussen het Australische CPM en het EU ETS leidde bijvoorbeeld tot een scherpe 
daling van de verwachte koolstofprijs van het CPM voor 2015, waardoor vervolgens 
het relatief hoge prijssignaal voor de koolstofprijs van het CPM erodeerde. Dit 
ondermijnde het Australische doel om investeringen voor lagere koolstofuitstoot op 
lange termijn te stimuleren.
In de toekomst zal koppeling van emissiehandelssystemen waarschijnlijk 
uitgroeien tot een zeer belangrijke factor in de internationale samenwerking bij 
de strijd tegen klimaatverandering. Het is echter twijfelachtig of dit bottom-up-
proces een daadwerkelijk wereldwijde koolstofmarkt zal opleveren. Bestaande 
koppelingen duiden op een trend richting regionalisme, waarbij handelssystemen 
in vergelijkbare geografische gebieden worden samengevoegd tot één koolstofmarkt. 
Hoewel de opkomst van regionale handelssystemen kan worden beschouwd als een 
eerste stap naar de ontwikkeling van een daadwerkelijk wereldwijde koolstofmarkt, 
is er geen garantie dat multilaterale koppelingen zullen ontstaan als gevolg van 
deze regionalisering. Het is heel goed mogelijk dat binnen regionaal geclusterde 
handelssystemen idiosyncratische institutionele structuren en beheersstructuren 
zich zullen ontwikkelen die verdere koppeling van meerdere regionale systemen 
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bemoeilijken. Dit laatste vooruitzicht vormt een intellectuele en politieke uitdaging: 
er moeten dan manieren worden gevonden om regionaal geclusterde handelssystemen 
multilateraal te koppelen.
